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Abstract
This thesis is about the role of housing as a consumption good and a risky asset,
and how it interacts with other choices like consumption, default, and migration
over the lifecycle.
In the first chapter the focus is on a quasi natural experiment in the State of
Nevada, which abolished deficiency judgments for purchase mortgage loans made
after October 2009. We test the eﬀect of the law change on mortgage supply and
demand, as well as on mortgage default. We find strong evidence that lenders
tightened their lending standards. Households, by contrast, neither increased their
mortgage applications, nor do they appear to have changed mortgage default be-
haviour.
The second chapter develops the theme of mortgage default and consumption
insurance in a more structural way. We estimate a model of consumption, housing
demand and labor supply when individuals may file for bankruptcy and default on
their mortgage over the lifecycle. Bankruptcy and mortgage default comply with
the basic institutional framework in the US, allowing for the choice between chapter
7 or chapter 13 bankruptcy.
The final chapter estimates a lifecycle model of consumption, housing choice
and migration in the presence of aggregate and regional shocks, using the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Using the model I estimate the value of
the migration option and the welfare impact of policies that may restrict mobility.
The option to move is equivalent to 4.4% of lifetime consumption. I also find that,
were the mortgage interest-rate deduction to be eliminated, the aggregate migration
rate would increase only marginally by 0.1%. In a new steady state the elimination
of the deduction is equivalent to an increase of 2.4% of lifecycle consumption.
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Introduction
This thesis is about the role of housing as a consumption good and a risky asset, and
how it interacts with other choices like consumption, default, and migration, over
the lifecycle. For the vast majority of consumers in developed economies, their home
is the single largest asset they possess. In most cases, purchase of the house goes
in hand with a longterm debt contract, i.e. a mortgage. The recent crisis painfully
reminds us about the implications of house price uncertainty together with mortgage
debt, and in this thesis I study some of those implications with the help of economic
models, which propose a theory of consumer behaviour, and which are confronted
with consumer data in empirical estimation exercises.
In the first chapter, which is joint work with Wenli Li, the focus is on a quasi
natural experiment in the State of Nevada, where the legislation concerning mort-
gage default was changed in late 2009. In particular, Nevada abolished deficiency
judgments for purchase mortgage loans made after October 2009 and collateralized
by primary single family homes. In the first chapter of this thesis, we test the eﬀect
of the law change on mortgage supply and demand, as well as on mortgage de-
fault. Using unique mortgage loan level application and performance data, we find
strong evidence that lenders tightened their lending standards in response to the
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law change. Particularly, lenders reduced approval rates and loan sizes for aﬀected
mortgages by about 5 percent. Households, by contrast, did not increase their mort-
gage applications because of the law change. More importantly, the law change did
not appear to have aﬀected mortgage default and house foreclosure outcomes. These
results thus cast a cautionary note on the eﬀectiveness of policy recommendations
that intend to use deficiency laws to curb mortgage defaults.
The second chapter, joint with Costas Meghir and Wenli Li, develops the theme
of mortgage default and consumption insurance in a more structural way. Looking
again at the United States, we analyse the role that diﬀerent legal frameworks
concerning consumer bankruptcy and mortgage default have on consumer welfare. In
order to do so, we estimate a rich model of consumption, housing demand and labor
supply in an environment where individuals may file for bankruptcy on unsecured
debt and default on their mortgage. Uncertainty in the model is driven by both
house price and income shocks, while bankruptcy and mortgage default comply
with the basic institutional framework in the US, allowing for the choice between
chapter 7 or chapter 13 bankruptcy. The model is estimated using micro data on
credit reports and mortgage performance, combined with individual level data from
the American Community Survey.
The final chapter is an extension of this theme into the migration literature.
I look at the impact being a homeowner on regional migration in the US, and
what the eﬀects of removing the mortgage interest deduction would be on mobility,
housing and welfare. In particular, I estimate a lifecycle model of consumption,
housing choice and migration in the presence of aggregate and regional shocks,
using the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Using the model
17
I estimate the value of the migration option and the welfare impact of policies
that may restrict mobility. The option to move is equivalent to 4.4% of lifetime
consumption. I also find that, were the mortgage interest-rate deduction to be
eliminated, the aggregate migration rate would increase only marginally by 0.1%.
Following a general equilibrium correction, house prices are reduced by 5%, which
results in a 1% increase in home ownership. In a new steady state the elimination
of the deduction is equivalent to an increase of 2.4% of lifecycle consumption.
Chapter 1
Recourse and Residential Mortgage
Market: The Case of Nevada
1.1 Introduction
In the United States, state laws govern residential mortgage defaults and house fore-
closure processes. In most states, mortgage loans are recourse loans, that is, lenders
can apply the diﬀerence between mortgage balance and proceeds from foreclosure
sales to debtors’ other assets or earnings. The state of Nevada changed its mortgage
default legislation in 2009 from recourse to non-recourse, and in this paper we use
the so-created quasi natural experiment to analyse the eﬀects on borrower default
as well as the response of lenders.
The extent and precise manifestation of lender recourse varies from state to
state.1 Regardless of this, theory predicts that recourse should deter default. This
1We refer the reader to Ghent and Kudlyak (2009) for a detailed description and categorization
of states into groups of recourse and non-recourse states.
18
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is because defaulting would put other assets of the debtor at risk through a so-called
deficiency judgment, which the lender could obtain in court against the borrower
(see Ambrose et al. (1997), and Corbae and Quintin (2015)). Empirically, however,
the findings regarding the relationship between default and legal provisions have
been mixed. For instance, Clauretie (1987) finds that whether a state allows for
deficiency judgments does not aﬀect mortgage default rates significantly, consistent
with the observation that deficiency judgments are not carried out much, if at all,
in practice. This is due to high costs associated with pursuing such judgments
(see Leland (2008), and Brueggeman and Fisher (2011)).2 By contrast, Ghent and
Kudlyak (2009) find lower default rates in recourse states, particularly for higher-
priced homes whose owners are likely to have other financial resources that can be
seized by mortgage lenders. Adding to this discussion, Guiso et al. (2013) illustrate
that response to the hypothetical survey question “would you default given a fall in
home equity of x%” is independent of whether the respondents state is recourse or
not. Many policy discussions have also centered on this provision. In an opinion
piece Feldstein (2008) makes the point that turning nonrecourse mortgage loans into
recourse loans may be an eﬀective way to solve the mortgage debt overhang problem
and, thus, the mortgage crisis following the 2008 drop in house prices.3
In this paper we show that the current debate on deficiency judgements as a
useful tool to curb mortgage defaults is incomplete and perhaps even misleading.
The reason for this is that borrowers and lenders respond to diﬀerences in regu-
lations. Without deficiency judgements, lenders may decide not to lend to riskier
2It’s costly and time consuming to persue deficiency judgments on foreclosures. Additionally,
debtors can file for bankruptcy and get rid of the unsecured deficiency debt.
3This suggestion has been controversial as summarized in Adam Levitin’s blog at
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/12/the-role-of-rec.html
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borrowers, lend less, or lend at higher interest rates. Borrowers may decide not to
apply for mortgages or apply for smaller ones. Analysis of the default behavior of
approved mortgage loans is, thus, subject to selection bias. In particular, a finding
that borrowers are less likely to default in states without deficiency judgements may
simply be because approved borrowers in those states are less risky.
To illustrate the point, we conduct a unique event study using proprietary mort-
gage loan level application and performance data. In 2009 Nevada, one of the crisis
states, made significant changes to its deficiency judgment law. For homeowners
who entered into a mortgage in conjunction with a purchase of a single family pri-
mary home after October 1, 2009, their mortgage lenders will not be able to pursue
a deficiency judgment, should the house be taken in a foreclosure. We test whether
lenders responded to the law change by altering their mortgage approval rates, mort-
gage loan size, and interest rate; We also test whether there were any changes in
mortgage applications or mortgage defaults on behalf of borrowers.
Our identification strategy uses both cross-sectional as well as time-series vari-
ation in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator. The cross-sectional diﬀer-
ence concerns primary single home purchase loans (henceforth “primary mortgages”)
versus refinanced loans, versus investment single family properties, and several other
mortgage loan types. The time diﬀerence simply compares primary mortgages before
and after the policy change. This identification strategy has an advantage over those
that rely exclusivley on cross sectional diﬀerences in state laws to detect the eﬀects
of recourse, because state laws exhibit very little variation over time in genereal.
The paper has three main results. First, we uncover evidence that lenders tight-
ened their lending standards by reducing approval rates and loan sizes for those
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aﬀected borrowers. More specifically, the abolishment of deficiency judgments for
primary mortgages leads to a reduction of about 5 percent in both mortgage ap-
proval rates and mortgage sizes. Mortgage interest rates for approved loans, on the
other hand, did not change in any statistically significant way. Second, we don’t find
that mortgage applications for purchase loans for one-to-four family owner-occupied
homes increased more than for similar mortgages made before the law change, and
similarly for refinance loans. Finally, we do not find that borrowers’ default behavior
responded to the change in Nevada law in any statistically significant way. What
is more, we do not find any evidence that the change in recourse law makes bor-
rowers’ default behavior more sensitive to home equity. Even though our results do
not dispute that mortgage deficiency judgments may still be a useful tool to reduce
mortgage defaults, they suggest that any such policy may be eﬀective by reducing
mortgage lending. Our paper thus casts a cautionary note on the promotion of
deficiency judgments as a tool to prevent mortgage defaults per se.
In addition to the researches cited above, our paper is also related to two other
strands of literature. The first is the literature that studies the impact of various
aspects of state laws on lending cost. For example, Clauretie and Herzog (1990)
and Ciochetti (1997) document greater lender costs in states that require judicial
foreclosure and statutory right of redemption. These findings are replicated in Mian
et al. (2011), who show that “states without a judicial requirement for foreclosures
are twice as likely to foreclose on delinquent homeowners.” Lin andWhite (2001) and
Jeremy Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) show that diﬀernt bankruptcy exemptions do
and do not aﬀect, respectively, whether a mortgage application was approved. Pence
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(2006) finds that lenders approve smaller loans in default-friendly states everything
else the same.
The second is the vast literature examining various aspects of mortgage bor-
rowers’ decision to default. Among the recent studies, Gerardi et al. (2007) and
Foote et al. (2008) focus on negative equity as an important condition for defaults
for mortgages originated in the state of Massachusetts. Bajari et al. (2008) and
Elul et al. (2010) study both negative home equity and illiquidity as two important
drivers of the rise in mortgage defaults during the recent crisis.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the law
change in Nevada and its potential impact on debtors and creditors. Section 1.3
presents our data sources. Section 1.4 reports our empirical analysis and section 1.5
concludes.
1.2 The Nevada Deficiency Judgment Law and Its
Impact
1.2.1 The Nevada Deficiency Judgment Law
Up until late 2009, the state of Nevada was a typical recourse state, allowing lenders
to pursue deficiency judgments. In practice this means that the lender was able to
pursue the borrower for the diﬀerence between the balance owed on a mortgage loan
and what the lender would sell the house for at auction within six months of the
auction having taken place.
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In October 2009, Nevada passed a law – Assembly Bill No. 471 – that made
significant changes to Nevada’s deficiency judgments law. Under the new legislation,
a financial institution holding a residential mortgage may not be awarded a deficiency
judgment under the following circumstances: (1) the real property is a single-family
house owned by the debtor; (2) the debtor used the money loaned from the bank
to buy the house (as in a typical mortgage); (3) the house was owner-occupied; and
(4) the loan was never refinanced. What this means is that, for many homeowners
who enter into a mortgage in conjunction with a purchase after October 1, 2009,
their mortgage lender will not be able to pursue a deficiency judgment should the
house be taken in a foreclosure. Rather, upon foreclosure, the risk that the house
has depreciated in value shifts back to the bank. Mortgages that do not satisfy these
conditions continue to be subject to the prior law, i.e. loans issued before October
2009 continue to be recourse loans.4
1.2.2 The Impact of Deficiency Judgments on Mortgage
Lending, Borrowing, and Default
The impact of the deficiency law on borrowers’ default behavior hinges crucially
on the borrowers’ non-housing assets. If the borrower has other assets that can
be collected after house foreclosure, then the permission of deficiency judgment
will deter the borrower from becoming seriously delinquent. The more assets the
4Aside from recourse, in Nevada, lenders may foreclosure on mortgages in default using either
a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure process. The judicial process of foreclosure involves filing a
lawsuit to obtain a court order to foreclosure and is used when no power of sale is present in
the mortgage. The borrower has 12 months after the foreclosure sale to redeem the property.
When a power of sale clause exists in a mortgage or deed of trust, the non-judicial process is used.
Borrowers have no right of redemption under the power of sale.
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borrower has, the stronger the deterrence will be. Another important factor that
aﬀects the impact of the deficiency law on borrowers’ default behavior is the cost of
collecting deficiency judgments on behalf of the lenders. If their cost is high, then
the eﬀect of the policy will be smaller. Finally, in a dynamic setting, future local
house price movement, borrower’s income, and the cost of defaulting (less access to
future credit) will all factor into borrowers’ decision. See Ghent and Kudlyak (2009)
and Corbae and Quintin (2015) for more discussion.
If lenders are not allowed to collect on debtors’ other assets, they will be reluctant
to foreclose on the house, especially when foreclosure costs are high, because there is
no financial gain from doing so. Furthermore, if lenders perceive default probabilities
to rise as a result of the elimination of deficiency judgments, they will tighten their
lending standards by lending to less risky people, lending smaller amount of loans,
or lending at higher mortgage rates. Borrowers, on the other hand, may decide to
apply for mortgages when they otherwise would not habe, or apply for larger loans,
if they do not risk their other assets in the event of being foreclosed.
Based on this simple theory, we seek to test several hypothesis. First, are lenders
less willing to lend, lend a smaller amount, or lend at higher rates to primary single
family purchase mortgage loans after October 2009? Second, do borrowers apply
for more and/or larger primary single family purchase mortgage loans after October
2009? Finally, are single family primary mortgage loans made after October 2009
more likely to become delinquent than single family loans made earlier? Are lenders
less likely to foreclose on a single family property with loans originated after October
2009 than other loans?
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1.3 Data and Empirical Methodologies
1.3.1 Data and Data Sampling
We use two main data sets. The first is data collected in accordance with the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), covering almost all mortgage applica-
tions as well as originations in US. It records each applicant’s final status (de-
nied/approved/originated), purpose of borrowing (home purchase/refinancing/home
improvement), occupancy type (primary residence/second or investment homes),
loan amount, race, sex, income, as well as lender institution.5 HMDA is available
through the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
The second dataset is the LPS Applied Analytics, Inc. data, which provides
information from homeowners’ mortgage applications concerning their financial sit-
uation, characteristics of the property, terms of the mortgage contract, and infor-
mation about securitization, plus updates on whether homeowners paid in full or
defaulted, whether lenders started foreclosure and whether the home was sold in
foreclosure. LPS covers some two-thirds of installment-type loans in the residential
mortgage servicing market for the post-2005 period that we are analyzing. LPS is
a proprietary dataset purchased by the Federal Reserve System.
Both data are then merged with county level monthly unemployment rates ob-
tained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and monthly zip code level house price
index available from CoreLogic. When the zip code house price index is not avail-
able due to low transaction volume, we substitute with the county level house price
5Only lenders who doe not do business in any metropolitan statistical area are not required
report (e.g., small community banks) to HMDA.
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index; in case the county level house price index is not available either, we use the
Nevada state house price index.
We use HMDA to examine lenders’ mortgage loan approval decision and mort-
gage loan size decision, and to detect whether there is any changes in mortgage ap-
plications for the aﬀected mortgages after the implementation of the new deficiency
judgment law. As our benchmark, we restrict the sample to first lien mortgages
made in Nevada for one-to-four family properties around October 2009 – six months
before and after, as well as one year before and after.6 We delete those applica-
tions that are withdrawn without an approval decision or closed for incompleteness.
We also drop all loans insured by Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Veterans
Administration (VA) or Farmers Home Administration (FmHa) because deficiency
judgments are prohibited on FHA loans and strongly discouraged on VA and FmHa
loans. We also drop mortgage loans with private mortgage insurance as in Ghent
and Kudlyak (2009) and loans for manufacturing housing.
We use LPS to analyze lenders’ interest rate decision conditional on mortgage
loan approval, borrowers’ default behavior, and lenders’ foreclosure decision. We
focus on first lien mortgages for single family properties made in Nevada around
October 2009 and follow the performance of these loans till the end of 2012. As
with the HMDA data, we delete from the sample loans insured by the government
including FHA, VA, and FmHa and loans with private mortgage insurance.
6HMDA does not distinguish single family properties from two-to-four family properties.
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1.3.2 Empirical Methodology
We use various regression techniques to study the impact of the deficiency law change
in Nevada on lenders as well as borrowers’ behavior. As mentioned earlier, mortgage
loan application approval decision and mortgage loan size come from HMDA. For
the hypothesis regarding borrowers’ mortgage application decision, we aggregate the
data to the county level and by purpose of the loan – whether the loan is for purchase
or refinance. We measure borrowers’ default behavior by becoming for the first time
60 days or more delinquent, and 90 days or more delinquent as reported by LPS.
The measurement of foreclosure decision comes from the same source. Note that
foreclosure is a legal process in which a lender attempts to recover the balance of
a loan from a borrower who has stopped making payments to the lender by forcing
the sale of the asset used as the collateral for the loan. We thus treat foreclosure as
a lender’s decision rather than a borrower’s. Mortgage interest rate at origination
also comes from LPS.
Our identification comes from the interaction of two terms, whether the loan is
a purchase loan for single family homes and whether the loan is made after October
2009. We construct a binary variable Zit that acts as a treatment indicator for loan
i in year t, according to the following rule, where the function m(i) gives the type
of mortgage i, and where t⇤ is October 2009.
Zit =
8>><>>:
1 if m(i) = primary and t   t⇤
0 else
(1.1)
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This setup implies that our control group is a composite of primary mortgages taken
out before t⇤, and other mortgage types taken out over the entire period. Recall
that only mortgages of type primary are aﬀected by the law change. In the baseline
version of the model, we only consider refinance mortgages as other mortgage types.7
A generic regression in our analysis then takes the following form,
yit = ↵Zit +  Xit + "it, (1.2)
where yit is the outcome variable of interest, Zit is the treatment indicator discussed
above, and Xit is a vector of control variables. For the HMDA data, Xit includes
the gender of the applicant, race, income, whether the applicant comes from an area
with 30 percent or more minorities, whether the lender is a commercial bank or its
subsidiary, independent mortgage bank, thrift, or credit union. When we aggregate
the data to test for trend in mortgage application, we can no longer control for
any mortgage loan level or applicant level information. Instead, Xit will include
county unemployment rates and zip code house price growth rates. For the LPS
data, it includes borrowers’ credit score at origination and mortgage loan contract
information such as mortgage loan age, loan to value ratio at origination, whether
the loan has full documentation, of fixed interest rate, the level of the current interest
rate, and whether the loan is sold to private investors.8 For tests on mortgage lending
and mortgage default, we further control for county fixed eﬀects, monthly time fixed
eﬀects, and separate linear time trends from each county. The tests on mortgage
7Given rich information contained in the data, we will conduct robustness analysis using other
information such as primary versus investment purchase loans as identification.
8We observe virtually no subprime loans, and very few interest only and balloon mortgage loans
during our sample period.
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demand, due to limited sample size after aggregation, include county fixed eﬀects,
a linear time trend and its square. Finally, we cluster standard errors at the loan
level.
We use ordinary least square regressions (OLS) when the dependent variable yit
is continuous and Probit regression when the dependent variable is binary. When
testing for mortgage loan size, we use Tobit analysis because the data are censored
in the sense that rejected loans eﬀectively have zero loan amount. As an alternative,
we also use Heckman’s test to control for selection bias. Unfortunately, LPS does
not include any rejected loans, we thus use OLS for our interest rate analysis.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis consists of three parts. First, we investigate how lenders
respond to the deficiency law change in terms of mortgage loan approval rates, loan
sizes, and interest rates. Then we examine whether borrowers respond to the law
change with regard to loan applications. Finally, we study the relationship between
changes in deficiency judgments and mortgage default and house foreclosure.
1.4.1 Mortgage Lending
We use three measures for lending standards: mortgage approval rates, approved
mortgage loan sizes, and interest rates of approved mortgage loans. As discussed
earlier, we use HMDA data for the analysis on approval rates and mortgage loan
sizes and LPS data for the test on mortgage interest rates.
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1.4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for the HMDA sample. For the six months
before and after October 2009, there are in total 27, 889 mortgages originated for
one-to-four family primary residence with no government guarantee or private in-
surance. Of the 27, 889 applications, 72 percent are for refinance. About 9 percent
of the applications are aﬀected by the change in deficiency judgments. The overall
mortgage approval rate is 66 percent. About 70 percent of the applications are filed
by male. Close to 80 percent of the applicants are white and a little over 2 percent
are black. Nearly half of the applications have cosigners. There exists substantial
income disparity among the applicants with the average (nominal) income at appli-
cation at $106, 000 and the median income at $73, 000. The average loan amount
is $222, 000 and the median is $183, 000. About 3 percent of the applicants live
in areas with over 30 percent of the residents are minorities. The majority of the
applications are filed at commercial banks (65 percent), followed by independent
mortgage banks (19 percent), thrifts (9 percent), and credit unions (5 percent). Un-
employment rates are high in all counties of Nevada with both mean and median at
over 12 percent. House prices declined for most of the state during that period.
Table 1.2 reports summary statistics for the LPS sample. Between April 2009
and April 2010 excluding October 2009, 10,987 mortgage loans are made for first
lien single family primary mortgages without government guarantees or private in-
surance. Note that this number is somewhat smaller than the 18,406 approved
mortgage loans calculated from HMDA. This is because we delete from LPS sample
mortgages with private insurance and 2-to-4 family mortgages while such informa-
tion is not available in HMDA. Including these two categories add a little over 1,000
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observations to the sample. The remaining diﬀerences comes from the imperfect
coverage of LPS data of the Nevada market.
Of the 10,987 mortgages, 45 percent are for refinance. This number is substan-
tially lower than the 72 percent at application indicating that mortgage approval
rates are lower for refinance mortgages during that period. About 5 percent of the
mortgages are aﬀected by the law change. The mean interest rate at origination
is 4.98 percent and the median is 4.88 percent and almost all of the mortgages are
fixed-rate mortgages (over 98 percent). The mean credit score at origination is 717
and the median is 771.9 About 41 percent of the mortgages have full documentation.
A mere 2 percent are jumbo mortgages, 18 percent are sold to private investors. Fi-
nally, the unemployment rates are about 12.3 percent on average and almost all
areas experience recent monthly house price decline of about 1 percentage point on
average.
1.4.1.2 Results
Approval and Loan Size. We chart the raw data for mortgage approval
rates and approved average mortgage loan sizes measured as deviations from their
respective October 2009 values in figures 1.1 and 1.2. Figure 1.1 indicates that loan
approval rates seem to be trending up for unaﬀected refinance loans while stayed
more or less flat for aﬀected purchase loans. For approved mortgage sizes, the
pattern is less clear.
We conduct two analysis using HMDA. The first is a Probit analysis where the
dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the loan is approved and zero otherwise.
9The credit score system used by LPS ranges from 300 to 850.
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The second is a Tobit analysis where the dependent variable is the actual loan
amount for approved loans and zero for rejected loans. We report the regression
results in table 1.3. The key variable, one-to-four family purchase loans made after
October 2009, contributes negatively and statistically significantly to lenders’ ap-
proval rate as well as mortgage loan size upon approval. In particular, a one-to-four
family mortgage purchase loan made after October 2009 has an approval rate that
is 3.71 percentage points lower than that of a similar loan made earlier or a single
family refinance loan, or 5.62 percent less likely to be approved and the loan size is
$10, 447, or 4.71 percent smaller after approval than loans not aﬀected.
In terms of the other control variables, for approval rates, all else equal a re-
finance mortgage loan is about 19 percent less likely to be approved. This result
is likely due to the fact that loans made earlier during housing booms are of lower
standards and are thus less likely to be approved for refinance once lenders tighten
their lending standards after the crisis. As expected, higher income increases the
probability of being approved while higher loan amount reduces the probability of
being approved. Specifically, a $1000 increase in income raises the approval rate by
about 2 basis points while a $1000 increase in loan amount reduces the approval
rate by about 3 basis points. Living in minority areas substantially lowers the ap-
proval rates. Non-white, female, and applicants without cosigners all have much
lower mortgage approval rates. Lending institutions also aﬀect loan approval rates.
In particular, compared with specialized mortgage banks, commercial banks are less
likely to approve mortgages while credit unions are more likely to approve.
In terms of loan size of approved mortgages, refinance loans are on average
$66, 000 smaller. Applicants with higher income borrow more with a $1000 in-
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crease in income corresponding to about $317 increase in loan size. Borrowers
living in minority areas get smaller loans, as do non-white, female applicants, or
applicants without cosigners. Compared with mortgage banks, commercial banks
approve smaller loans while thrifts and credit unions giving out larger loans. Higher
local unemployment rates reduce loan sizes.
Interest Rate To further investigate whether lenders lend at higher interest
rates to borrowers aﬀected by the change in the deficiency law, we run an ordinary
least squares regression (OLS) using LPS for loans made between April 2009 and
April 2010 excluding October 2009. The results are reported in table 1.4.
According to our analysis, interest rates on first lien single family primary pur-
chase mortgage loans made after October 2009 are not statistically diﬀerent from
those made after October 2009 or first lien single family primary refinance mortgage
loans. This could stem from our earlier results that the approved first lien single
family purchase loans are already of relatively higher quality and relatively smaller
size after October 2009.
For the other control variables, mortgage rates for refinance loans are, on average,
about 11 basis points lower. An increase of 10 percentage points in mortgage loan-
to-value ratio raises the interest rate by about 3 basis points. An increase of 10 in
credit score, on the other hand, reduces the interest rate by about 2 basis points.
Loans sold to private investors and loans with adjustable-rate mortgages all have
lower interest rates but jumbo mortgages have higher interest rates. Finally, areas
with high local unemployment rates also face higher mortgage interest rates.
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1.4.1.3 Robustness Analysis
Approval Rate and Mortgage Loan Size To test the robustness of our
results on mortgage loan approval rate and mortgage loan size, we conduct four
additional analysis. First, we use the Heckman model to adjust for selection bias.
Then we extend our sample to include loans made between October 2008 and Oc-
tober 2010, but excluding October 2009, exactly one year before and one year after
the deficiency law change. As another exercise we include investment single family
property loans as part of the control group for the primary single property purchase
loans that are aﬀected by the law change. Finally, we conduct two placebo tests,
one assuming the law change occurred in April 2008 and the other assuming the law
change occurred in April 2011. The results are reported in Table 5, where we display
the value of the main coeﬃcient of interest, “purchase loan made after reform “, for
each model.
The Heckman model generates a much bigger eﬀect on approval rates, a 10
percent reduction in approval rates, but the eﬀect on loan size is roughly unchanged
from the benchmark. Extending the benchmark sample to include loans made one
year before October 2009 and one year after, on the other hand, produce much
larger eﬀects on both approval rates and approved mortgage loan sizes. Particularly,
the approval rates are reduced by close to 9 percentage points and the loan size is
reduced by about $24, 000. Including investment property loans does not change the
benchmark results by nearly as much. Tests using the two placebo dates generate
very diﬀerent results from the benchmark. For both fake dates, the eﬀects on both
mortgage approval rates and mortgage loan sizes are statistically significant but have
positive signs. All these experiments thus confirm that after the change in deficiency
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judgement law, lenders tightened their lending standards in terms of loan approval
rates and loan size for aﬀected borrowers.
Mortgage Interest Rate For mortgage interest rates, we conduct three ro-
bustness tests, extending the sample by including loans made one year before and
one year after the deficiency law change, including investment properties, and in-
cluding multifamily properties, respectively. The results are presented in Table 6.
Compared with the results on mortgage approval rates and mortgage loan sizes,
the results on mortgage interest rates turn out to be less robust. Lenders actually
reduce interest rates for aﬀected mortgages in the longer sample regression and the
regression including investment properties. These results are plausible because, as
pointed out earlier, the new purchase loans made after October 2009 are of higher
quality and small sizes.
1.4.2 Mortgage Application
In this subsection, we test mortgage applicant’s behavior. Theory predicts that
those that are aﬀected by the change in the deficiency law should increase their
demand for mortgages after the law change. Using the constructed HMDA sample,
we calculate by month, county, and loan type (purchase versus refinance), the total
number and value of mortgages made for one-to-four family houses. Figure 1.3
charts the demand in average loan sizes as deviations from its October 2009 level.
As can be seen, compared with the average loan size of purchase mortgages, there
is a downward trend in average refi loan sizes.
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In our regression analysis, we regress the number of applications or the amount
applied for on the key variable identifying loans that are aﬀected by the law change,
whether the loans are refinanced loans, average income of the MSA, the fraction
of MSAs that have over 30 percent minorities, lagged average local unemployment
rates, lagged average local house price growth rates, a time trend and its square,
and, finally, county dummies.10 The regression results are reported in table 1.3.
As can been seen, there does not appear to exist a structural break for loan
applications for one-to-four primary purchase mortgage loans after October 2009 in
terms of total number and dollar amount of mortgage applications and the average
size of mortgage applications. Regarding other control variables, refi loans explain
a large fraction of total loan demand. County dummies (not reported) that cap-
ture applicant as well as local characteristics beyond those already included in the
regressions also play important roles
Robustness Analysis We conduct two additional robustness tests, expanding
sample periods to one year before and after the law change and include loans for
investment properties. According to the results reported in table 1.8, we do not
detect any trend break in demand for single family primary purchase mortgages
after October 2009.
1.4.3 Mortgage Default and House Foreclosure
This subsection seeks to test whether primary mortgage borrowers that borrowed
after October 2009 are more likely to default and whether lenders are less willing to
10We chose not to have separate time dummies given the much smaller sample size.
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foreclose on these borrowers. As before, the control groups are single family purchase
loans made before October 2009 and single family refinance loans made during the
whole sample period. We define defaults to be the first time that the loan becomes
60 days delinquent or 90 days delinquent, respectively. The foreclosure decision is
defined as entering foreclosure process.
1.4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
We use LPS for the default and foreclosure analysis. In particular,we focus on
mortgage loans originated six months before and six months after the change in
the deficiency judgment laws in October 2009 which spans April 2009 to April 2010
excluding October 2009. During this period, 10,987 mortgage loans were originated
for owner-occupied primary home mortgages without mortgage insurance and by
private mortgage lenders.
We follow these mortgage loans from the time of their origination to the first
time the loan becomes 60 day, 90 day delinquent, enters into foreclosure, or reaches
the end of the sample period December 2012. Table 9 reports the summary statistics
for 60+ delinquency sample. In total, we have 343,120 observations. The monthly
60 day delinquency rate is 0.08 percent. The average loan age is 21 months and the
median is 24 months. The mean mortgage loan-to-value ratio at origination is 68
percent with a median of 65 percent. The average credit score is 760, on the high end
of the credit score range of 300 and 850. The monthly unemployment rate averages
13 percent while the monthly net house price growth rate averages about 0.0055
percent with large variances. The sample statistics for the 90 days delinquency and
foreclosure sample are very similar except that the 90 day delinquency rate averages
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0.04 percent monthly for the 90+ day delinquency sample and the foreclosure rate
is 0.02 percent monthly for the foreclosure start sample. Figure 1.4 shows the
cumulative 60-day delinquency rate for loans six months before and after the policy
change, respectively.
1.4.3.2 Results
As discussed in the empirical methodologies, we run Probit regressions with the
dependent variable being the binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the loan
becomes delinquent or being foreclosed by the lender and 0 otherwise. We cluster
standard errors at the loan level. Table 10 reports our regression results including
marginal eﬀects of each explanatory variable and its associated standard error.
The variable of interest, single family mortgage loans made after October 2009,
is not statistically significant in any of the three regressions. During that period,
refinance loans are more likely to become delinquent. The older the mortgage loan
is, the more likely it becomes 60 days, 90 days delinquent or enters into foreclosure
though the speed of the increase declines. As expected, mortgage loans with high
mortgage loan-to-value ratios at origination are more likely to become delinquent or
being foreclosed. Current interest rate as well as adjustable-rate-mortgage loans also
contribute positively to default and foreclosure probabilities. By contrast, having
high credit scores at origination reduces default as well as foreclosure probability.
County, time fixed eﬀects and separate county linear time trends are included in all
three regressions.
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1.4.3.3 Robustness Analysis
We conduct four additional analysis to test the robustness of our benchmark results.
Specifically, we study loans that were made one year before and one year after the
change in deficiency law; we look at subsamples where the appraised house value
is above the median and where current mortgage loan-to-value ratio is above 90,
respectively; and we include in the benchmark sample refinance loans for primary
homes. The results on the key variable, primary purchase loans for single family
homes made after October 2009 are reported in Table 11. As can be seen, none
of the estimates are statistically significant for any of the default and foreclosure
definition.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper studies whether the change in deficiency judgments in the state of Nevada
had a measurable eﬀect on mortgage lending and borrowing in addition to mortgage
default and foreclosure. In doing so, the paper makes a contribution to several
strands of the literature, all of which seek to understand the relationship between real
estate laws and borrower and lender behavior. In contrast to some existing studies,
the paper does not find any significant change in aﬀected borrowers’ mortgage default
and lenders’ foreclosure decisions. However, it does find strong evidence that lenders
have tightened their lending standards substantially both in terms of loan approval
rate and loan size though not on mortgage interest rates. It further reveals that
there are no changes in mortgage applications from households.
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The paper thus casts a cautionary notes on using deficiency judgments as a
deterrence for mortgage default or mortgage foreclosure. While it does not dispute
the finding that deficiency judgments may deter mortgage default, it argues that
it may also has the side eﬀect of discouraging mortgage lending. Further policy
analysis requires more structural analysis which we pursue in a separate project.11
11See “Consumer Bankruptcy and Mortgage Default” by Wenli Li, Costas Meghir, and Florian
Oswald.
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Figure 1.1: Relative diﬀerence of mortgage approval rates for primary and refi loans
to their October 2009 level. HMDA data.
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Figure 1.2: Relative diﬀerence of mortgage sizes for primary and refi loans to their
October 2009 level. HMDA data.
42 CHAPTER 1. RECOURSE MORTGAGES IN NEVADA
−
10
0
10
20
$0
00
200904 200906 200908 200910 200912 201002
 
purchase loans refinance loans
Figure 1.3: Average diﬀerence in the value of mortgage loans applied for. Primary
and refi loans, relative diﬀerence to their October 2009 level. HMDA data.
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Figure 1.4: Cumulative 60 Days or more Delinquency Rates for Loans Made 6
months before and after october 2009. Aﬀected loans include single family purchase
loans for primary residence made after October 2009; not aﬀected loans include
single family purchase loans for primary residence before October 2009 and single
family refi loans for primary residence. Source: LPS Applied Analytics.)
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mean std. deviation
approval rate⇤ 0.6594 0.4739
refinanced mortgage loans⇤ 0.7159 0.4510
loans aﬀected by law changes⇤ 0.0878 0.2831
female⇤ 0.2733 0.4456
gender unknown⇤ 0.0682 0.2520
race: black⇤ 0.0229 0.1495
race: non-white and non-black⇤ 0.0886 0.2842
race: unknown⇤ 0.1157 0.3199
no cosigner⇤ 0.4711 0.4992
income ($ thousands) 106.4254 191.4229
loan amount ($ thousands) 222.0114 200.2909
living in area with 30% or more minorities⇤ 0.0262 0.1596
lender: commercial bank and their subsidiaries⇤ 0.6463 0.4781
lender: independent mortgage banks⇤ 0.1911 0.3932
lender: thrifts⇤ 0.0906 0.2870
lender: credit unions⇤ 0.0527 0.2234
lagged local unemployment rate (%) 12.0379 1.5494
lagged net local house price growth rate -0.0032 0.1195
Total number of observations 27,889
Table 1.1: HMDA Sample Summary Statistics. Stars indicate a binary variable that
takes the value 1 if an observation belongs to the category.
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mean std. deviation
refinance mortgage loans⇤ 0.4493 0.4974
loans aﬀected by the law change⇤ 0.0473 0.2122
current interest rate 4.9805 0.4506
mortgage loan-to-value ratio at origination 66.4874 22.0924
credit score at origination 717 182
full document⇤ 0.4059 0.4910
jumbo loan⇤ 0.0198 0.1392
loan sold to private investor⇤ 0.1844 0.3878
adjustable-rate mortgage⇤ 0.0179 0.1328
lagged local unemployment rate 12.3008 1.7558
lagged gross local real house price growth rate -0.0007 0.1171
Total number of mortgage loans 10,987
Table 1.2: LPS Summary Statistics: Purchase or refinance loans for owner-occupied
single family housing originated between April 2009 and April 2010 excluding Oc-
tober 2009. These loans are not government guaranteed. Stars indicate a binary
variable that takes the value 1 if an observation belongs to the category.
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Mortgage Approval Mortgage Loan Size
marginal eﬀects s.e. coeﬃcient s.e.
purchase loans made after reform -0.0371⇤⇤⇤ 0.0135 -10.4465⇤⇤⇤ 3.2977
refinance loan -0.1897⇤⇤⇤ 0.0062 -66.0726⇤⇤⇤ 3.4139
income at origination ($ 1000) 1.60e-04⇤⇤⇤ 2.67e-05 0.3172⇤⇤⇤ 0.0112
loan amount ($ 1000) -2.87e-04⇤⇤⇤ 2.24e-05
MSA with over 30% minorities -0.2496⇤⇤⇤ 0.0061 -132.3559⇤⇤⇤ 6.7045
being black -0.1089⇤⇤⇤ 0.0051 -45.7309⇤⇤⇤ 2.4109
being non-white and non-black -0.0681⇤⇤⇤ 0.0047 -25.8185⇤⇤⇤ 2.2543
race unknown -0.0796⇤⇤⇤ 0.0034 -25.5976⇤⇤⇤ 3.2223
female -0.0173 0.0154 -18.6823⇤⇤⇤ 4.6003
gender unknown 0.0402⇤⇤⇤ 0.0086 28.5598⇤⇤⇤ 3.7594
no cosigner -0.0594⇤⇤⇤ 0.0037 -36.0006⇤⇤⇤ 1.9352
lender: commercial bank -0.0245⇤⇤⇤ 0.0057 -8.9606⇤⇤⇤ 1.9501
lender: thrift -0.0115 0.0109 18.7221⇤⇤⇤ 2.6794
lender: credit union 0.1258⇤⇤⇤ 0.0153 15.3800⇤⇤⇤ 3.2681
lagged monthly unemp. rate 0.0358 0.0306 -15.9427⇤⇤⇤ 5.8650
lagged hpi growth rate -0.0068 0.0197 -31.2756⇤⇤⇤ 7.8177
linear county time trends yes yes
county fixed eﬀects yes yes
time fixed eﬀects yes yes
Pseudo R-square 0.1325 0.0206
number of observations 27,889 27,889
Table 1.3: HMDA Benchmark Mortgage Lending: The first column shows probit
marginal eﬀects for mortgage approvals with associated standard erros and the third
column shows tobit coeﬃcients for loan sizes. * indicates statistical significance at
10 %, ** 5 %, and *** at 1 % level.
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interest rate at origination
coeﬃcient s.e.
purchase loan made after reform -0.0398 0.0260
refinance loan -0.1072⇤⇤⇤ 0.0099
loan-to-value ratio at origination 0.0027⇤⇤⇤ 0.0002
credit score at origination -0.0018⇤⇤⇤ 0.0001
full document 0.0108 0.0103
private investor -0.0527⇤⇤⇤ 0.0132
jumbo mortgage 0.4600⇤⇤⇤ 0.0631
adjustable rate mortgage -0.8055⇤⇤⇤ 0.0402
lagged monthly unemployment rate 0.0573⇤⇤⇤ 0.0150
lagged real hpi growth rate 0.0321 0.0352
linear county time trend yes
county fixed eﬀects yes
time fixed eﬀects yes
R-squared 0.1934
number of observations 10,987
Table 1.4: LPS Benchmark Mortgage Lending
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Purchase Loan after reform: Zit
Mortgage Approval Loan size ($)
Baseline Model -0.0371⇤⇤⇤ -10.4465⇤⇤⇤
Heckman Model -0.1012⇤⇤⇤ -10.8093⇤⇤
loans originated: October 2008 – October 2010 -0.0870⇤⇤⇤ -24.1974⇤⇤⇤
include investment loans -0.0566⇤⇤⇤ -10.1488⇤⇤⇤
placebo law change date: April 2008 0.1062⇤⇤⇤ 52.4968⇤⇤⇤
placebo law change date: April 2011 0.0687⇤⇤⇤ 63.4501⇤⇤⇤
Table 1.5: HMDA Robustness Analysis for Mortgage Lending: We display the value
of the main coeﬃcient of interest, i.e. purchase loan made after reform, in both
equations for loan approval rates as well as for loan sizes. Each row shows the result
for a diﬀerent extension of the baseline model.
Interest rate (%)
coeﬃcient s.d.
loans originated: October 2008 – October 2010 -0.0684⇤ 0.0353
include investment properties -0.1270⇤⇤⇤ 0.0250
include multifamily properties -0.0328 0.0255
Table 1.6: LPS Mortgage Lending Robustness Analysis for Interest Rates.
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#applications amount ($1000) Average loan size
purchase loans made after reform 55.8642 13107.88 2.3620
refinance loans 113.4092⇤⇤⇤ 27813.71⇤⇤⇤ 16.4886
average income of the MSA -0.0463 -13.3958 -0.01300
MSA with over 30% minorities -264.1975 -72401.97 -175.8475
lagged unemployment rate 5.7299 1239.245 6.7488
lagged house price growth rate -24.2818 -2485.247 -6.0640
time trend 0.2149 -1644.464 -23.4374
time trend squared -0.3734 -41.6182 0.5207
county dummies included yes yes yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.6693 0.6479 0.3725
number of observations 295 295 295
Table 1.7: HMDA mortgage applications and loan sizes in the benchmark specifica-
tion.
# loan applications loan amount ($1000) Average loan size
sample coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e.
loan application: 200810 – 201010 19.3580 22.1870 4481.328 5140.752 3.6045 9.0657
include investment properties 33.3558 27.3476 7709.468 6304.198 3.1862 13.2608
Table 1.8: Mortgage Applications – Robustness Analysis (HMDA)
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mean median standard deviation
60 day mortgage delinquency rate 0.00082 0 0.0286
age of the loan (months) 20.5853 24 11.6763
mortgage loan-to-value ratio at origination 67.8904 65.44 18.0439
refi mortgage⇤ 0.6356 1 0.4813
loans aﬀected by the law change⇤ 0.0550 0 0.3289
current interest rate 4.9543 4.8750 0.4645
credit score at origination 760 773 44
full document⇤ 0.5251 1 0.4994
jumbo loan⇤ 0.0184 0 0.1344
loan sold to private investor⇤ 0.0232 0 0.1505
adjustable-rate mortgage⇤ 0.0170 0 0.1293
lagged local unemployment rate 12.8822 13.1000 1.7929
lagged local house price growth rate 0.0050 -0.0044 0.1392
Total number of mortgage loans 10,987
Total number of observations 343,120
Table 1.9: Dynamic LPS Summary Statistics: Purchase loans for owner-occupied
housing originated between April 2009 and April 2010 excluding October 2009 and
followed until the loan first becomes 60 days delinquent or the end of the sample
period, December 2012. These loans are not government guaranteed and with no
private mortgage insurance. ⇤ indicates dummy variables.
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60 days delinquent 90 days delinquent Foreclosure start
purchase loans made after reform 3.47e-05 2.35e-06 6.05e-07
refi loans 1.12e-04⇤⇤⇤ 6.01e-06⇤⇤⇤ 3.21e-06⇤⇤⇤
loan age (months) 3.01e-05⇤⇤⇤ 1.36e-06⇤⇤⇤ 7.79e-07⇤⇤⇤
loan age squared -3.94e-07⇤⇤⇤ -1.51e-07⇤⇤⇤ -1.07e-08⇤⇤⇤
loan-to-value ratio at origination 5.77e-06⇤⇤⇤ 3.34e-07⇤⇤⇤ 1.97e-07⇤⇤⇤
credit score at origination -1.86e-06⇤⇤⇤ -6.81e-08⇤⇤⇤ -2.61e-08⇤⇤⇤
current interest rate 8.87e-05⇤⇤⇤ 4.49e-06⇤⇤⇤ 1.84e-06⇤⇤⇤
full document 5.12e-05⇤⇤ 2.21e-06⇤ 6.96e-07
private investor 3.90e-05 -1.82e-06 -7.00e-07
jumbo mortgage -1.04e-04
adjustable rate mortgage 3.13e-04⇤⇤⇤ 2.54e-05⇤⇤⇤ 2.19e-05⇤⇤⇤
lagged monthly unemployment rate 2.13e-05 5.81e-07 -1.64e-07
lagged real hpi growth rate 6.76e-06 2.05e-07 5.39e-07
county fixed eﬀects yes yes yes
time fixed eﬀects yes yes yes
county time trends yes yes yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.1133 0.1405 0.1636
number of observations 343,120 344,836 344,890
Table 1.10: Marginal eﬀect estimates for Mortgage Default and Foreclosure start
outcomes. These are loans originated between 200904 to 201004. Dummies for
interest only and balloon loans predict 90 days delinquency perfectly and are not
included in the regression. The dummy for jumbo loans predicts foreclosure proba-
bility perfectly and are not included in the 90 days delinquency and the foreclosure
regressions.
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60 days delinquent 90 days delinquent Foreclosure start
originated: Oct. 2008 - Oct. 2010 -8.3-e05 -6.65e-06 -3.57e-06
house value above the mean 9.73e-05 -3.80e-07 2.49e-06
mortgage ltv above 100 3.76e-04 -3.13e-05 -6.96e-06
benchmark + investment loans 1.89e-05 1.46e-05 1.22e-07
Table 1.11: Robustness Analysis for Mortgage Default and Foreclosure starts. None
of the estimated coeﬃcients is significant.
Chapter 2
Consumer Bankruptcy and Mortgage
Default
2.1 Introduction
A number of countries, inluding the US and the UK have legislation that defines
the way bankruptcy is to be treated. Such legislation is an attempt to balance
the legitimate rights of creditors with the need to oﬀer some level of insurance for
adverse events. Diﬀerent legislation governs defaults on secured and unsecured debt
and interestingly such legislation varies widely across states in the US and across
countries. For example the extent to which housing equity can be used to repay
outstanding debts following default on unsecured debts varies widely from 0% to
nearly the entire level of housing equity. On the other side the extent to which
non-housing assets can be used to repay debts following mortgage default is also
regulated by legislation. Finally, the way debts are handled can also be means
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tested. For example, following a recent reform, only lower income people can file
for chapter 7 in the US, while individuals with above median earnings must file for
chapter 13.
Such legislation can have important welfare eﬀects for a number of reasons. On
the one hand, it limits to varying degrees the impact of adverse shocks on lifetime
consumption. This will increase welfare. On the other, such policies will cause
adverse welfare eﬀects because they may induce greater risk taking, which in turn
may lead individuals to file for bankruptcy when in principle they could repay debts
(albeit at the cost of very low consumption for extended periods of time), and
possibly reduce the incentive to work for accumulating assets; it will also tend to
increase interest rates for both unsecured and to some extent secured debt, as the
interest will have to cover the expected losses by creditors. Finally the way that
debts may be partially recovered can also have important welfare implications. For
example wage garnishing following filing for chapter 13 can reduce the incentive to
work.
In this paper we specify and estimate a microeconomic life-cycle model of non-
durable consumption, housing and labor supply allowing for both bankruptcy and
mortgage default so as to understand the eﬀects of legislation governing such events.
In our model individuals can choose to buy or rent a house, the amount of liquid
assets they wish to accumulate and their labor supply. At each point in time they
can decide to either file for bankruptcy or default on their mortgage; this decision is
made in view of the benefits that such actions will have for them under the specific
institutional context that they are facing. So as to capture the eﬀects of bankruptcy
on the pricing of credit we allow the interest rate on unsecured debt to depend on the
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probability of bankruptcy, which will depend on the state describing the individual
circumstances and on the specific legislative framework.
Our model is estimated using data from the period 2006-2010, which coin-
cided with the enactment of both an important reform in the US bankruptcy code
(BAPCPA) and the collapse of the housing market in 2007. The bankrutpcy reform
in essence mandates that individuals with earnings above the state median are only
eligible to file for bankruptcy chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code. This arrangement
embodies in most cases a debt restructuring whereby debtors agree to make repay-
ments to creditors according to a schedule drawn up by a bankruptcy judge. Often
this takes the form of a wage garnishment, i.e. the debtor delivers part of monthly
income to the creditor. Given that the alternative, chapter 7, does not require such
payments, there may be an incentive to reduce labor supply for individuals with
incomes near the state median, conditional on other aspects of their balance sheet,
which we will explain below.
Our estimation approach relies on house price processes, bankruptcy and mort-
gage default rates at the county level in the US which is based on microeconomic
data recording all loan and mortgage activity as well as bankruptcies. Combining
such data together with information from the census allows us to estimate a rich
model of individual consumption and labor supply behavior allowing for diﬀerences
across education groups.
The model can be used to assess the eﬀects of policy reforms such as BAPCPA,
as well as address the tradeoﬀs involved in more or less consumer protection for
example we could answer the question of what would have happened over the course
of the last couple of years had the reform not been enacted. To be able to do so,
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we rely on a representation of the economy that takes into account local variation
in house prices and bankrutpcy and default rates. We provide empirical evidence
that local economic conditions over and above state legal arrangements matter for
the determination of bankruptcy and default rates.
There has been a lot of interest in homestead exemption levels and how they
aﬀect the rate of bankrutpcy. Convincing evidence is hard to come by, mainly
because there is little variation in legal arrangements concerning bankruptcy over
time, and the rate itself is an equilibrium outcome. As in the most typical example
of identifying demand and supply curves of Working (1927), it is diﬃcult to identify
a causal eﬀect of homestead exemption on bankruptcy, because the supply of credit
may be restricted in areas where the incentives to file are relatively large (i.e. high
exemption), so that only good quality borrowers obtain credit, and therefore the
higher incentives for bankruptcy are counterbalanced by a better quality pool of
risks. An incomplete list of examples of this literature might include Pavan (2008),
who investigates the eﬀect of exemption levels on bankruptcy and durable purchases
and finds that exactly this is happening, i.e. welfare gains from greater insurance are
cancelled out by losses due to tighter credit constraints. Her conclusion is opposed
to the one of Hintermaier and Königer (2009), who find that the stock of durables
has little impact on the pricing of, and thus access to, unsecured borrowing in a
calibrated model. In terms of empirical contributions, Gropp et al. (1997) find, using
SCF data, that all else equal borrowers in high exemption states are significantly
more likely to have a loan application rejected. Fay et al. (2002) use PSID panel data
to investigate the determinants of consumer bankruptcy, but they cannot examine
exemption levels as they include a state fixed eﬀect. Traczynski (2011) examines
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how diﬀerent exemption levels may lead to diﬀerent incentives for couples to divorce,
relying on within state variation of exemption levels.
In terms of wider placement within the literature on consumer bankruptcy, this
paper adds the housing and mortgage default dimension to the common framework
of dynamic bankruptcy analysis. This framework relies on an extension of an Aiya-
gari (1994)-type economy which extends the way in which borrowing is possible.
While in Aiyagari (1994) the assumption is that borrowing is allowed up to an
amount the consumer can repay with probability one (typically this is the present
discount value of lowest possible income for the rest of his life), thereby of course
precluding non-repayment of debts, in this type of models non-repayment of debts
is made possible by the bankruptcy law, which bounds the losses that a consumer
can incur: the oﬀered insurance then leads to moral hazard and it is this tradeoﬀ
that we eplore in this paper. The possibility of non-repayment leads banks to oﬀer
interest rates for unsecured borrowing which is based on an individual’s probability
of repayment of the loan. The theoretical foundation of this is laid out in Chatterjee
et al. (2007), examples of applications to diﬀerent aspects of risk-sharing and welfare
implications are Athreya (2008), which examines the interaction of bankruptcy with
social insurance, and Livshits et al. (2007), who calibrate a life-cycle model to in-
vestigate welfare diﬀerences of diﬀerent bankruptcy schemes. This last contribution
is close in spirit to the present paper, the diﬀerence being that here we augment the
set of shocks the consumer is subject to assets they may hold. This set comprises
income shocks, health shocks, and family shocks (divorce or children). See Sullivan
et al. (1999) pp. 128 for another account for the importance of housing shocks as
drivers of bankruptcy.
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The closest paper to ours is the one by Mitman (2011) who also considers a model
of consumption and housing with bankruptcy and default. However our model diﬀers
in a number of substantive ways. First, our model allows for labor supply; this is
important both because by varying labor supply one can change the probability of
bankruptcy and because it allows us to deal with post-bankruptcy wage garninshing
when this is relevant; the anticipation of such an event can initself change behaviour
limiting bankruptcy. Thus second, individuals with above median income do not
have the bankruptcy option in Mitman’s model. In ours they do and they have to
file for chapter 13. The fact that we allow for endogenous labor supply allows us to
deal with this important diﬀerence and oﬀer a richer evaluation of the actual policy
framework. Beyond these major modelling diﬀerences our model includes a more
realistic long-term mortgage contract. From an estimation point of view, beyond
the fact that we rely on detailed microeconomic data we use the observed house
price process as opposed to Mitman who calibrates the houseprice shocks to obtain
the desired level of defaults. Finally the housing market has more frictions in our
model. In that dimension, our model is much closer to Attanasio et al. (2012)
In the next section we present some descriptive facts about bankruptcy, default
and the instituional context. We then describe our model. We then discuss our data
and the estimation approach. We then discus the estimation results and present the
policy implications of our model.
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Figure 2.1: Homestead exemption vs Bankrutpcy rate. Homestead exemption
values are top-coded at the 75% percentile ($91250). Blue line is a polyno-
mial smoother with 95% confidence interval. Data: http://www.uscourts.gov/
Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/ and http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/
~mitmanke/MitmanJMP.pdf
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2.2 Some Descriptive Facts
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Figure 2.2: Bankruptcy and Default rates by state in 2009. Calculated as proportion
of total individuals who take either choice.
A snapshot of bankruptcy and default rates are displayed in figure 2.2. Recent trends
are shown in figure 2.3. Notice the spike in bankruptcies in 2005 which corresponds
to the introduction of the “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act” (BAPCPA), which led to a final rush before the rules changed.
Consider the regression (2.1), where we use data from the NYFed consumer
credit report in conjunction with information on state ownership rates, the legal
environment concering homestead exemption and recourse (recorded as to whether
it is possible for the lender to obtain a deficiency judgment against delinquent bor-
rowers), and on the fraction of state j’s population filing for a new bankruptcy in
quarter t, measured in percent.
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Figure 2.3: Trends in bankruptcy and default. The top panel shows shows the
percentage of total population with a new foreclosure by quarter, available at http:
//www.newyorkfed.org/householdcredit/. The bottom panel shows data from
the American Bankruptcy Institute, where per capita rates are computed using the
population count from the US census. The spike in chapter 7 bankrutpcy in 2005
corresponds to the introduction of the BAPCPA reform.
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newbkjt = 0.33
(0.079)
+ 0.0077
(0.0024)
unemploymentjt  0.00035
(0.00005)
pj,t 1
+ 0.24
(0.037)
lagged newforeclosuresj   0.0016
(0.0009)
ownership ratej + 0.024
(0.013)
Recoursej
+ 0.00008
(0.000037)
(Homestead Exemptionj/1000)  0.0807
(0.0134)
unlimited exemptionj + ujt(2.1)
where pjt is the house price index. From the above, we see that recourse legislation
is positively related to new bankruptcies at the 10% significance level. Unlimited
homestead exemption is significantly negatively associated with bankruptcy. All
else equal, states with unlimited homestead exemption have 0.08% fewer consumers
entering bankruptcy per quarter than states with a limit – if compared to the sam-
ple median of 0.17%, that is about half as much. This phenomenon could be ex-
plained by credit rationing and composition eﬀects, whereby creditors in states with
higher exemption are more selective, because incentives for bankruptcy are relatively
strong. This has been shown for example in Gropp et al. (1997). However, these
results show that relying on cross-sectional variation in institutional arrangements
in itself does not provide a valid source of variation for estimating the model.
In terms of elasticities at the sample median for the regressors as shown in table
2.1, we see that a 1% decrease in the lagged house price index is associated with
a 0.75% increase in the percentage of consumers with new bankruptcies. This is a
sizeable eﬀect, if compared to the elasticity associated with homestead exemption,
which implies a 0.01% increase in new bankruptcies if exemptions are increased by
1% from the sample median. It appears that there are channels from house price risk
to default on unsecured credit, i.e. bankruptcy. One could for example think that
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homeowners who are subject to a house price shock and at the same time are liq-
uidity constrained could use the bankruptcy option to losen their budget constraint,
so that they can keep current on their mortgage. Another possibility arises from
the interaction between recourse law and bankruptcy. It could for example be that
owners in foreclosure use bankruptcy to discharge any remaining debt which would
be carried forward in case the lender had recourse. The elasticity of lagged foreclo-
sures in table 2.1 indicates that increasing new foreclosures by 1% from it’s median
would result in a 0.17% increase of new bankruptcies in the following quarter.
variable median sd elasticity
newbk 0.17 0.11
unemp 6.23 1.91 0.28
Lhpi 367.86 126.27 -0.75
Lnewfore 0.12 0.16 0.17
own.rate 68.50 6.29 -0.62
hex 17425.00 154888.70 0.01
DeficiencyYes 0.82 0.39 0.11
ultdTRUE 0.18 0.39 -0.08
Table 2.1: Elasticites of estimates from regression (2.1), calculated at the sample
median of the respective variables.
2.2.1 Regional Environments: Laws and Prices
In this section we compare diﬀerent legal systems of US states and the properties
of their house price processes. In our model we do not solve for the equilibrium
houseing price, which is byond the scope of this paper. However we condition on
an empirically estimated stochastic process: we assume that the log house price of
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state j evolves according to a random walk.1
pjt = pjt 1 + ujt (2.2)
ujt ⇠ N(0,  2u)
We report results for a series of states on the value of standard deviation of ujt in
conjunction with data on legal environment and bankruptcy rates in table 2.2. As
is well known, the standard deviation of u in this context expresses the volatility
in percentage changes of the price process. Two things transpire from this. First,
the house price volatility is enormous. Second, volatility diﬀers substantially across
regions of the US. The table also summarizes the diﬀerences in the institutional
framework and in the bankruptcy rates across states.
1We assume away any drift in the random walk process for the sake of simplicity. It would be
straightforward to add.
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State Deficiency hex.fraction bk.rate sigma
NC No 0.42 0.26 3.56
WA No 0.66 0.42 7.30
CA No 0.81 0.41 11.44
AZ No 2.88 0.39 13.30
MN No 3.19 0.30 7.41
OH Yes 0.10 0.48 3.89
IL Yes 0.14 0.45 6.69
GA Yes 0.18 0.63 5.85
MI Yes 0.32 0.40 8.21
OR Yes 0.48 0.45 7.22
CO Yes 0.72 0.42 5.27
NY Yes 0.93 0.27 7.32
MA Yes 1.62 0.24 6.76
NV Yes 9.43 0.57 13.42
FL Yes 0.37 10.29
TX Yes 0.26 2.70
Comp10 8.75
Comp20 10.61
DC 9.40
Table 2.2: House Prices and Homestead Exemption. Bankruptcy rates are aver-
ages over the period 1987–2012, expressed in percent. “hex.fraction” is homestead
exemption over state median income. Column sigma corresponds to model (2.2),
using Case-Shiller data 1987–2012. (sigma is in percent).
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Figure 2.4: House prices histories in diﬀerent states. Case-Shiller index.
2.3. THEORETICAL MODEL 67
2.3 Theoretical Model
2.3.1 The individual lifecycle
Individuals maximize expected lifetime utility. As we focus on house purchases
and since we need to economise in computations, the active life period starts at
age 30 and lasts until age T = 60, which in the model is the age of retirement.
Individuals diﬀer by their completed level of schooling and an unobservable type
aﬀecting a monetary fixed cost of working, but are identical in all other respects ex
ante. There are two sources of uncertainty: house prices and earnings uncertainty.
2.3.2 Preferences
Households derive utility from consumption of a composite non-durable consumption
good c, leisure 1   l and from a housing good h.2 Labour supply decisions (l) are
modelled as choices from a discretized set of values L = l1, l2, . . . , lm corresponding
to the fraction of disposable time supplied to the labor market, with the convention
that lj < lj+1 and l1 = 0, lm = 1. Houses are characterized by their size, and we
allow choice over small and big houses (think of flat versus house). In terms of
notation this implies h 2 {0, 1, 2}, where h = 0 stands for renting – only one type
of house is available for rent. The instantaneous utility function is
2we use “individuals”, “households” and “agents” interchangeably.
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u(c, lj, h) =
(c⇥ exp (↵lj))1  
1    exp (✓⇣(h)) + µ⇣(h)
⇣(h) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if h = 0
2 (0, 1) if h = 1
1 if h = 2
j = 1, . . . ,m
l1 = 0, lm = 1, lj < lj+1
where (↵, µ, ⇣, ✓,  ) is a vector of parameters. This specification is non-separable in
consumption and labor as well as in consumption and housing.3 We will restrict
parameter values ↵ < 0,   > 1, implying that utility is decreasing in labor, that
individuals are risk averse and that the marginal utility of consumption is increas-
ing in the amount of labor supplied. The consumption and labor component is
augmented by a multiplicative and additive term reflecting the eﬀect of housing on
utility for owner occupiers. The multiplicative term is a nonseparable scaling factor
of utility, with the convention that scaling is relative to utility of renting, in which
case h = 0. The additive term implies that we don’t have a utility function which is
homogeneous, thus preferences over consumption and housing are not homothetic.
The sign of µ establishes whether housing is a necessity or a luxury. The setup is
similar to Attanasio et al. (2012) but for the additional utility derived from leisure.
3Formally: Thinking of c, h, l as continuous, consumption and labour are weakly separable
from housing but consumption and housing are not separable from leisure and neither are housing
and leisure separable from consumption.
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The aim of the household is to maximize lifetime utility
U = E0
TX
t=1
 t 1u (ct, lt, ht) +  T u˜ (aT , hT , pT )
by means of choosing sequences {ct, ht, lt, dt}Tt=1 of consumption, labor supply, hous-
ing and a set of discrete choices d relating to bankruptcy and default, which are
detailed below. There is a standard discount factor   < 1 and a modified final
period utility function u˜ that takes into account the amount of home equity at the
end of the active lifecycle and the start of retirement. The expectation is taken with
respect to contingent paths of labor productivity and house prices.
2.3.3 House Prices
Owner-occupied housing of size h trades at a unit price pt(h) in period t, with the
assumption that
pt(h) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
pt if h = 2
pt if h = 1, with  2 (0, 1]
⌘pt if h = 0, with ⌘ 2 [0,]
i.e. smaller houses trade at a constant fraction of larger ones and rental is a fraction ⌘
of the house price. The evolution of house prices is assumed to be a unit root process
as outlined in equation (2.2). There is a markov transition matrix  p associated with
process p.
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2.3.4 Labor productivity
Labor productivity is composed of a deterministic age and education profile and a
persistent random process similar to Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).4
lnwit = µ
e
t + z
e
it (2.3)
zeit = ⇢z
e
it 1 + ⌫
e
it
⌫e ⇠ N  0,  2⌫,e 
where µet an education type e-specific age profile and ze is a persistent random
component which we model as a random walk. The transition matrix associated
with ze is denoted  ez. We denote the wage level by w(t, z). When unemployed, i.e.
when choosing l = 0, the household is endowed with unemployment benefit b > 0.
For the sake of brevity, we will denote y(z, t) = w(z, t)⇥ l⇤ as implied labor income
(l⇤ stands for the labor supply policy function). There is an element of unobserved
heterogeneity which we model as a heterogeneous monetary fixed cost of working
F (k) for K discrete types k = 1, . . . , K.
2.3.5 Default Institutions
There are two distincts credit default institutions in the model: there is default on
unsecured debt and default on secured housing debt. We will refer to the former as
“bankruptcy” and to the latter as “default” for simplicity.
4Note that throughout the paper we focus on lifecycle eﬀects only, i.e. we do not account for
cohort-specific eﬀects.
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In 2005 the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA) was introduced, making it more diﬃcult for some consumers to file
under chapter 7 of the bankruptcy act and instead forcing them to choose chapter
13 instead. In general terms, chapter 7 amounts to full discharge of debt while chap-
ter 13 is a debt restructuring. The main aspect of eligibility for chapter 7 concerns
a means test, whereby chapter 7 is not a choice if the individual’s monthly income
is above the state median. Under chapter 7, no debt repayments need be made (i.e.
there is complete discharge of unsecured debts) but non-exempt assets are seized,
while under chapter 13 the consumer must commit to a repayment plan that lasts on
average for 5 years, but may otherwise keep their assets. One is tempted to expect
that owners with important amounts of non-exempt home equity (maybe because
they reside in states with low exemption level, or because they are rich in equity)
would prefer to make debt repayments, if they are in a situation to do so, whereas
owners in high exemption states may prefer the chapter 7 option, since this guaran-
tees their home equity without the onerous debt repayment plan. The extent of the
owner’s preference for either option will depend on the amount of equity, their rank
in the state income distribution, and the details of the repayment plan, i.e. what
wage garnishments the bankrutpcy judge deems just.5
We model the distinction between both chapters. In particular, we incorporate
the means test which requires consumers with greater than state median income to
file for chapter 13. Given that homeowners are the ones predominantly aﬀected by
this restriction, it seems like an important feature of the budget set of the consumers
5Note that garnishments must not exceed 25% of disposable income under Federal Law.
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in our data. We will perform a counterfactual policy experiment where we undo the
reform and allow all consumers to file under chapter 7, regardless of their income.
With this distinction in mind, we model bankruptcy as follows. Depending on
their position in the income distribution, a consumer may choose either chapter 7
or 13. In chapter 7 they are subject to the restrictions imposed through homestead
exemption levels, i.e. they may only keep their homes if equity is less than the
state exemption level. In chapter 13, on the other hand, they may keep their house
regardless of the exemption level since they sign up to a repayment plan, which
stipulates debt repayments for as long as they are in bankruptcy state. Associated
with filing for bankruptcy we allow for certain costs: first the individual is excluded
from financial markets for five years on average.6 In addition bankruptcy involves
psychic costs  bk associated with the stigma of a bad credit record.
The so–called homestead exemption is a legal clause which exempts a certain
amount of home equity from liquidation, to diﬀerent extents in diﬀerent states. In
practice, this means that if an owner finds themself with unsecured debt and at the
same time has equity in the home below the exemption level, they could file for
bankruptcy without risking to loose the home in a forced sale, since the unsecured
lender is prevented from claiming the exempt equity. In the model, therefore, an
owner with less than exempt equity stays in their house during bankruptcy (if it is
optimal for them to do so). If an owner in excess of the exemption limit files, they
loose the house, which is sold at market price, but they get to keep the exeption
level from the proceeds of the sale.
6In the model, the length of exclusion is random and one exits exclusion at a constant probabil-
ity. We adopt this strategy purely out of computational reasons. Having a counter variable would
increase the state space five-fold, which is not an option.
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The second institution concerns default on mortgage debt. It is important to
distinguish the case where the individual no longer finds it optimal (or aﬀordable)
to continue repaying a mortgage on a house following, say, an income shock, to the
case where the house price has fallen placing them in negative equity. In the former
case the house is sold and the mortgage repaid; the individual then moves either to
a smaller house or rents. In the latter (negative equity case) there is an incentive
to default. However, even then default may not occur in the model because of the
costs involved. Owners may decide to default strategically if it is optimal to do so;
they may also default if they are cash-flow constrained.7
In practice, default means that the owner becomes a renter, but is relieved of all
outstanding mortgage debt. Credit scores of defaulters deteriorate by 200–300 points
according to some observers, so we apply one period with no access to unsecured
borrowing and psychic cost  def as a punishment. One issue that warrants a comment
is so–called recourse legislation. According to a commonly used classification (see
Ghent and Kudlyak (2009)), there are eleven US states in which a mortgage lender
is practically prohibited to claim other assets of a home owner who defaults on a
mortgage when the sale of the property does not cover the outstanding debt. Those
states are classified as non-recourse states, whereas in the other states, a lender may
lay claim to other assets to cover remaining outstanding debt after default. It is in
those states and cases that remaining mortgage debt gets converted into unsecured
debt, and which those defaulting then seek to discharge in an ensuing bankruptcy,
should this be necessary. We use a factor  2 [0, 1] to control what fraction of
remaining debt gets carried over in certain legal systems.
7see Bajari et al. (2008) and Guiso et al. (2013) for discussions of these issues
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2.3.6 Financial Market
There are two types of financial institutions in the model, one specializing in un-
secured lending and one in mortgage lending. Both have access to international
financial markets and take the interest rate r as given.
Mortgage Market
There is a unique mortgage contract for all types of individuals. For computational
convenience, we assume that a mortgage contract by default lasts until the end of
working life at period T . Mortgages are modeled to resemble fixed term repayment
mortgages (FRM), which are characterized by constant mortgage payments. The
mortgage interest rate rm, is such that rm > r, to reflect the risk premium. However,
we have simplified the problem by assuming that all consumers face the same rate.
Although this is by no means a perfect assumption it can be justified in part by the
fact that the main driver of default is house price volatility (and not fluctuations
in interest rates). Moreover, in the model we impose a minimum downpayment
amount. The following rules apply to a mortgage contract:
• remaining mortgage debt is charged at the exogenous interest rate rm.
• Buyers must make a fixed downpayment   2 [0, 1] proportional to house value
at purchase.8
• given remaining mortgage debt m at age j, the period t payment is
⇠(m, rm, j) = (1 + rm) mT j . This formula is set up so that by the end of
active life in period T the mortgage is paid oﬀ.
8At present we assume it is 10% fixed.
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• mortgage debt evolves from period t to t + 1 according to mt+1 = mt  
1
1+rm ⇠(m, r
m, t) = mt
⇣
T j 1
T j
⌘
• upon sale, the remaining mortgage needs to be repaid at once.
Housing equity in period t is hpt  mt, where mt is the outstanding mortgage debt.
This setup of the repayment schedule is a slight modification from an industry
standard FRM in that it keeps the proportion of capital to interest repaid with each
installment constant over the lifetime of the loan; in reality the porportion of capital
in each installment increases with the age of the loan, the modeling of which would
require an additional state variable that records the age of the loan, complicating
the computations. This setup implies constant mortgage payments over the life of
the contract, and linearly decreasing mortgage debt. An example for diﬀerent levels
of downpayments is given in figure
2.3.7 Unsecured debt market
Unsecured borrowing means that the liquid asset a can be made negative up to a
certain endogenously determined amount a¯ < 0. The interest rates for saving and
borrowing are denoted r and rb, respectively. Borrowing and saving is assumed to
take place in a one period discount bond fashion as in Chatterjee et al. (2007) or
Athreya (2008) for example. In our model there is no asymmetric information so
that the bank can compute the probability of default. The interest rate it charges is
accordingly adjusted at the individual level, assuming a competitive market where
all financial intermediaries make zero profits. The zero profit condition combines
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expected (partial) repayment of the loan in the case of bankruptcy, which diﬀers by
chapter, with full repayment in case of no bankruptcy.
If the individual is eligible to file under chapter 7 and does not own a house, no
further repayments will be made. On the other hand if she does own a house, any
value over and above the homestead exemption (applicable in the state of residence)
can be used to cover loan repayments: the housing equity eﬀectively acts as security
for the ”unsecured” loan. Thus the equlibrium price of borrowing will depend on
the amount of equity in the house. The expected repayment in this case is denoted
EP 7:
EP 7 = Ep0|p min [max ((1   )ph m  e, 0) , s] , 8s < 0 (2.4)
where the expectation is taken over future house prices, given current ones. The
inner max operator in (2.4) defines non-exempt equity, whereby (1    )ph   m is
home equity net of proportional transaction costs   and state homestead exemption
level e.
When filing for for chapter 13 a fraction ⌧ will be deducted from earnings for
a maximum of I years. In this case the expected repayment is denoted by EP 13,
and it is a function of endogenous future labor supply decisions of the individual,
which depend on future random events and housing decisions. Thus expectations
are taken over all these future unknown events up to the smaller of maximal lifetime
and t+ I periods ahead, conditional on period t, when the loan s < 0 is taken out.
EP 13t = min
24min(T,t+I)X
i=1
Et+i|t (lt+i(St+i)w(t+ i, zt+i)⌧) , s
35 (2.5)
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where lt+i(S) is the optimal labor supply function in period t + i when the state is
S, and where s < 0 denotes the amount of unsecured debt borrowed.
Taking all these factors into account, the equilibrium price for unsecured debt q,
conditional on the individual circumstances and the default insititutions applicable,
is defined as a solution to the equation
q(·)⇥ s = 1
1 + r
[(1  ⇡7   ⇡13)⇥ s+ ⇡13EP 13 + 1(y < ym)⇥ ⇡7 ⇥ EP 7] (2.6)
where the left hand side is the amount forwarded to the consumer, and where ⇡j, j =
7, 13 are the endogenous probabilities that the individual files for bankruptcy under
the respective chapters. Finally, 1(y < ym) denotes income being below the median
and hence permitting filing under chpater 7. The lender needs to calculate these
together with the expected repayments conditional on filing under chapter 13 or
under chapter 7. The expression then defines the discount q which is a function of
the determinants of the default probability and the expected repayments as well as
the amount (s) the individual has to repay. Note that when the individual either
does not borrow (s > 0) or borrows a relatively small amount that can be repaid
with certainty ( s < ⇡13EP 13 + 1(y < ym) ⇥ ⇡7 ⇥ EP 7) then the implicit price
becomes q = 11+r , where r is the internationally fixed interest rate. In what follows
the dependence of the equilibrium price on individual circumstances will be left
implicit to keep the notation simpler.
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2.3.8 Consumer choice
Consumers can either be owners or renters, and either type can be in a bankruptcy
punishment state, or not. While in a punishment state, there is no borrowing
possible, be it secured or unsecured (i.e. no new house purchase is possible), and a
utility penalty is incurred. Exit from the punishment state occurs each period with
exogenous probability  . Whether an individual is in the punishment state or not
is part of their state space. In addition the renter’s state space is a compact subset
of R3⇥ {k1, . . . , kK}⇥ {1, . . . , T} denoted R with typical element R = (a, z, p, k, t),
whereas the owner’s space is defined as S ⇢ R4⇥ {1, 2}⇥ {k1, . . . , kK}⇥ {1, . . . , T}
with typical element S = (a, z, p,m, h, k, t). The variables contained in S denote
assets, labor productivity, house price, mortgage debt, house size, unobservable type
and age. Notice that the renter’s space does not contain mortgage debt and house
size. In each period t < T   1, the renter’s problem in the non-bankruptcy state
is to choose the maximal value among three discrete choices “rent”, “buy” and “file
for bankruptcy chapter 7” and “file for bankruptcy chapter 13”, although this last
choice is subject to a means test. While in punishment state, they can only rent.
The owner’s problem in the non-bankruptcy state is to choose among “stay”,
“sell”, “default”, “file for bankruptcy chapter 7/13” and “file for bankruptcy chapter 7
and default”, whereas during punishemt, this reduces to “stay”, “sell” and “default”.
In each of those cases, there are two intraperiod choices to make, i.e. how much
to consume and how much labour to supply. In period T   1 unsecured borrowing
is not permitted, since final period assets must be non-negative. Also notice that
the mortgage contract is structured in a way that the debt is paid oﬀ by the last
period. We describe the setting for the final period T at the end of this subsection.
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2.3.9 The Choice of Renters
Denote the maximal expected lifetime utility for a renter of age t as W if not in a
bankruptcy state. Otherwise it is denoted by W˜j for bankruptcy state j = 7, 13.
Let s denote the end of period savings choice (i.e. s = a0). We write the problem as
follows:
W (a, z, p, k, t) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
max
 
W rent,W buy,W file.7,W file.13
 
if a < 0, y < y
max
 
W rent,W buy,W file.13
 
if a < 0, y   y
max
 
W rent,W buy
 
if a   0
(2.7)
The restriction on the discrete choice set of the renter in (2.7) makes explicit the
fact that one only can file for bankruptcy if there are eﬀectively unsecured debts
to discharge. In addition we implement the BAPCPA means test by preventing
individuals with labor income above a threshold y to file for chapter 7. We define
the conditional value functions next.
Value of Renting
The value of renting is given by
W rent (R) = max
s2R
l2L
u(c, l, 0) +  Ez0|z,p0|p [W (R0)] (2.8)
subject to
c+ q (z, p, t, s)⇥ s = 1 [l > 0] (w(t, z)⇥ l   F (k)) + 1 [l = 0] b+ a  ⌘p > 0(2.9)
2.3. THEORETICAL MODEL 81
where R is the current state space and R0 the state space as it evolves. Equation
(2.9) is a standard budget constraint that requires expenditures (LHS: consumption
c and saving/borrowing s) to be equal to cash-on-hand (labour income plus assets
minus rent). If no labor is supplied (l = 0) the unemployment benefit applies, and
if labor supply is positive, the unobserved type-dependent fixed cost F is incurred.
Value of Buying
The value function for the buyer is
W buy (R) = max
s2R
h02H
l2L
u(c, l, h0) +  Ez0|z,p0|p [V (S 0)] (2.10)
subject to
c+ q (·)⇥ s = 1 [l > 0] (w(t, z)⇥ l   F (k)) + 1 [l = 0] b (2.11)
+ a  ⇠(m0, rm, t)   p(h0) > 0
Compared to the renter’s problem, the budget constraint of the buyer (2.11) is
augmented by two terms ⇠ and  p, which stand for mortgage payment and down-
payment, respectively. The function q now depends on the additional state variables
mortgage debt and house size, (m,h).
Renter Bankruptcy Chapter 7
The value of filing for bankruptcy under chapter 7 as a renter is similar to the value
of staying a renter with the exception that current assets are set to a = 0 in the
budget constraint since all assets are used against the debt. Moreover, the various
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penalties are applied (no borrowing and psychic cost of bankruptcy  bk). The future
value in the bankruptcy state 7 is denoted by W˜7.
W file.7 (R) = max
s2R+
l2L
u(c, l, 0) +  Ey0|y,p0|p
h
W˜7(R
0)
i
   bk (2.12)
subject to
c+
1
1 + r
s = 1 [l > 0] (w(t, z)⇥ l   F (k)) + 1 [l = 0] b  ⌘p > 0, (??)
As a result of filing for bankruptcy underchapter 7 all assets are used against
the debt and the remaining amount is forgiven. However, the individual suﬀers the
utility (stigma) cost  bk and cannot borrow until she exits this state. This happens
with probability   in each period. Thus the expected duration of this state is 1  .
The value W˜7 in the bankruptcy state is
W˜7 (a, z, p, t) = max
s2R+
l2L
u(c, l, 0) (2.13)
+  Ez0|z,p0|p
h
 W (R0) + (1   )W˜7(R0)
i
   bk
subject to
c+
1
1 + r
s = 1 [l > 0] (w(t, z)⇥ l   F (k)) + 1 [l = 0] b+ a  ⌘p > 0, (??)
Renter Bankruptcy Chapter 13
Individuals may notbe elgible for Chapter 7, or indeed may choose Chapter 13. This
problem is actually very similar to the previous one except that a wage garnishment
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tax ⌧ is levied from labor income. Hence moving into the bankruptcy state we have
W file.13 (R) = max
s2R+
l2L
u(c, l, 0) +  Ey0|y,p0|p
h
W˜13(R
0)
i
   bk (2.14)
subject to
c+
1
1 + r
s = 1 [l > 0] (w(t, z)⇥ (1  ⌧)⇥ l   F (k)) + 1 [l = 0] b  ⌘p > 0,
The corresponding punishment state, following filing for chapter 13 is given by
W˜13 (a, z, p, k, t) = max
s2R+
l2L
u(c, l, 0) (2.15)
+  Ez0|z,p0|p
h
 W (R0) + (1   )W˜13(R0)
i
   bk
subject to
c+
1
1 + r
s = 1 [l > 0] (w(t, z)⇥ (1  ⌧)⇥ l   F (k)) + 1 [l = 0] b+ a  ⌘p > 0, (??)
2.3.10 The Problem of the Owner
The discrete choice problem of an owner not in a bankruptcy state is
V (a, z, p,m, h, k, t) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
max
 
V stay, V sell
 
if a   0, hpt  mt   0
max
 
V stay, V sell, V def
 
if a   0, hpt  mt < 0
max
 
V stay, V sell, V file.7, V file.13
 
if a < 0, hpt  mt   0, y < y
max
 
V stay, V sell, V file.13
 
if a < 0, hpt  mt < 0, y   y
max
 
V stay, V sell, V def, V file.7, V file.13, V file.def
 
if a < 0, hpt  mt < 0, y < y
max
 
V stay, V sell, V def, V file.13, V file.def
 
if a < 0, hpt  mt < 0, y   y
(2.16)
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where a   0 denotes someone with positive financial assets and hpt   mt is the
net equity in the house over and above the mortgage m. Importantly, not all dis-
crete choices are available everywhere on the state space, as can be seen from the
restrictions for each case. For example, filing for bankruptcy is only an option if
there is in fact unsecured debt, i.e. on the region where a < 0. Additionally, the
admissible chapter of bankruptcy depends on labor income lying below the thresh-
old y¯, as before. Similarly for the default choice, which is only an option if home
equity is negative. Owners with home equity in excess of the exemption level face
eviction should they file for bankruptcy under chapter 7. The level of homestead
exemption determines whether an owner filing under chapter 7 stays on in the house
or is evicted. We define the sub-problems in sequence below. Define the current
state space as S = (a, y, p,m, h, k, t) and remember that h 2 {1, 2} stands for “flat”
and “house”.
Value of Staying as Owner
The value of staying in the current home is
V stay (S) = max
s2R
l2L
u (c, l, h) +  Ez0|z,p0|p [V (S 0)] (2.17)
subject to
c+ q (z, p,m0, h, t, s)⇥ s = 1 [l > 0] (w(t, z)⇥ l   F (k)) + 1 [l = 0] b+ a  ⇠(m, rm, t)
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This problem is very similar to the buyer’s above with the exception that there is
no downpayment in the budget constraint as this is a one-oﬀ payment made at the
time of purchase.
Value of Selling the Home
The value of selling depends on the renter’s continuation value:
V sell (S) = max
s2R
l2L
u (c, l, 0) +  Ez0|z,p0|p [W (R0)] (2.18)
subject to
c+ q (z, p, t, s)⇥ s = 1 [l > 0] (w(t, z)⇥ l   F (k))
+ 1 [l = 0] b+ a  ⌘p+ ((1   )ph m)
In the above ⌘p is rent and the additional term (1  )ph m is the capital that can
be recovered following the sale:   is the proportion of capital lost by the process of
selling due to administrative and marketing costs.
Value of Default
The default value, in turn, is similar to the value of selling with the exception that
for a defaulter unsecured borrowing is impossible, and a one-time utility penalty
is incured. Regarding recourse legislation, we include a factor  2 [0, 1] here that
relates to the fraction of negative equity ((1  )(ph m)) that is rolled over in post
default life. For example  = 1 would mean that the entire remaining mortgage
debt is rolled over into post default life. Notice that the future value is that of a
renter, but the asset state takes into account any remaining mortgage debt d brought
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forward.
V def (S) = max
s>0
l2L
u (c, l, 0) +  Ez0|z,p0|p [W (d+ s, z0, p0k, t+ 1)]   def (2.19)
subject to
c+
1
1 + r
s = 1 [l > 0] (w(t, z)⇥ l   F (k)) + 1 [l = 0] b
+ a  ⌘p,
d =  ((1   )ph m)
Owner Bankruptcy chapter 7
The value of an owner who files for chapter 7 while staying in the home is given by
V file.7 (a, z, p,m, h, k, t) = max
s>0
l2L
u (c, l, h) +  Ez0|z,p0|p
h
V˜7 (S
0)
i
   bk (2.20)
subject to
c+
1
1 + r
s = 1 [l > 0] (w(t, z)⇥ l   F (k)) + 1 [l = 0] b  ⇠(m, rm, t) > 0
This value is only defined if current assets are negative, a < 0. Crucially, the
household may only stay in the house if net home equity lies below the homestead
exemption level e, i.e. iﬀ (1   )(ph m) < e. The case of filing for chapter 7 with
excess equity is described next.
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Value of Filing and Default The final value for the owner is defined by filing
for bankruptcy and defaulting on the mortgage at the same time as follows:
V file,def (S) = max
s>0
l2L
u (c, l, 0)   bk    def (2.21)
+  Ez0|z,p0|p
h
W˜7(R
0)
i
c+
1
1 + r
s = 1 [l > 0] (w(t, z)⇥ l   F (k))  ⌘p > 0
The assumption is that any remaining mortgage debt is discharged in the chapter 7
bankruptcy.
Owner Bankruptcy Chapter 13
The main diﬀerence to chapter 7 bankruptcy is that the owner may keep the house
(and all other assets) no matter how much equity there is after signing up to a
chapter 13 repayment plan. Consequently we don’t have to compute a value of
eviction and we also rule out the possibility to file for chapter 13 and default on the
mortgage at the same time.9
V file.13 (a, z, p,m, h, k, t) = max
s>0
l2L
u (c, l, h) +  Ez0|z,p0|p
h
V˜13 (S
0)
i
   bk (2.22)
subject to
c+
1
1 + r
s = 1 [l > 0] (w(t, z)⇥ l ⇥ (1  ⌧)  F (k)) + 1 [l = 0] b  ⇠(m, rm, t) > 0
9Filing for chapter 13 and defaulting at the same time is a particularly unrealistic choice, since
the consumer assumes the increased burden of chapter 13 (wage tax) without getting to enjoy the
benefits (staying in the house).
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Owner Bankruptcy punishment States
An owner in punishment state for either chapter has the discrete choice set “stay”,
“sell” and “default”. Her savings s cannot be negative (she cannot borrow). As in the
case of the renter, exit from the state is governed by the Bernoulli random variable
X ⇠ Bernoulli ( ). Thus the value for this owner is
V˜j(S) = max
⇣
V˜ stayj , V˜
sell
j , V˜
def
j
⌘
, j = 7, 13
where the value for stay is given by
V˜ stayj (S) = maxs>0
l2L
u (c, l, h) +  Ez0|z,p0|p
h
(1   )V˜j (S 0) +  V (S 0)
i
   bk (2.23)
subject to
c+
1
1 + r
s = a+ 1 [l > 0] (w(t, z)⇥ l ⇥ (1  ⌧(j))  F (k))  ⇠(m, rm, t) > 0,
⌧(j) =
8>><>>:
⌧ if j = 13
0 otherwise.
(2.24)
j = 7, 13
the value for sell is given by
V˜ sellj (S) = maxs>0
l2L
u (c, l, 0) + (2.25)
 Ez0|z,p0|p
h
(1   )W˜j(R0) +  W (R0)
i
   bk
c+
1
1 + r
s = 1 [l > 0] (w(t, z)⇥ l ⇥ (1  ⌧(j))  F (k))
+ a+ (1   )ph m  ⌘p > 0
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and finally the value for default in the punishment state is given by
V˜ defj (S) = maxs>0
l2L
u (c, l, 0)   bk    def (2.26)
+  Ez0|z,p0|p
h
(1   )W˜j(R0) +  W (R0)
i
c+
1
1 + r
s = 1 [l > 0] (w(t, z)⇥ l ⇥ (1  ⌧(j))  F (k))
+ a  ⌘p
The amount of assets that the person carries over into the next period depends both
on the extent of recourse in the specific state and on the amount of mortgage debt. In
any case a cannot be negative since the person has already filed for bankruptcy and
cannot borrow. However it can be positive if the person started saving after filing.
In a recourse state the existing financial assets will be used to pay oﬀ the mortgage
(under chapter 7). We assume that any remaining mortgage debt is then forgiven
and a = 0. This is not a particularly strong assumption because the individual could
again file for bankruptcy, something we do not see that much of in the data.
Final Period
We close the model by defining the final period value function as a function of the
state of the individual. We also need to avoid creating an artificial incentive for the
household to go bankrupt one or two periods before retirement and we allow for this
by estimating a penalty for such an action.
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2.4 Data
Our data is drawn from several sources. We use a confidential version of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel which we merge with LPS Mort-
gage Loan Level Data to compute bankruptcy and default rates at county level. We
supplement this with county level house prices obtained from Zillow Research10, as
well as county level demographic and economic characteristics from the American
Community Survey (ACS).
The NY Fed Consumer Credit Panel is assembled mainly from quarterly credit
bureau data, which the Federal Reserve Board, the New York Fed, and the Philadel-
phia Fed purchased from Equifax, one of the three major credit reporting agencies
in the United States. The dataset contains a random subsample of credit users (a
5% random sample that is representative of all individuals in the US who have a
credit history and whose credit file includes the individual’s social security num-
ber). This is individual level data which includes comprehensive summaries of key
characteristics of the diﬀerent types of debt held by individual borrowers (e.g., to-
tal credit-card balances and limits). In addition, the dataset includes loan-level
information on these borrowers’ mortgage. More specifically, the data contain de-
mographics (e.g. individual age, location by state, zipcode, and census tract, credit
risk score), information on mortgages11, information on other debts such as auto,
student, department, installment loans etc (e.g. current balance, past-due indica-
10http://www.zillow.com/research/data/
11loan origination date, origination amount, current balance, requested payment amount or term
of the loan, credit limit (on HELOCs), individual/joint account and payment status, whether GSE
guaranteed, whether for a mobile home, whether second mortgage, and whether the account was
closed in bankruptcy or foreclosure.
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tors, credit limit, payments). A detailed description of the panel can be found at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr479.pdf.
The second source is the LPS Mortgage Loan Level Data, formerly known as
“McDash” data. We combine this with the consumer panel because the panel does
not have very detailed information on mortgage terms. Merging with the LPS data
gives us information on first liens (loan origination date, origination amount, lien
status, and zipcode). This data have been used extensively over the past few years
to study mortgage defaults. The LPS data set is divided into a “static” file, whose
values generally do not change over time, and a “dynamic” file. The static data set
contains information obtained at the time of underwriting, such as the loan amount,
house price, (origination) FICO score, documentation status, source of the loan (e.g.,
whether it was broker-originated), property location (zip code), type of loan (fixed-
rate, ARM, prime, subprime, etc.), the prepayment penalty period (if any), and the
termination date and termination status if the loan has indeed terminated. The
termination types include “paid oﬀ,” foreclosure (and other negative termination
events such as REO sale), and the transfer of the loan to another servicer. The
dynamic file is updated monthly, and among other variables, it contains the status
of the loan (current, 30 days delinquent, 60 days, etc.), the current interest rate
(since this changes over time for ARMs), current balance, and investor type (private
securitized, GNMA, FNMA, FHLMC, portfolio). LPS covers about 70% of the
market after January 2005 and it oversamples prime mortgages.
We match the FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel with LPS based on mortgage
loan origination date, origination amount, the zipcode of the property, purpose of
the mortgage (purchase versus refinance), lien status (first lien versus second lien or
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home equity), type of mortgage (agency loans or not)) and occupancy type (primary
residence, second homes or investment properties).
The final dataset we use is the American Community Survey (ACS) Public Use
Microdata Sample. Merging ACS county level data onto the previous datasets results
in a panel by county over time which contains information on average bankruptcy
filing rates (for chapter 7 and 13 respectively), average default rates, on default
and bankruptcy rates, average educational attainment, and average employment in
a certain region over time. This information will allow us to relate education to
bankruptcy and mortgage default rates, which introduces an element of heterogene-
ity in the model. Additional to that we use PSID data to estimate a life-cycle profile
for the income process.
2.5 Model Implications
For illustrative purpose, we show some simulation paths of individual histories in
figure 2.6. Those plots combine discrete and continuous choice policy functions for a
random set of individuals. sThe mechanism connecting interest rate and probability
of bankrutpcy is illustrated for an arbitrary simulated individual in figure 2.7.
2.6 Estimation
A number of parameters are set based on earlier results from the literature. Table
2.3 lists the values of those. We rescale the house price so that it reflects the ratio
of price to median income and set the initial log house price p0 to 12, which roughly
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Figure 2.6: Individual simulation histories from the baseline model. Color codes
illustrate the discrete choice taken at that age. Keep in mind that 2 important state
variables (income and house price) are missing from this graphic to avoid clutter.
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Figure 2.7: Mechanism between probability of bankruptcy, savings, and interest
rate. Depending on the value of other (not shown) state variables, with negative
savings, there is positive probability of bankruptcy (chapter 7 in this case), and an
interest rate premium to pay.
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corresponds to the average value in our ACS dataset for 2006. We choose the values
of ↵ and   in conjunction so as to pin down the amount of labour supplied, the
value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and the value of the Frisch
labor supply elasticity. We set the weight of leisure in utility ↵ so that on average
individuals work 35% of their time. We want to target the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (IES) estimated by Blundell et al. (1994) of 0.75. The IES for
consumption is given by   [↵(1   )  1] 1, therefore we require   = 2,↵ = 0.33.
Beyond this set of parameters the rest are estimated using the data described
earlier and within the context of our model. The estimation approach we use com-
bines simulation with the MCMC approach developed by Chernozhukov and Hong
(2003). The criterion we minimize is a distance criterion between data moments and
simulated moments from the model. One of the key advantages of this approach
is that it can cope with criteria that are not diﬀerentiable, which is often the case
when dealing with simulated moments. 12
2.6.1 Empirical Moments
To estimate the model we combine a basic set of moments, as listed in Table 2.4
together with indirect inference. Indirect inference involves matching the coeﬃcients
12Our function is evaluated on a set of N parallel Markov chains, which diﬀer in their respective
“tempering”. Intuitively, chains with higher index n are subject to larger shocks to the current
parameter vector, therefore they perform exploration of the parameter space over a wider area.
Additionally, chains can communicate with one another according to some rule. This mechanism
allows chains to make large jumps over the parameter space, moving away from areas where the
objective function has a relatively large value and towards regions with better, smaller values. For
a technical description see Baragatti et al. (2013).
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value meaning
1 + r 1.040 gross risk free interest rate
1
1+r 0.962 inverse of gross risk free interest rate
  0.950 discount factor
  0.200 downpayment as proportion of house value
(1 + rm) 1.060 mortgage rate
p0 13.000 median log house house price 2006
p2y 12.000 initial price to income ratio in simulation
  0.940 proportional fixed cost of selling
⇢z 0.950 AR1 coeﬃcient on wage AR1 component
⇢p 0.900 AR1 coeﬃcient on price AR1 component
  0.200 prob of exiting bk state
⌘ 0.000 rental rate as a fraction of house price
 0.600 flat price as a fraction of house price
 0.100 fraction of mortgage debt rolled-over under Recourse
⌧bk 0.100 prop of wage garnished in chapter 13 bankruptcy
w 1.000 chapt. 7 income meanstest as a fraction of med income
e 0.500 homestead exemption as a fraction of med. income
↵ -0.333 disutility from labour
  2.000 CRRA
b 0.250 unemployment benefit
aL -2.000 minimal assets (times med. income)
aH 4.000 maximal assets (times med. income)
pL 0.300 minimal price (times p0)
pH 1.100 maximal price (times p0)
HS 0.130 proportion of individuals less than HS
Table 2.3: Exogenous parameters
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moment data
Bankruptcy rate % 0.5
bankruptcy ch. 13 (prop) 0.2
bankruptcy ch. 7 (prop) 0.3
default rate (prop) 0.030
default rate age 30-40 (prop) 0.033
default rate age 41-50 (prop) 0.030
default rate age 51-60 (prop) 0.025
duration 8.000
flats (prop of total) 0.105
ownership rate (prop) 0.716
ownership rate age 30-40 (prop) 0.613
ownership rate age 41-50 (prop) 0.740
ownership rate age 51-60 (prop) 0.804
unemployment rate (prop) 0.068
Table 2.4: List of aggregate moments. (prop) means that the number is given as
a proportion of the total population, i.e. for bk=0.004, the observed number of
bankruptcies would be population * bk. These are computed from our baseline set
of states. Refer to Section ??, group 5.
of auxiliary regressions obtained from the actual data to those obtained when the
same regressions are fit to simulated data. In particular we wish to allow for ex ante
heterogeneity in the model by specifying preferences as well as wages to be functions
of education. Other sources of heterogeneity (ex-post) are the wage shocks and of
course the house prices.
In estimating the model we need to define the source of variation that identi-
fies it. Unfortunately, the variation in the institutional framework cannot be used
for identification of the model. This is because the institutions themselves may be
endogenous, in the sense that they are designed to fit the local context. Moreover,
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the composition of people borrowing and hence defaulting will vary as a result of
diﬀerent equilibria in each market. Changes in institutions may have been informa-
tive but on the one hand these are very rate and secondly we would need more than
one discrete item of variation. As a result we decided to estimate the model based
on a single institutional context. We then use the model to simulate the impacts
of alternative institutions. For this purpose we group states into 5 distinct groups
according to bankrupcty–relevant legislation (amount of homestead exemption and
whether or not deficiency judgements are allowed). Our reference group is the largest
one, labelled group 5 in table A.1, which we observe annually from 2006 to 2012.
We use time variation from housing prices (which we take as exogenous) to
identify the model. This relies on local county level shocks to generate variabilty
in the bankruptcy rates. We also need a source of information to identify the way
that ex-ante heterogeneity, which we associate with education, aﬀects decisions.
For this we use cross sectional variation. The diﬃculty is that the data on defaults
and bankruptcy does not include information on education. However, we can exploit
variation acoss counties in the level of education to identify the model. This requires
us to control for factors that aﬀect bankruptcies and are correlated with education
but are not accounted for in the model. To achieve this we first construct a county
level data set by matching into ACS county level data information on bankruptcy
and mortgage default. We then regress these on the proportion of indivuals with a
college degree that live in the county, as well as other confounding characteristics
that are not included in the model and whose impact needs to be accounted for. The
idea is to generate a “synthetic” county level dataset which nets out heterogeneity
between counties, resulting in an environment that is closely comparable to the one
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in our model. A plot of percentage of low-educated vs log bankruptcy rate is in
figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8: Bankruptcy vs fraction of low-educated
To generate the auxilary coeﬃcients used in estimation we run regressions of the
per capita mortgage default rate, the bankruptcy rate, the rate of filing for chapter
7 and 13 respectively and the proportion in small homes (flats), i.e. those with less
than three rooms. In each auxiliary regression also we include the proportion with
less than college degree, house prices divided by median income and the proportion
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mean Standard Deviation
Bankruptcy Rate 0.006 0.002
Mean House Value / Median Income 2.522 0.768
Percentage less than HS 14.530 5.481
Percentage of HS.grad 32.335 6.278
Percentage of HS.grad+ 53.139 9.736
Percentage of Graduate 8.658 3.927
Percentage of divorced females 12.242 1.734
Percentage of divorced males 10.178 1.860
Ownership Rate 71.769 8.598
Default Rate 0.015 0.010
Bankruptcy Rate Chapter 7 0.003 0.002
Bankruptcy Rate Chapter 13 0.002 0.002
Percentage Flat owners 8.037 3.454
Median Earnings 47006.016 8344.394
Homestead Exemption 8153.907 1773.698
Homestead Exemption / Median Income 0.179 0.053
Table 2.5: Summary statistics from the ACS-NYFed data
of males and females who are divorced. Summary statistics from the dataset we are
using are given in table 2.5. The numbers represent means and standard deviations
across counties.
The result of the auxiliary regressions are summarised in table 2.6. We are
particularly interested in the coeﬃcient on house prices and on the proportion of
low educated people, which we match with our model. Our assumption is that the
associations of these variables with the various outcome variables can be replicated
by our model once we condition on the remaining variables, which absorb cross
county heterogeneity. The coeﬃcient on education is a function of both the process
of income associated with education and possibly of preferences. According to these
coeﬃcients, increased house prices (relative to median income) reduce the probability
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of bakruptcy and particularly under chapter 7; this is because under Chapter 7, a
filer is likely to loose their assets. Consequently if there is a valuable house on the
balance sheet, this provides a reason not to file. House prices are not associated
with increased filings under chapter 13, which is consistent with the fact that under
that chapter assets are not confiscated. Furthermore, increased house prices reduce
default rates and they decrease the probability of owning at all, while increasing the
probability of owning a smaller house (flat). Lower levels of education are associated
with higher levels of bankruptcy and indeed higher rate of filing under chapter 13.
This seems unexpected since chapter 7 allows you to write oﬀ all debts against any
assets you may have, while under chapter 13 you keep your assets and a repayment
plan is agreed based on withholding of wages. However, low educated people have
low wages and lower labour market attachment and as a result are likely to pay
much less under Chapter 13, while still being able to hold on to their houses or
other assets. Of course higher earning individuals are compelled to file under 13,
but as the bankruptcy rate declines rapidly with education, this eﬀect does not
dominate. We also included divorce rates, which may reflect the extent of hardship
particularly for females. Finally, we also condition on the state level of homestead
exemption and on county level median income. These coeﬃcients are not used in
the estimation of the model, which is based on a group of states with a homogeneous
set of institutions.
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bk.rate bk.rate7 bk.rate13 def.rate Pr(own) Pr(flat|own)
Intercept  0.0021  0.0011  0.0010 0.0048 93.5402⇤⇤⇤  0.8768
(0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0035) (2.8428) (1.2045)
House Price  0.0005⇤⇤⇤  0.0005⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000  0.0021⇤⇤⇤  1.8661⇤⇤⇤ 1.1329⇤⇤⇤
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.4422) (0.1894)
Prop Less than College 0.0094⇤⇤⇤ 0.0036⇤ 0.0058⇤⇤⇤ 0.0158  16.3043⇤ 1.0075
(0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0087) (7.0597) (2.9948)
Divorced Females 0.0004⇤⇤⇤ 0.0001⇤ 0.0003⇤⇤⇤ 0.0006⇤  2.0070⇤⇤⇤ 0.5623⇤⇤⇤
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.2364) (0.1004)
Divorced Males  0.0002⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000  0.0002⇤⇤⇤  0.0003 0.6831⇤⇤ 0.1349
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.2584) (0.1094)
Mortgage Default 0.0675⇤⇤⇤ 0.0333⇤⇤⇤ 0.0341⇤⇤⇤  9.0432
(0.0076) (0.0060) (0.0060) (13.7826)
Homestead Exemption 0.0000⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000⇤⇤⇤
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Median Earnings 0.0000 0.0000⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000⇤⇤
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Bankr.Rate (Chpt. 7) 1.6216⇤⇤⇤ 454.2885⇤  598.5466⇤⇤⇤
(0.2404) (195.0143) (85.4790)
Bankr. Rate (Chpt. 13) 1.6160⇤⇤⇤ 1257.2595⇤⇤⇤  228.2523⇤⇤
(0.2405) (195.1241) (85.5037)
R2 0.3581 0.1809 0.3124 0.2184 0.2550 0.1750
Adj. R2 0.3508 0.1716 0.3046 0.2109 0.2477 0.1657
Num. obs. 627 627 627 627 627 627
⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05
Table 2.6: Auxiliary Regressions. Notice that p and low have been rescaled for
readibility by multiplying both data series with a factor of 0.01.
2.7 Estimation Results
Table (2.7) shows the current values of the parameters being estimated, which are
used in our current simulations. It is hard to interpret these in isolation. However
there are some interesting features. First, there is a strong ownerhip premium (µ),
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value meaning
✓ 0.10 partial deriv of cons w.r.t housing in utility
  0.50 utility weight of flat relative to house
µ 3.00 ownership premium
 bk,H 1.10 cost of bankruptcy High Educ
 bk,L 1.00 cost of bankruptcy Low Educ
 def,H 0.70 cost of default High Educ
 def,L 1.00 cost of default Low Educ
 bk,def,H 50.00 cost of default and bankruptcy High Educ
 bk,def,L 50.00 cost of default and bankruptcy Low Educ
F 0.10 Fixed cost of work
Table 2.7: Parameter estimates. Currently the estimation is only based on matching
the moments in table (2.4). Including the auxiliary regression parameters into the
estimation is work in progress.
which ensures that even low wealth individuals will much prefer to own than to rent.
Secondly, increasing the size of the house reduces the marginal utility of consumption
making housing and housing substitutes (✓ < 1). Finally a flat is worth about half
a larger house in terms of utility.
The cost of bankruptcy is higher for high educated individuals, while the cost
of default is higher for the low educated, which is driven by the fact that many low
educated individuals file under chapter 13. The cost of doing both at the same time
is eﬀectively infinite and this just reflects the fact that these events are almost never
seen to occur simultaneously.
2.8 Policy Experiments
Bankruptcy law is a form of insurance against the worst kind of shocks. In eﬀect
it puts a floor on consumption when events occur that prevent individuals from
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repaying debts. This of course allows individuals to borrow amounts that they may
not be able to repay, contrary to the standard Ayagari model where the amount
borrowed is bounded by the amount individuals can repay with certainty. Like most
insurance systems it comes with its share of moral hazard, which depends on the
institutional framework providing this insurance. For example if there is unlimited
homestead exemption there is an incentive to store all assets in housing and then
default on ones debt. It is this kind of behaviour that the BAPCA tried to eliminate
by requiring individuals with higher incomes to file under Chapter 13. But then
again, income can be manipulated through changes in labour supply, which is one
of the moral hazard issues with chapter 13. Our model includes all these elements
and now we proceed to understand the eﬀects on behavior and the welfare value of
alternative arrangements for managing bankruptcy and mortgage default taking into
account the eﬀects on the cost of credit and of course the changes in the behaviour
of individuals.
The key policy parameters we consider are the amount of homestead exemption
and whether non-housing equity can be used to repay mortgage loans following
default. In addition, given the recent reforms on who can file under chapter 7 vis a
vis chapter 13 an interesting question is how should this be regulated and what is
the eﬀect on behaviour of wage garnishings. We consider these issues based on our
model simulations.
In this section we report results from policy experiments where we change three
parameters: firstly, the extent to which lenders have recourse (controlled by a pa-
rameter  , which is the proportion of debt that is rolled over); secondly we vary the
level of means testing that is applied before an individual is allowed to file for chap-
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ter 7; and finally we will be looking at the eﬀects of changing the level of homestead
exemption.
2.8.1 Reducing the level of Homestead exemption
In the first experiment we set homestead exemption to a value close to zero. We
measure homestead exemption in terms of median income, which is normalized to
unity. The baseline value of homestead exemption is 0.5, meaning that we assume
that a value of half of median income may be exempt in bankruptcy, which is
consistent with the legal framework we consider in our estimations.
Table 2.8 shows the key results. As we expect, filing under chapter 7 declines
to a third of its baseline value since fewer assets can be preserved in the event
of bankruptcy, while there is a small increase in filing under chapter 13. Overall
bankruptcy rates fall, which results in an interest rate reduction on average of 1
percentage point. This reflects precicely the tradeoﬀ motivating the paper. Credit
becomes cheaper and thus more available, but the level of insurance declines. It turns
out that the disutility of reduced insurance outweighs the benefits of the decline of
interest rates: individuals are willing to give up 0.52% of lifecycle consumption for
the original higher exemption level. This is despite the reduction in the cost of
credit for young people. The lifecycle profiles of average unsecured interest rates are
shown in Figure 2.9 while Figure 2.10 illustrates the lifecycle profile of bankruptcy.
The highest reductions occur for young individuals because they have the highest
probability of bankruptcy. At the same time they are those who are most liquid-
ity constrained. The implication of these results is that the homestead exemption
provides insurance desired by consumers, despite the increased costs of credit.
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Figure 2.9: Homestead exemption experiment: This graph shows the average interest
rate for unsecured debt charged to an average owner and renter over the lifecycle in
both regims.
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Figure 2.10: Homestead exemption experiment: Probability of Bankruptcy for av-
erage owner and renter over the lifecycle in both regims.
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Variable baseline: hex=0.5 policy: hex=0.1
Prob BK7 (%) 1.75 0.56
Prob BK13 (%) 0.75 0.77
Interest Rate (%) 6.03 5.19
Labor supply 0.99 0.99
Consumption 0.60 0.60
Mortgage Debt 2.29 2.26
Equity 3.19 3.13
Willingness to Pay (%) - -0.53%
Table 2.8: Statistics for setting homestead exemption (hex) to 0.1.
2.8.2 Changing the level of recourse
Another important element of the law is the extent to which mortgage debt is
carried forward following default and foreclosure. If for example one defaults and
after selling oﬀ the house the mortgage lender is still owed, say, $100,000 to what
extent can the lender go after other assets to cover the shortfall. We experiment by
increasing the level of recourse from 10% to 25% of the shortfall.
The summary of results can be found in Table 2.9. Bankruptcy rates go up
because an increase in the rollover fraction means that defaulting on the mortgage
creates unsecured debt. More unsecured debt means more bankruptcies, which
means that interest rates are pushed up by nearly 0.5% on average. The result is
a decline in overall welfare equivalent to a reduction in consumption of 0.61% over
the lifecycle. Mortgage defaults decline markedly as a result of this reform while
figure 2.11 shows the lifecycle profile of the reduction in interest rates for owners
- renters do not have an increased incentive to default and hence do not face a
higher cost of borrowing. The implication of this simulation is that increasing the
amount of recourse is welfare reducing, because it reduces the amount of insurance.
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Variable baseline: rollover=0.1 policy: rollover=0.25
Prob BK7 (%) 1.75 2.01
Prob BK13 (%) 0.74 0.87
Interest Rate (%) 6.03 6.48
Labor supply 0.99 0.99
Consumption 0.60 0.60
Mortgage Debt 2.28 2.24
Equity 3.19 3.21
Willingness to pay(%) - -0.61%
Table 2.9: Statistics for setting rollover=0.25.
Since banks can go after a greater proportion of remaining mortgage debt after
default. However, this simulation does not take into account the potential declines
in mortgage interest rates, as a result of the higher level of recourse. Such a decline
in mortgage rates would counteract the welfare decline shown here and may even
reverse the result.
2.8.3 Making the BAPCPA meanstest more stringent
The BAPCPA meanstest states that anyone with income above state median income
is barred from filing for chapter 7. In this experiment we lower the means test all
the way to zero earnings, essentially barring everyone with any labor income from
filing for chapter 7. We see this illustrated in figure 2.14, where eﬀectively no one
files for chapter 7, since very few people in the model have zero earnings, and if they
do, they are unlikely to be able to take out any unsecured loans.
Closing down the option of chapter 7 does not change chapter 13 filings and
reduces interest rates substantially. Since this latter channel is still available the
level of insurance provided seems suﬃcient, which is reflected in a willingness to
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Figure 2.11: Average interest rates on unsecured debt when increasing the level of
recourse given to mortgage lenders.
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Figure 2.12: Average probability of bankruptcy when increasing the level of recourse
given to mortgage lenders.
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Variable baseline: meanstest=1 policy: meanstest=0
Prob BK7 (%) 1.77 0.03
Prob BK13 (%) 0.74 0.73
Interest Rate 6.03% 4.92%
Labor supply 0.99 0.99
Consumption 0.60 0.60
Mortgage Debt 2.29 2.29
Equity 3.19 3.10
Willingness to Pay (%) - 0.65%
Table 2.10: Statistics of reducing BAPCPA meanstest to 0: nobody with any labor
income can file for chapter 7 bankruptcy.
pay for this reform of about 0.65% of lifecycle consumption. Here is an interesting
example of a reform which reduces options and thus moral hazard, but leads to
aggregate welfare improvements.
2.9 Conclusions
We specify and estimate a rich model of consumption, housing demand and labor
supply in an environment where individuals may file for bankruptcy or default on
their mortgage. Uncertainty in the model is driven both by house price shocks and
income shocks, while bankruptcy is governed by the basic institutional framework
in the US as implied by chpater 7 and chapter 13.
The aim of the paper is to oﬀer a framework for understanding and evaluating
alternative systems for bankruptcy protection and mortgage default. These systems
provide some insurance against important adverse shocks to individuals but also
generate moral hazard and increase the costs of credit. Understanding how these
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Figure 2.13: Average interest rates when the BAPCPA meanstest is made more
stringent.
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Figure 2.14: Average probability of bankruptcy when making the BAPCPA
meanstest more stringent.
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eﬀects should be weighed against each other and evaluating the overall welfare eﬀects
of such legislation is key for evidence based design of legislation.
The model is estimated using a combination of data from credit records and
mortgages together with individual level data from the American Community Sur-
vey. We then use the model for counterfactual simulations to address the questions
raised above.
We simulate three reforms all of which tend to reduce the amount of insurance
oﬀered by the bankruptcy system: one where we reduce the homestead exemption,
one where we increase the amount of non-housing assets that lenders can access
after a mortgage default (degree of recourse) and one where any positive earnings
disqualifies one from filing under chapter 7. The underlying trade-oﬀs between
reduction in moral hazard and changes in the cost of credit for unsecured loans
are diﬀerent in each case and it turns out that the first two reforms are welfare
reducing, while the latter is welfare increasing. This demonstrates that bankruptcy
reform invloves a delicate balancing act between the various forces at hand and
consequently the way it is carried out must carefully balance the various alternatives.
Chapter 3
Regional Shocks, Migration and
Homeownership
3.1 Introduction
Homeownership and the likelihood of moving across regions are negatively corre-
lated. This negative correlation has important implications when considering the
insurance mechanisms available to consumers in the face of regional shocks to hous-
ing and labor productivity in a world of incomplete markets. The possiblity of
moving to another region in the event of a shock is a way to self-insure against tail
risk.
The aims of this paper are first to investigate the value of this self insurance
mechanism, second to analyse the reaction of regional mobility to regional shocks and
third to establish how important government policies such as the mortgage interest
tax deduction, which encourages ownership, interact with regional migration. To
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address those issues, I propose a lifecycle model of consumption and savings, housing
tenure and location choice, with aggregate uncertainty which aﬀects prices in regions
diﬀerentially. Migration serves as a partial insurance device because regions are
exposed to aggregate shocks to a diﬀerent degree, consistent with the observed data.
The lifecycle considerations have important implications for the analysis of welfare
impacts of policy changes, since age groups are diﬀerentially aﬀected.
Regional shocks to labor demand and house prices may have profound and lon-
glasting impacts, as we are still witnessing in the aftermath of the 2007 fall in house
prices and ensuing Great Recession. In this episode we have seen wide variation in
the magnitude of local shocks despite underlying high national correlations. For ex-
ample, the peak-to-trough decline in the Federal Housing Financing Agency (FHFA)
house price index from 2007 to 2011 ranged from -2.3% in Pittsburgh, to -61% in Las
Vegas.1 The decline of the automobile industry in Detroit provides a vivid example
of the eﬀects of a permanent shock to labor income in a region: from the 1950 to
the 2010 censuses, the population of Detroit declined by 61%.
Shocks to regional labor demand aﬀect renters and owners in a similar way, i.e.
labor income of both falls. The eﬀects of a fall in house prices is more nuanced,
since renters stand to benefit from cheaper rent, if this is related to prices, while
owners may loose wealth invested in the house. Furthermore, if house prices reflect
the value of local amenities in some kind of way, the location becomes less attractive
for renters as well as for owners. For those reasons, we should expect to see diﬀerent
reactions in the mobility of renters and owners in response to diﬀerent shocks. Labor
market shocks should make both types more likely to leave the region, while price
1This refers to FHFA expanded house price index data for the 50 largest MSAs in the USA.
Available at http://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Documents/HPI/HPI_EXP_metro.txt
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shocks could have diﬀerential impacts, depending on the relative importance of cheap
rents, low value housing asset, lower amenity values, and moving costs for renters
and owners.
In 2013, 63% of occupied housing units in the US were owned, while 37% were
rented.2 At the same time, roughly 1.3% of the population migrate across US
census division boundaries per year. Conditioning on ownership we find that 1.9%
of renters and 0.67% owners move. A natural question is then to ask why do we
observe owners moving less? All else equal, owners face higher moving costs, both
in terms of financial as well as time and eﬀort costs. Financial costs occur because
of transaction costs in the housing market upon sale of the house (e.g. agency fees
or transaction taxes), while costs of eﬀort arise from owners having to spend time
finding a suitable buyer, meet with agents and lawyers etc. A comparable renter
is subject to those costs only to a lesser degree. Buying a house means to make
a highly local financial investment, which is subject to shocks as discussed above,
is relatively illiquid, and in addition may have a location specific flow of utility.
Consumers may have preferences for locations. These factors interact to shape the
joint decision of housing tenure, location choice, and mortgage borrowing. What is
more, they all interact to influence the decision to move in response to a shock.
In the model I develop, there are several mechanisms which aﬀect the home
ownership choice of individuals. A downpayment requirement means that only indi-
viduals with suﬃcient cash on hand are able to buy a house at the current price. The
model assumes a preference for owner-occupied accomodation, which also influences
2see American Community Survey 2013, table DP04.
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the buying decision next to age, the probability of moving, and beliefs about future
shocks.
In terms of the decision to migrate to another region, the model predicts that
the likelihood of migration is increasing in the diﬀerence of discounted expected
lifetime utilities between any two regions. Those relative utilities, in turn, depend
among other things on the average regional income level and the level of regional
house prices, both of which vary over time. Allowing regional characteristics to vary
is a significant contribution to the literature on dynamic migration models such
as for example Kennan and Walker (2011), since it provides an additional reason
for agents to move in response to a change in their economic environment, rather
than as a result of idiosyncratic preference shocks alone. Including time-varying
location characteristics, however, increases computational demands substantially.
To keep those demands tractable, the model employs a factor structure which allows
aggregate shocks to aﬀect regions diﬀerently.
I estimate the model using a simulated method of moments estimator. I find that
the model fits the data very well along the main dimensions of interest, which are
mobility and ownership patterns over the lifecycle, ownership rates by region, as well
as wealth accumulation over the lifecycle and by region. After fitting the model to
the data, I first illustrate how adding ownership and assets to a dynamic migration
model aﬀects behaviour. I then show how the model reacts to large regional shocks,
before I move on to compute a measure of the value of the migration option. Finally,
the model is used to perform counterfactual policy simulations.
I find that owners and renters face very diﬀerent incentives in the model. The
probability of moving conditional on being a renter is consistently higher than the
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one for owners, and it varies considerably with income and assets. The model can be
used to quantify the moving cost in terms of dollars, and I find that the estimates for
renters and owners bracket the moving cost obtained in Kennan and Walker (2011).
Migration is a low probability event in both data and model. Nevertheless, the
welfare implications are large. I conduct an experiment whereby moving away from
a certain region is prohibited. I compute the expected lifetime utility of agents in
the region under both scenarios, and I find that removing the option to move away
from the region reduces expected utility by 5.1%. This implies that residents of this
region would demand a 4.4% increase in per period consumption over their lifecycle
in order to be indiﬀerent to the baseline environment. Conditioning on age when
computing expected utility reveals that the cost of not being able to move is largest
for younger individuals, and it gradually fades out as agents grow older.
Government policies might help to increase labor market eﬃciency, housing mar-
ket ineﬃciency or both. The main ineﬃciencies any policy might target are incom-
plete asset markets, liquidity constraints, moving and transaction costs, income taxes
and imperfect rental markets. One large pre-existing intervention in this context is
the mortgage interest deduction. It is interesting to consider how abolishing this
tax deduction might interact with borrowing, housing tenure choice and migration.
I find that abolishing the mortgage interest deduction would have a only a neg-
ligible impact on the aggregate migration rate. At first sight one might be tempted
to think that removing the deduction would result in more renters, which would
mechanically translate into an increase in migration, since renters move more. The
actual eﬀect is more nuanced. First, because the mortgage tax deduction is a large
scale policy, there is likely to be a general equilibrium eﬀect. While my model is
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a partial equilibrium model, I can approximate the general equilibrium eﬀect by
assuming that the policy changes both taxes as well as prices. I use recent results
from a stationary GE model by Sommer and Sullivan (2013) who find that house
prices fall, while rents keep constant, after the policy is changed. Applying this
price and rent correction to my model results in an increase in the ownership rate of
roughly 1%, because more households are able to buy at lower prices. The net eﬀect
on migration is very small (0.1% of the baseline rate). The reduction in mobility
is smaller than what we would expect from a pure change in composition towards
more owners, because migration behaviour changes as well. Lower prices and a
higher level of disposable income for the poor after redistribution of tax proceeds in
all regions change the incentives to exploit regional diﬀerences with respect to the
baseline. In terms of welfare, households prefer removing the deduction and would
agree to giving up 2.4% of period consumption before being indiﬀerent to the status
quo.
Literature. My paper builds on Kennan and Walker (2011), who are the first
to develop a model of migration with multiple location choices over the lifecycle.
Their main finding is that expected income is an important determinant of migra-
tion decisions, and their framework requires large moving costs to match observed
migration decisions. Gemici (2007) focuses on migration decisions of couples with
two working spouses and finds that, for this subgroup, family ties can significantly
hinder migration decisions and wage growth. Winkler (2010) is a recent paper that
extends Gemici (2007) to include housing choices and focuses on the response of
owners to individual labor market shocks.
122 CHAPTER 3. MIGRATION AND HOMEOWNERSHIP
The main diﬀerences to this paper are the way I model regional price and income
dynamics and the assumption about how job search takes place. Regarding regional
dynamics, I am able to allow for shocks which are correlated across regions and with
an aggregate component that is persistent, while they are assumed to be independent
in Winkler (2010). I follow Kennan and Walker (2011) in assuming that individuals
must visit a location in order to discover the exact value of their new wage, over and
above a predictable part, while Winkler (2010) assumes that job oﬀers arrive in the
current location from a random alternative location. My assumption implies firstly
that individuals consider all potential locations in each period, and decide to move
based on their expectations about how they will fare in each. Secondly it allows for
reasons other than job oﬀers to trigger a move, which is a feature of the data, as I
will show below. Finally, it is interesting to note that when simulating the eﬀects
of abolishing the mortgage interest deduction, I correct for a GE eﬀect on house
prices, which is likely to occur as a result of the policy change, and I enforce revenue
neutrality by redistributing saved tax receipts, which is not done in his paper. I find
that that welfare implications strongly depend on those features.
By considering regional shocks, this paper is also related to the seminal contribu-
tion of Blanchard and Katz (1992). In light of state-specific shocks to labor demand,
the authors find that after an adverse shock, the relocation of workers is one of the
main mechanisms to restore unemployment and participation rates back to trend
in an aﬀected region. Related to this, Notowidigdo (2011) analyses the incidence
of local labor demand shocks on low-skilled workers in a static spatial equilibrium
model and finds that they are more likely to stay in a declining city than high-skilled
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workers to take advantage of cheaper housing.3 The same mechanism operates in
my model. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of my model allows me to evaluate the
response of migration to shocks over time.
Also related is a recent literature that considers the eﬀects of the 2007 housing
bust on labor market mobility. In terms of empirical contributions, Ferreira et al.
(2010), Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) and Demyanyk et al. (2013) look at whether nega-
tive equity in the home reduces the mobility of owners and report mixed findings.
The first paper finds an eﬀect, whereas the next two do not, with the diﬀerence
arising from diﬀerent datasets and definitions of long-distance moves. More theoret-
ical papers like Head and Lloyd-Ellis (2012), Nenov (2012), Song et al. (2014) and
Karahan and Rhee (2011) use search models of labor and housing markets to look
at geographical mismatch in order to understand how a fall in house prices aﬀects
unemployment and migration rates. The last paper, in particular, formalizes the
negative equity lock-in notion in a model with two locations and finds only a mod-
erate eﬀect of lock–in on the increase in unemployment. The present paper diﬀers
from this group of contributions by assuming multiple locations and by adopting a
life-cycle framework.4
Finally, the paper relates to the literature on tax treatment of housing and
ownership. The federal tax code in the United States allows households to deduct
mortgage interest payments from Federal taxes. Glaeser (2011) and Glaeser and
3See Moretti (2011) for a comprehensive overview of this literature going back to Roback (1982)
and Rosen (1979), and Diamond (2012) and Piyapromdee (2013) for recent applications.
4In general, the relationship between homeownership and labor market mobility or unemploy-
ment has been discussed in many other places, and an incomplete list might include Oswald (1996);
Blanchflower and Oswald (2013), Coulson and Fisher (2002), Güler and Taskın (2011), Battu et al.
(2008) or Halket and Vasudev (2014).
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Shapiro (2002) respectively discuss the benefits and distortions generated by this
policy, and Poterba and Sinai (2008) provide an estimate of the financial benefit to
owners from it. Sommer and Sullivan (2013) is a recent contribution that analyses
the policy in a GE framework. I evaluate the eﬀect of removing the deduction on
both homeownership and mobility.
This paper merges housing demand over the lifecycle, as for example Li et al.
(2014), with dynamic migration decisions under aggregate and regional shocks. I
find that housing is an important feature of the individual migration decision. The
likelihood of moving depends not only on whether or not the individual owns their
house and on their asset holdings, but also on the price and income levels in all
potential destination regions. The value of the migration option to actual migrants
is very large.
3.2 Empirical Background
The amount of regional migration in the US is still high by international standards.
According to Molloy et al. (2011), who use three publicly available datasets (Ameri-
can Community Survey (ACS), the Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the
CPS (March CPS), and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data), each year roughly
1.5% of the entire population moves between two out of four census regions, and
about 1.3% move between states within any one region. At a more local level, they
find that 5% of the population move between counties each year, which amounts to
roughly one-third of the annual flows into and out of employment according to the
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Period Geography % of US population
Annual county 5
state 2
region 1.5
5-year county 18.6
state 8.9
region 4.8
Table 3.1: Migration rates at diﬀerent levels of geographic aggreagation and over
diﬀerent time spells. Taken from Molloy et al. (2011), computed from ACS, March
CPS and IRS data.
measure in Fallick and Fleischman (2004). An overview of migration rates across
diﬀerent regional delineations and over diﬀerent time spells is shown in table 3.1.
It is somewhat unfortunate that none of the datasets employed by Molloy et al.
(2011) are very well suited for the purpose of analysing migration and ownership.
None of them tracks movers, so it is impossible to know the circumstances of an
individual at the moment they decided to move, which is ultimately of interest in
this paper.5 I therefore use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
in this paper, a longitudinal and nationally representative dataset.
Before presenting statistics from SIPP data, I will explain the geographic concept
I will be using in this paper, which is a US Census Division. Census Divisions are nine
relatively large regions which separate the United States into groups of states “for
the presentation of census data”6. To a first approximation, those regions represent
areas with a common housing and labor market. In the model, a move within any
5It is possible to construct a panel dataset from the CPS, but only with postal address as unit
identifier. If an individual moves out, this can be inferred from the data, however, the destination
of the move cannot – in particular it is unknown whether they relocated withing the city, or
somewhere else.
6See the Census bureau’s website at https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_
census_divreg.html and figure B.1 for a map.
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region is not considered as migration and therefore does not contribute to the overall
migration rate. This implies that there is a proportion of moves across markets that
do happen in the data, but which are not picked up by my geographic definition of
a market.
The aggregation of states into this particular grouping is but one of many pos-
sibilities, and I adopt this particular partition based on computational constraints.
In many respects the ideal concept of a region is what economists would refer to as
a local labor market, and metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) or commuting zones
(CZ) come close to this. Unfortunately, for the purpose of the model in this pa-
per, the so–defined number of regions would be far too large to be computationally
feasible. Hence the choice of census divisions.7
Descriptive Statistics on Cross Division Migration. I combine four panels
of SIPP data (1996, 2001, 2004 and 2008) into a database with 102,529 individuals
that I can follow over time and space. From this dataset, a couple of interesting
facts emerge. Table 3.2 presents some summary annual moving rates for both state
and Census Division level migration. The overall unconditional migration rate is
1.95% and 1.32% per year for cross state and cross division, respectively. The
cross state figure diﬀers from the 2% in table 3.1 because I set up the SIPP data
in terms of household heads, thereby missing some moves of non–reference persons,
and potentially because of sample attrition. It is quite clear from table 3.2 that there
7The model presented below contains 25.4 million diﬀerent points in the state space at which to
solve a savings problem. Increasing the number of regions to 51 (to represent US states) increases
this to 815 million points in the state space. Given that estimation requires evaluation of the
model solution many times over, the former state space can be handled with code that is highly
optimized for speed, while the latter cannot.
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is a marked distinction in the likelihood of moving across state as well as division
boundaries between renters and owners, with 2.6% (1.85%) of renters versus 0.93%
(0.7%) of owners moving across state (division) boundaries on average per year.
In total I observe of 2684 cross Division moves made by 2329 unique individuals,
implying multiple moves for some movers, see table 3.3.8
Moving on to migration by age, we can see in figure 3.1 firstly that renters are
more likely to move at all ages, and secondly that there is a strongly declining age
eﬀect – younger individuals move more. Both of those are highly salient features
of the data, and they are the main dimension along which my model’s performance
is going to be evaluated. Finally, a summary regarding homeownership rates and
median price to income ratios by Census division is presented as an average over the
years 1997–2011 in table 3.4.
Determinants of Migration. The March Supplement to the Current Population
Survey (CPS) contains several questions relevant for the study of migration. Here
I analyse answers to the 2013 edition of the CPS to the question “What was the
main reason for moving”. The results are displayed in table 3.5. It is striking to
note that even though we are conditioning on moves across Division boundaries
(and thus think of long-range moves), the percentage of people citing “housing” as
their main motivation is roughly 24% of the total population of movers. The table
also disagreggates the response to the question by the distance between origin and
destination state (not Division), and we can see that the proportion of respondents
does vary with distance moved, but not to an extent that would suggest that housing
8Just for comparison, the estimation sample in Kennan and Walker (2011) is drawn from the
geo-coded version of NLSY79 and contains 124 interstate moves.
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becomes irrelevant as a motivation with increasing distance. Summing up in the
bottom row of the table, we see that 55% say work was the main reason, 24% refer
to housing and the remaining 21% is split between family and other reasons.
In table 3.6 I present estimates from a statistical analysis of the determinants of
cross division moves from SIPP data. I regress a binary indicator for whether or not
a cross division move took place in a given year on a set of explanatory variables
which relate to the household in question in a probit regression. The table shows
marginal eﬀects computed at the sample mean of each variable, as well as the ratio
of marginal eﬀects to the baseline unconditional probability of moving (1.32%). The
results indicate that there is a pronounced age eﬀect, with each additional year of
age implying a reduction that is equal to 6% of the baseline probability. The same
eﬀect is found for whether or not children are present in the household. The eﬀect of
being a homeowner is very large and equivalent to a reduction in the propensity to
move of 51% of the baseline probability. Increasing household income by $100,000
is equivalent to a 5% baseline baseline increase. Finally, having a college degree has
an eﬀect of equal magnitude than being a homeowner, but in the opposite direction:
a college degree amounts to an increase of the baseline of 49%. According to this
model, the eﬀect of being a homeowner on the baseline moving probability is equal
to an age increase of 8.3 years, thus taking a 30-year old to age 38; also, a household
which owns the house would have to experience an increase in household income of
$1m in order to make up for the implied loss in the probability of moving across
divisions from being an owner. The house price to income ratio does not play a
significant role in this specification.
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Cross State Cross Division
Overall 1.95 % 1.32 %
Renter 2.60 % 1.85 %
Owner 0.93 % 0.70 %
Table 3.2: Annual moving rate in percent of the population. Households are catego-
rized into “Renter” or “Owner” based on their homeownership status at the beginning
of the period in which they move. SIPP data.
1 2 3 4 5
Renter 1202 98 12 2 1
Owner 936 73 5 0 0
Table 3.3: Distribution of the number of moves per mover by homeownership status.
Households are categorized into “Renter” or “Owner” based on their homeownership
status at the first move. SIPP data.
Division Abbreviation Ownership Rate py
South Atlantic StA 0.63 2.59
West North Central WNC 0.69 2.08
East North Central ENC 0.66 2.30
New England NwE 0.60 2.99
Middle Atlantic MdA 0.57 2.66
Pacific Pcf 0.51 3.74
West South Central WSC 0.60 1.95
East South Central ESC 0.65 1.85
Mountain Mnt 0.61 2.83
Table 3.4: Census Division housing characteristics. Shows average ownership rates
over 1997–2011 and median price to income ratios for the same period. The (unob-
served) house price for renters is computed assuming an implied user cost of owning
of 5%, i.e. prent = rent0.05 .
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Figure 3.1: SIPP sample proportion moving across Census Division boundaries by
age (upper panel) and proportion of owners by age (lower panel).
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Main Reason
Distance Moved (KM) Work Housing Family Other
<718 47.9 % 23.2 % 22.7 % 6.1 %
(718,1348] 55.3 % 25.7 % 16.7 % 2.3 %
(1348,2305] 51.6 % 24.1 % 22.5 % 1.8 %
(2305,8087] 65.5 % 22.7 % 11.1 % 0.7 %
Total 55 % 23.9 % 18.3 % 2.7 %
Table 3.5: CPS 2013 data on main motivation of moving, conditional on a cross
Division move. This selects a sample of 20-50 year-olds and aggregates the response
to the question “What was the main reason for moving” (variable NXTRES) as
follows. Work = {new job/transfer, look for job, closer to work, retired}, Housing
= {estab. own household, want to own, better house, better neighborhood, cheaper
housing, foreclosure, other housing}, family = {change marstat, other fam reason},
other = {attend/leave college, climate change, health, natural disaster, other}. The
distance of a move is computed as the distance between geographic center of the
state of origin (not Division) and the center of the destination state. The rows of
the table categorize the distance measure into its quartiles.
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Marginal Eﬀects ME/baseline
Intercept  0.0250⇤⇤⇤
(0.0020)
Age  0.0008⇤⇤⇤  0.06
(0.0001)
Age Squared 0.0000⇤⇤⇤ 0.0
(0.0000)
Children in HH  0.0008⇤⇤  0.06
(0.0003)
Homeowner  0.0067⇤⇤⇤  0.51
(0.0004)
Household income 0.0006⇤⇤ 0.05
(0.0003)
Total wealth 0.0000 0.0
(0.0001)
College 0.0063⇤⇤⇤ 0.48
(0.0004)
Price/Income 0.0000 0.0
(0.0000)
Deviance 28793.7099
Dispersion 1.0261
Num. obs. 294840
⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤p < 0.1
Table 3.6: Determinants of cross census division moves in SIPP data. Household
income and wealth are measured in 100,000 USD. This regresses a binary indicator
for whether a cross division move takes place at age t on a set of variables relevant
at that date. The first column shows marginal eﬀects, the second column shows the
marginal eﬀects relative to the unconditional baseline mobility rate of 0.0132. The
interpretation of this column is for example that the eﬀect of being a homeowner is
equivalent to reducing the baseline probability of migration by 51%.
3.3. MODEL 133
3.3 Model
In the model I view households as a single unit, and I’ll use the terms household and
individual interchangeably. Individuals are assumed to live in census Division (or
region) d 2 D for a total of T years of age. At each age t, individual i has to decide
whether to move to a diﬀerent region, whether to own or rent, and how much of his
labor income to save. Individuals derive utility from consumption c, from owning a
house h and an unobservable location preference shock.
Individuals are subject to uncertainty at both the aggregate and individual level.
At the aggregate level, regional house price p and average labor productivity levels q
fluctuate. This allows some scope for regional migration as an insurance mechanism.
The regional fluctuations are driven by a common set of low dimensional stochastic
factors denoted P and Q. This reflects the fact the regional shocks to both house
prices and average labor income are highly correlated. It also allows for fluctuations
in the underlying aggregate factors P and Q to have diﬀerential impacts across
regions, while maintaining a degree of computational tractability. Every individual
in region d faces an identical level of house price pdt and mean labor productivity
qdt at time t. In addition to that, qdt enters the individual wage equation as a level
shifter. At the individual level uncertainty enters the model through an idiosyncratic
component of income risk, a Markovian process that models changes in household
size over the lifecycle, and a location–specific preference shock, which is assumed
identically and independently distributed across agents, regions and time.
The job search process is modeled as in Kennan and Walker (2011). Individuals
do not know the exact wage they will earn in the new location. The new wage
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is composed of a deterministic, and thus predictable, part and a component that
is random. Over and above an expectation about some prevailing average level of
wages the mover can expect in any given region at time t, it is impossible to be
certain about the exact match quality of the new job ex ante. The new job can be
viewed as an experience good where quality is revealed only after an initial period.
This setup gives rise to income risk associated with moving.
3.3.1 Individual Labor Income
The logarithm of labor income of individual i at age t, residing in region d, is defined
as in equation (3.1).
ln yidt = ⌘d ln qdt + f(t) + zit
zit = ⇢zit 1 + eit 1
e ⇠ N(0,  2) (3.1)
Here qdt stands for the region specific price of human capital, f(t) is a determin-
istic age eﬀect and zit is an individual specific persistent idiosyncratic shock. The
coeﬃcient ⌘d allows for diﬀerential transmission of regional shocks into individual
income by region d. The log price of human capital qdt is allowed to diﬀer by region
to reflect diﬀerent industry compositions by region, which are taken as given.9
9Underlying this is an assumption about non–equalizing factor prices across regions. It is
plausible to think that within a single country, wages should tend to converge to a common level,
particularly in the presence of large migratory flows from one region to the next. In assuming
no relative factor price equalization across US regions I rely on a host of evidence showing that
relative wages vary considerably across regions over a long time horizon (see for example Bernard
et al. (2013)).
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When moving from region d to region d0 at date t, I assume that the timing is
such that current period income is earned in the origin location d. The individual’s
next period income is then composed of the corresponding mean income at that date
in the new region d0, qd0t+1, the deterministic age t + 1 eﬀect, f(t + 1), and a new
draw for zit+1 conditional on their current shock zit. For a mover, this individual–
specific idiosyncratic component is drawn from a diﬀerent conditional distribution
than for non-movers. Let us denote the diﬀerent conditional distributions of zit+1
given zit for stayers and movers by Gstay and Gmove, respectively. This setup allows
for some uncertainty related to the quality of the match with a job in the new region
d0, as mentioned above. The shape of Gmove determines the probability with which
a mover with current value z can expect to draw a new value z0 after moving to
d0. The data will be informative about whether there is mean reversion or high
persistence in Gmove for movers.
3.3.2 National factors P and Q
I assume the national state variables Q and P evolve according to a stationary
vector autoregression of order one (VAR(1)). At date t, all individuals observe the
price vector Ft containing both factors Pt and Qt. The VAR(1) process is defined in
equation (3.2), where A is a matrix of coeﬃcients and ⌃ is the variance-covariance
matrix of the bivariate normal innovation ⌫. Agents in the model have rational
136 CHAPTER 3. MIGRATION AND HOMEOWNERSHIP
expectations concerning this process.
Ft = AFt 1 + ⌫t 1
⌫t ⇠ N
0@240
0
35 ,⌃
1A (3.2)
Ft =
24Qt
Pt
35
3.3.3 Mapping aggregate factors to regional prices
I assume that there is a deterministic mapping from the aggregate state Ft into the
price and income level of any region d which is known by all agents in the model.
This means that once the aggregate state is known, agents know the price pdt and
income level qdt in each region with certainty. The mapping is defined in terms of
a linear function that depends on both aggregate states Q,P and where the slope
coeﬃcients are region dependent, as shown in expression (3.3). Similarly to the
aggregate case, ad is a matrix of coeﬃcients specific to region d.
24qdt
pdt
35 = adFt (3.3)
I provide some illustration regarding the fit this model provides to the data in
section 3.5.1, where I describe the estimation of this part of the model in greater
detail. Notice that the great virtue of this formulation is that the relevant price
3.3. MODEL 137
and income related state variables in each region are subsumed in Ft, given the
assumption that ad is known for all d.
3.3.4 Home Ownership Choice
Ownership choice is discrete, ht 2 {0, 1}, and there is no quantity choice of housing.
While renting, i.e. whenever ht = 0, individuals must pay rent which amounts
to a constant fraction d of the current region-d house price pd. Similar to the
setup in Attanasio et al. (2012), I denote total financial (i.e. non-housing) wealth
at age t as “assets” at. This includes liquid savings and mortgage debt. There is
a terminal condition for net wealth to be non-negative by the last period of life,
i.e. aT + pdThT 1   0, which translates into an implicit borrowing limit for owners.
Additional to that, in order to buy, a proportion  pdt of the house value needs to
be paid up front as a downpayment, while the remainder (1    )pdt is financed
by a standard fixed rate mortgage with exogenous interest rate rm. The mortgage
interest rate is assumed at a constant markup rˆ > 0 above the risk free interest rate
r, such that rm = r + rˆ. The markup captures default risk incurred by a mortgage
lender.
The equity constraint must be satisfied in each period, i.e. at+1    (1  
 )pdtht, 8t. This means that only owners are allowed to borrow, with their house
as a collateral. Selling the house incurs proportional transaction cost  , such that
given current house price pt, upon sale the owner receives (1   )pt.
This setup implies that owners will choose a savings path contingent on the
current price, their income and debt level, the mortgage interest rate, and their
current age t, such that they can satisfy the final period constraint. The setup
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is formally defined in subsections 3.3.8.1 and 3.3.8.2 which describe the budget
constraints.
3.3.5 Moving
Moving Costs. Moving across locations is assumed to be costly in terms of utility.
Denote (d, x) the utility costs of moving from d at a current value of the state vector
x (defined below). Moving costs diﬀer between renters and owners. Moving for an
owner requires to sell the house, which in turn requires some eﬀort and time costs.
This is in addition to any other psychological costs incurred from moving states
which are common between renters and owners. I specify the moving cost function
as linear in parameters ↵:
 (d, x) = ↵0,⌧ + ↵1tit + ↵2t
2
it + ↵3hit 1 + ↵4sit (3.4)
In expression (3.4), ↵0,⌧ is an intercept that varies by unobserved moving cost type
⌧ , ↵1 and ↵2 are age eﬀects, ↵3 measures the additional moving cost for owners, and
↵4 measures moving cost diﬀerential arising from family size sit.
The unobserved moving cost type ⌧ 2 {0, 1}, where ⌧ = 1 indexes the high type,
is a parsimonious way to account for the fact that in the data, some individuals
never move. This is of particular relevance when thinking about owners, who may
self–select into ownership because they know they are unlikely to ever move. In
the model this selection mechanism, together with any other factor that implies a
high unobservable location preference, is collapsed into a type of person that has
prohibitively high moving costs (↵0,⌧=1 is large) and thus is unlikely to move.
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Restrictions. I rule out the possibility of owning a home in region d while residing
in region d0. This would apply for example for households who keep their home in
d, rent it out on the rental market, and purchase housing services either in rental or
owner–occupied sector in the new region d0. In my sample I observe less than 1% of
movers for which this appears to be true, most likely as a result of high managment
fees or a binding liquidity constraint that forces them to sell the house to be able to
aﬀord the downpayment in the new region.10
3.3.6 Preferences
Period utility u depends on which region k the household chooses, and whether this
is diﬀerent from the current region d. A move takes place in the former case, and
the household stays in d in the latter case.
u (cit, hit, d
0, xit) =
c1  it
1    + ⇠(sit)⇥ hit   1 [d 6= d
0]  (d0, xit) + "ikt (3.5)
The period t payoﬀ consists of utility from consumption cit, from owning a house,
valued diﬀerently at diﬀerent household sizes sit, and the idiosyncratic preference
shock for the chosen region d0. Notice the moving cost   (d0, xit) is only incurred if
in fact a move takes place. Household size s at age t is a binary random variable,
s 2 {0, 1}, relating to whether or not children are present in the household. It
evolves from one period to the next in an age-dependent way as described in section
3.3.8.
10SIPP allows me to verify whether individuals possess any real estate other than their current
home at any point in time. Fewer than 1% of movers provide an aﬃrmative answer to this.
140 CHAPTER 3. MIGRATION AND HOMEOWNERSHIP
3.3.7 Timing
Timing within the period is assumed to proceed in two sub-periods: in the first
part, stochastic states are realized and observed by the agent, and labor income is
earned; in the second part the agent makes optimal decisions regarding consumption,
housing and location. The chronological order within a period is thus as follows:
1. observe Ft, zit and "it = ("i1t, "i2t, . . . , "iJt), iid location taste shock
2. earn labor income in current region d, as a function of qdt and zidt
3. given the state, compute optimal behaviour in all D regions, i.e.
(a) choose optimal consumption c⇤h conditional on housing choice h 2 {0, 1}
in all regions d
(b) choose optimal housing h⇤d(c⇤h)
(c) choose optimal location, based on the value of optimal housing in each
location
There is in fact no timing issue in point 3., as the optimization problem is si-
multaneous. However, the quasi-cronological order is helpful for emphasizing the
interdependence of one choice on another.
3.3.8 Recursive Formulation
It is now possible to formulate the problem recursively. The state vector of individual
i at date t is given by
xit = (ait, zit, sit,Ft, hit 1, d, ⌧, t)
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where the variables stand for, in order, assets, individual income shock, household
size, aggregate price vector, housing status, current region index, moving cost type
and age. Following Rust (1987), I assume additive separability between utility
and idiosyncratic location shock " as well as independence of the transition of "
conditional on x. Furthermore, I assume that " ⇠ EV Type 1.
The consumer faces a nested optimization problem in each period. At the lower
level, optimal savings and housing decision must be taken conditional on any discrete
location choice, and at the upper level the discrete location choice with the maximal
value is chosen. It is useful to define the conditional value function v (x, k), which
represents the optimal value after making housing and consumption choices at state
x, while moving to location d0, net of idiosyncratic location shock ".
Equation (3.6) is the top level problem of the consumer which requires to choose
one of D potential locations. Notice that the value from each discrete choice is
additively seperable in the conditional value v and the choice specific idiosyncratic
shock ". The conditional value function (3.7) represents the choices that have to be
made conditional on being in a given location d while moving to location d0. This
formulation conveniently nests all discrete location choice configurations (staying in
d and moving from d to d0, 8d0 6= d). The optimization problem is subject to several
constraints which are outlined below.
Equation (3.8) is a result of the distributional assumption on ", which admits a
closed form expression of the expected value function, whereby  ¯ ⇡ 0.577 is Euler’s
constant.
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Vt (xit) = max
k2D
{vt (xit, d0) + "ikt} (3.6)
vt (xit, d
0) = max
cit>0,hit2{0,1}
u(cit, hit, dit, d
0) +  Ez,s,F [vt+1 (xit+1) |zit, sit,Ft](3.7)
xit+1 = (ait+1, zit+1, sit+1,Ft+1, hit+1, d
0, t+ 1)
vt (xit) = E"Vt (xit)
=   + ln
 
DX
d0=1
exp (vt (xit, d
0))
!
(3.8)
Another convient by-product of the Type 1 EV assumption is that there is a closed
form expression for the conditional choice probability of making a move from d to
k when the state is x, denoted as M(x, d, d0).
M(x, d, d0) = Pr [move to d0|x, d]
=
exp (v(x, d0))PD
d0=1 exp (v(x, d
0))
=
exp (v(x, d0))
exp (v(x)) / exp( )
= exp (  + v(x, d0)  v(x)) (3.9)
The final period models a terminal value that depends on net wealth and a term
that captures future utility from the house after period T , as shown in equation
(3.10).
VT (a, hT 1, d) =
(a+ hT 1pdT )
1  
1    + !hT 1 (3.10)
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The maximization problem in equation (3.7) is subject to several constraints, which
vary by housing status and location choice. It is convenient to lay them out here
case by case.
3.3.8.1 Budget constraint for stayers, i.e. d = d0
Starting with the case for stayers, the relevant state variables in the budget con-
straint refer only to the current region d. In particular, given (pdt, qdt), renters may
choose to become owners, and owners may choose to remain owners or sell the house
and rent.
Renters. The period budget constraint for renters (i.e. individuals who enter the
period with hit 1 = 0) depends on their housing choice, as shown in equation (3.11).
In case they buy at date t, i.e. hit = 1, they need to pay the date t house price in
region d, pdt, otherwise they need to pay the current local rent, dpdt. Labor income
is defined in equation (3.12) and depends on the regional mean labor productivity
level qdt as introduced in section 3.3.1. Buyers can borrow against the value of
their house and are required to make a proportional downpayment amounting to
a fraction   of the value at purchase, while renters cannot borrow at all. This is
embedded in constraint (3.13), which states that if a renter chooses to buy, their
next period assets must be greater or equal to the fraction of the purchase price that
was financed via the mortgage, or non-negative otherwise. Constraint number (3.14)
defines the interest rate function, which simply states that there is a diﬀerent interest
applicable to savings as opposed to borrowing, both of which are taken as exogenous
parameters in the model. The terminal condition constraint is in expression (3.15).
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ait+1 = (1 + r(ait)) (ait + yidt   cit   (1  hit)dpdt   hitpdt) (3.11)
ln yidt = ⌘d ln(qdt) + f(t) + zit (3.12)
ait+1    (1   )pdthit (3.13)
r(ait) =
8>><>>:
r if ait   0
rm if ait < 0
, rm = r + q (3.14)
aiT + pThiT 1   0 (3.15)
Owners. For individuals entering the period as owners (hit 1 = 1), the budget
constraint is similar except for two diﬀerences which relate to the borrowing con-
straint and transfers in case they sell the house. Owners are not required to make
a scheduled mortgage payment – a gradual reduction of debt, i.e. an increase in a,
arises naturally from the terminal condition aiT +pdThiT 1 > 0, as mentioned above.
Therefore the budget of the owner is only aﬀected by the house price in case they
decide to sell the house, i.e. if hit = 0. In this case, they obtain the house price
net of the proportional selling cost  , plus they have to pay rent in region d. Apart
from this, the same interest rate function (3.14), labor income equation (3.12) and
terminal condition (3.15) apply.
ait+1 = (1 + r(ait)) (ait + yidt   cit + (1  hit)(1     d)pdt) (3.16)
ait+1    (1   )pdt (3.17)
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3.3.8.2 Budget constraint for movers, i.e. d 6= d0
Renters. For moving renters the budget constraint is close to identical, with the
exception that (3.11) needs to be slightly altered to reflect that labor income is
obtained in the current period in region d before the move to k is undertaken.
ait+1 = (1 + r(ait)) (ait + yidt   cit   (1  hit)d0pd0t   hitpd0t) (3.18)
Owners. The budget constraint for moving owners depends on the house price
in both current and destination regions d and k since the house in the current
region must be sold by assumption. The expression (1    )pdt in (3.19) relates to
proceeds from sale of the house in region d, whereas the square brackets describe
expenditures in region d0. Notice also that the borrowing constraint (3.20) now is
a function of the value of the new house in d0. It is important to note that this
formulation precludes moving with negative equity if labor income is not enough to
cover it. This is exacerbated in cases where the mover wants to buy immediately
in the new region, since in that case the downpayment needs to be made as well,
i.e. if yidt < ait + (1   )pdt   hitpd0t then the budget set is empty and moving and
buying is infeasible.11
11In my sample I observe 29 owners who move with negative equity (amounting to 3.4% of moving
owners). 78% of those do buy in the new location, the rest rent. I do not observe whether or not
an owner defaults on the mortgage. Accounting for this subset of the population would require to
1) assume that they actually defaulted and 2) it would substantially increase the computational
burden. For those reasons the model cannot account for this subset of the mover population at
the moment.
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ait+1 = (1 + r(ait)) (ait + yidt   cit + (1   )pdt   [(1  hit)d0 + hit] pd0t)(3.19)
ait+1    (1   )pd0thit (3.20)
3.4 Solving and Simulating the Model
The model described above is a typical application of a mixed discrete–continuous
choice problem. In the next section I will introduce a nested fixed point estimator,
which requires repeated evaluation of the model solution at each parameter guess,
thus placing a binding time-contraint on time each solution may take.
The consumption/savings problem to be solved at each state, and its combination
with multiple discrete choices and borrowing constraints, introduces several non-
diﬀerentiabilities in the asset dimension of the value function. This makes using
fast first order condition–based approaches to solve the consumption problem more
diﬃcult.12
I solve the model in a backward-recursive way, starting at maximal age 50 and
going back until initial age 20. In the final period the known final period value is
computed at all relevant states. From period T   1 onwards, the algorithm in each
period iterates over all state variables and computes a solution to the savings problem
at each combination of state and discrete choices variables (including housing and
12There has recently been a lot of progress on this front. Clausen and Strub (2013) provide
an envolope theorem for the current case, and the endogenous grid point method developed by
Carroll (2006), further extended to accomodate (multiple) discrete choice as in Fella (2014) are
promising avenues. I found my problem not easily amenable to their solution, and focused on a
robust solution (i.e. one not subject to potential local minima to the savings problem).
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location choices). After this solution is obtained at a certain state, the discrete
housing choice is computed, after which each conditional value function (3.7) is
known. The distributional assumption on " implies that the discrete location choice
does not have to be computed, instead the main object of interest is the probability
of moving function (3.9).
Once the solution is obtained, simulation of the model proceeds by using the
model implied decision rules and the observed aggreate prices series Ft as well as
their regional dependants (qdt, pdt) to obtain simulated lifecycle data. As I will ex-
plain in greater detail in the next section, this proceedure needs to replicate the
time and age structure found in the data, which is achieved by simulating diﬀerent
cohorts, starting life in 1967 and all successive years up until 2012. The model
moments are then computed using the empirical age distribution found in the esti-
mation sample as sampling weights.
3.5 Estimation
In this section I explain how the model is estimated to fit some features of the
data. There is a set of preset model parameters, the values of which I either take
from other papers in the literature or I estimate them outside of the structural
model and treat them as inputs. The remaining set of parameters are estimated
using the simulated method of moments (SMM) approach, whereby given a set of
parameters, the model is used to compute decision rules of agents, which in turn
are used to simulate artificial data. A set of summarizing features from the artificial
data should then be close to the same features of the the real data. I will first discuss
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estimation of the exogenous stochastic processes, and then turn to the estimation
of the model preference parameters.
3.5.1 Estimation of Exogenous Processes
VAR process for aggregates Qt and Pt
The VAR processes at the aggreate and regional level are estimated using a
seemingly unrelated regression with two equations, one for each factor Qt and
Pt, t = 1967, . . . , 2012. I use real GDP per capita as a measure for Qt, and the Fed-
eral Housing and Finance Association (FHFA) US house price index for Pt. Given
that I am interested in the level of house prices (i.e. a measure of house value), I
compute the average level of house prices found in SIPP data for the year 2012 and
then apply the FHFA index to construct the house value for each year.13
I reproduce equation (3.2) here for ease of reading:
Ft = AFt 1 + ⌫t 1
⌫t ⇠ N
0@240
0
35 ,⌃
1A
Ft =
24Qt
Pt
35
The estimates from this equation are given in table 3.7.
13The GDP series is as provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis through the FRED
database. All non-SIPP data used in this paper are provided in an R package at https:
//github.com/floswald/EconData, documenting all sources and data-cleaning proceedures.
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Qt Pt
Intercept 0.86 19.13⇤
(0.58) (7.31)
Qt 1 1.00⇤⇤⇤ 0.16
(0.02) (0.28)
Pt 1 0.00 0.89⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.06)
R2 0.99 0.94
Adj. R2 0.99 0.94
Num. obs. 94 94
⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05
Table 3.7: Estimates for Aggregate VAR process
Aggregate to regional price mappings
The series for qdt is constructed as per capita personal income by region, with a
measure of personal income obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and
population counts by state from intercensal estimates from the census Bureau. The
price series by region comes from the same FHFA dataset as used above.
24qdt
pdt
35 = adFt + ⌘dt
⌘dt ⇠ N
0@240
0
35 ,⌦d
1A (3.21)
The performance of this model in terms of delivered predictions from the aggre-
gate state can be gauged visually in figures 3.2 and 3.3. The model parameters are
shown in table B.2 in the appendix.
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Figure 3.2: This figure shows the observed and predicted time series for mean income
by Census Division. The prediction is obtained from the VAR model in (3.3), which
relates the aggreate series {Qt, Pt}2012t=1968 to mean labor productivity {qdt}2012t=1968 for
each region d. Agents use this prediction in the model, i.e. from observing an
aggregate value Ft = (Pt, Qt) they infer a value for qdt for each region above.
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Figure 3.3: This figure shows the observed and predicted time series for house prices
by Census Division. Please refer to the previous figure 3.2, which uses an identical
proceedure.
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Individual Income Process
This part deals with the empirical implementation of equation (3.12), which models
log labor income at the individual level. I estimate the linear regression
ln yidt =  0 + ⌘d ln qdt +  1ageit +  2age2it +  3age3it + uit
=  0 + ( d ⇥  q) ln qdt +  1ageit +  2age2it +  3age3it + uit (3.22)
where the region-specific influence of regional mean productivity qdt on individual
income is specified as an interaction between a regional fixed eﬀect  d and the average
eﬀect  q of regional income. The results of this are displayed in table B.3 in the
appendix. Figure B.2, also in the appendix, illustrates predicted age profiles from
this model.
Copula estimates for Gmove
The conditional distribution of z for movers is specified as the density of a bivariate
normal copula Gmove, which is invariant to date and region.14 This means I assume
that the conditional probability of drawing z0 in new region d0 is the same regardless
the origin location. It would be straightforward to relax this assumption, but data
limitations forced me to impose this restriction.
To estimate the parameters of the copula, I view zidt in equation (3.1) as the
residual from an ordinary least squares regression of log wages on time and region
14A copula is a multivariate probability distribution function which connects univariate margins
by taking into account the underlying dependence structure. For example, a finite state Markov
transition matrix is a nonparametric approximation to a bivariate copula, and they converge as
the number of states goes to infinity, see Bonhomme and Robin (2006).
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eﬀects, as well as person specific demographic variables. The question is whether
individuals with a particularly high residual zidt are likely to have a high residual
zid0t+1 after their move to region d0. In other words, we want to investigate the joint
distribution of (zidt, zid0t+1). I describe the full procedure in the appendix.15
Values for preset parameters
I take several parameters for the model from the literature, as shown in table 3.8.
The estimates for the components of the idiosyncratic income shock process for non-
movers, i.e. the autocorrelation ⇢ = 0.96 and standard deviation of the innovation
  = 0.118 are taken from French (2005). I set the financial transaction cost of
selling a house,  , to 6% in line with Li and Yao (2007) and conventionally charged
brokerage fees. The time discount factor   is set to 0.96 which lies within the range
of values commonly assumed in dynamic discrete choice models (e.g. Rust (1987)).
The downpayment fraction   is set to 20%, which is a standard value on fixed
rate mortgages and used throughout the literature. The coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion could be estimated, but is in this version of the model fixed to 1.43 as in
Attanasio and Weber (1995).
To calibrate the interest rate for savings and for mortage debt, I follow Sommer
and Sullivan (2013), who use the constant maturity Federal Funds rate, adjusted by
headline inflation as mesured by the year on year change in the CPI. They obtain
15The proceedure relies crucially on the assumption that individuals have to move to the new
region before they can discover zt+1. I am investigating ways to account for a potential selection
eﬀect on zt by moving estimation of this part into the structural model and jointly estimate
behavioural and wage related parameters. The model provides a set of exclusion restrictions that
would allow to do this in theory. Identification of a potential selection eﬀect may be diﬃcult,
however, because the sample of movers is small.
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Value Source
CRRA coeﬃcient   1.43 Attanasio and Weber (1995)
Discount Factor   0.96 Assumption
AR1 coeﬃcient of z ⇢ 0.96 French (2005)
SD of innovation to z   0.118 French (2005)
Transaction cost   0.06 Li and Yao (2007)
Downpayment proportion   0.2 Assumption
Risk free interest rate r 0.04 Sommer et al. (2013)
30-year mortgage rate rm 0.055 Sommer et al. (2013)
Table 3.8: Preset parameter values
an average value of 4% for the period of 1977–2008, and I thus set r = 0.04. For the
markup q of mortgage interest over the risk-free rate they use the average spread
between nominal interest on a thirty year constant maturity Treasury bond and the
average nominal interest rate on 30 year mortgages. This spread equals 1.5% over
1977–2008, therefore rˆ = 0.015, and rm = 0.055.
3.5.2 Estimation of Preference Parameters
The parameter vector to be estimated by SMM contains the parameters of the
moving cost function (↵), the parameter in the final period value function !, the
population proportion of high moving cost types (⇡⌧ ), and the utility derived from
housing for both household sizes, (⇠1, ⇠2). We’ll denote the parameter vector ✓ =
{↵0,↵1,↵2,↵3,↵4,!, ⇡⌧ , ⇠1, ⇠2}.
Given ✓, the model generates a set of model moments mˆ(✓), where mˆ() is of
dimension K. After obtaining the same set of moments m from the data, the SMM
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proceedure seeks to minimize the criterion function
L(✓) =
1
2
[m  mˆ(✓)]T W [m  mˆ(✓)] ,
which delivers point estimate ✓ˆ = argmin✓ L(✓). The weighting matrix W is formed
of the inverse of the diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix of data
moments ⌦, i.e. I set W =
⇣
diag
⇣
⌦ˆ
⌘⌘ 1
.
I obtain point estimates for ✓ by following a modification of the pseudo-likelihood
estimator as introduced in Chernozhukov and Hong (2003). The modification de-
fines N parallel instances of Chernozhukov and Hong (2003)–MCMC chains, which
are diﬀerently “tempered” (i.e. they have diﬀerent shock variances and rejection
criteria), and are able to communicate with each other. This helps to explore large
areas of the parameter space and avoids getting stuck in local minima. The procee-
dure is formally defined in Baragatti et al. (2013).16 The quasi-posterior mean and
confidence intervals are computed from the chain with lowest temperature analo-
gously to Chernozhukov and Hong (2003), after accounting for the fact that I do
not use the optimal weighting matrix.
Estimation Sample
My estimation sample is formed mainly out of averages over SIPP data moments
covering the period 1997–2012. All moments are constructed using SIPP cross-
sectional survey weights, and all dollar values have been inflated to base year 2012
16I’ve co-authored a software package that implements the proceedure at https://github.com/
floswald/MOpt.jl.
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using the BLS CPI for all urban consumers.17 Averaging over years was necessary to
preserve a reasonable sample size in all conditioning cells. However, it also introduces
an initial conditions and cohort eﬀects problem, since, for example, a 30-year-old
in 1997 faced a diﬀerent economic environment over their lifecycle than a similar
30-year-old in 2012 would have. The challenge is to construct an artificial dataset
from simulated data, which has the same time and age structure as the sample
taken from the data – in particular, agents in the model should have faced the same
sequence of aggregate shocks as their data counterparts from the estimation sample.
This requires to simulate individuals starting in diﬀerent calendar years, taking into
account the actual observed time series for regional house prices and incomes. I
describe the proceedure in detail in the appendix.
Additional to SIPP data, the moment vector contains three statistics from Ken-
nan and Walker (2011), which relate to the lifetime frequency of moves (“moved
never”, “moved once” and “moved more two times or more”). The reason for us-
ing external data is that I cannot compute such a statistic from SIPP, where the
maximum panel length is four years.
The moment vector m is shown in table 3.9. It contains conditional means
and covariances, which are largely self-explanatory. I introduce here two auxiliary
models inluded inm which relate to the age profiles of both migration and ownership.
Both models are linear probability models, where the dependent variable is either
ownership status at the beginning of the period, hit 1, or whether a move took place,
17http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CPIAUCSL
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denoted by moveit = 1 [dit 6= d0it]:
hit =  0,h +  1,htit +  2,ht
2
it + uh,it (3.23)
moveit =  0,m +  1,mtit +  2,mt2it + um,it (3.24)
Identification
Identification is achieved by comparing household behaviour under diﬀerent price
regimes. The variation comes from using the observed house price and labor pro-
ductivity series in estimation, which vary over time and by region. The identifying
assumption is that, conditional on all other model features, households must be sta-
tistically identical across those diﬀering price regimes. In particular, this requires
that household preferences be stable over time and do not vary by region.18
The structural parameters in ✓ are related to the moment vector m(✓) in a
highly non-linear fashion. In general, all moments in m(✓) respond to a change in ✓.
However it is possible to use graphical analysis to show how some moments relate
more strongly to certain parameters than others.
Regarding parameters of the moving cost function, parameters ↵0,⌧=0,↵3,↵4 rep-
resent the intercept for low moving cost types, the coeﬃcent on ownership and
the eﬀect of household size on moving costs, respectivley. They are related to, in
order, the average moving rate E[move], the moving rate conditional on owning
E[move|ht = 1], and the moving rate conditional on household size E[move|st = 1].
The age eﬀects ↵1,↵2 are related to the age–coeﬃcients of the auxiliary model for
18The model is not non-parametrically identified; Both variation in prices and further restrictions
such as functional form are needed, because price variation is at the regional (and not household-)
level.
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moving, defined in expression (3.24), as well as the the average proportion of movers
in the last period of life E[move|T ]. The relationship between mobility and own-
ership, as well as mobility and household size are also captured by the covariances
Cov(move, h) and Cov(move, s), both of which are again related to the moving cost
parameters ↵3 and ↵4.
The proportion of high moving cost types ⇡⌧ is related to the data moments
concering the number of moves per person, and in particular the fraction of individ-
uals who never moved, E[moved never]. The other two moments on the frequency
of moves, E[moved once] and E[moved twice+] help to identify all moving cost pa-
rameters.
Given that the house price processes in each region are exogenous to the model,
the parameters measuring utility from ownership, ⇠1, ⇠2 are related to a relatively
large number of moments: ownership rates by region and by household size, the
covariance of owning with household size, and the age–profile parameters from the
auxiliary model of ownership in (3.23).
3.5.3 Parameter Estimates and Moments (Preliminary)
The model fits the data moments fairly well overall. The fit is displayed in table
3.9. The upper panel shows moments related to mobility, the lower panel shows
moments related to homeownership. Regarding mobility, the fit is very good. The
only statistic slightly out of line is the frequency distribution of moves per mover.
There is no mechanism in the model that could generate the observed pattern in
the data. One possibility would be to augment the set of moving cost types with
a third type that has an even lower moving cost. The estimates for the auxiliary
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model defined in (3.24) representing the age profile in ownership also provide a good
fit to the data.
Moving on to moments related to ownership, we see that the unconditional mean
of ownership is identical to the data moment. Condition by region provides a more
varied picture, with some regions overestimated and others underestimated. The
reason for this is that there is heterogeneity in ownership rates by region which is
not easily accounted for by the fundamentals of regional house price and mean in-
come alone.19 Remember that by taking prices and incomes as given, the model is
restricted to only few levers that aﬀect the homeownership rate. The main param-
eters in this respect are the utility premia ⇠1, ⇠2 and the weight in the final period
utility !. The model at the moment overpredicts ownership in later periods of life.
This is visible from the intercept of the auxiliary model (3.23), which relates the
ownership rate to an age profile. The reason for this is that in a model where age and
wealth are the main dimensions of variation across households, as soon as a certain
wealth threshold is crossed, all agents become owners. In other words, the model
cannot account for wealthy houeholds who prefer not to own. One way to improve
in this dimension would be to introduce diﬀerent types of housing preferences.
Given that the CRRA coeﬃcient   is taken as fixed in the current implementation
of the model, the moments relating to wealth resulting from the model can be viewed
as some form of model validation. The model moments in table 3.10 are not included
19There is large degree of house price heterogeneity at the local level with is not in the model but
which contributes to the average ownership rate at the regional level. Local building regulations,
rent control or certain topographical features all influence the actual house price that the local
level; The price index used in the model incurs some unavoidable aggregation error in this respect,
and the same holds for my estimate of the average rent to price ratio.
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in the SMM objective function, that is, they are not targeted by the estimation
algorithm. Despite this, they are very close the data counterparts.
The estimated parameters and standard errors are shown in table 3.11.
3.6 Properties of the model
In this section I use model to illustrate several mechanisms which are implied by
the inclusion of homeownership status and assets into a dynamic migration model
à la Kennan and Walker (2011).
3.6.1 Probability of Migrating
In figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 I plot the conditional mean of the moving probability
function (3.9), conditioning on wealth, income (y), income shock (z), and by hous-
ing status (h). The plots show throughout a marked diﬀerence by housing status h,
which is fully expected given the data. The average probability of moving is decreas-
ing in the level of wealth of a houshold. Figure 3.4 illustrates that increasing wealth
makes households more likely to become owners, and at the same time decreases the
probability of moving.
3.6.2 The role of moving costs
Moving costs in the model are measured in terms of utility. I convert them to
dollar values by finding the amount of compensating assets a0 which would make
an individual at state x indiﬀerent between the value of moving with costs (v) (but
extra assets) and without (v˜). I consider moves from region d = 2 to k = 1. In other
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Moments related to mobility
Moment Data Model
E[move] 0.013 0.013
E[move|T ] 0.005 0.002
E[move|s = 0] 0.014 0.017
E[move|s = 1] 0.01 0.01
E[move|ht 1 = 0] 0.019 0.026
E[move|ht 1 = 1] 0.007 0.005
Cov(move, h)  0.003  0.005
Cov(move, s)  0.001  0.001
E[moved never] 0.83 0.88
E[moved once] 0.07 0.08
E[moved twice+] 0.09 0.04
Auxiliary model (3.24): moveit =  0,m +  1,mtit +  2,mt2it + uit
 0,m 0.06 0.05
 1,m  0.002  0.003
 2,m 0.00001 0.00006
Moments related to homeownership
E[ht 1] 0.61 0.63
E[ht 1|ENC] 0.66 0.7
E[ht 1|ESC] 0.65 0.64
E[ht 1|MdA] 0.57 0.64
E[ht 1|Mnt] 0.61 0.63
E[ht 1|NwE] 0.6 0.55
E[ht 1|Pcf] 0.51 0.5
E[ht 1|StA] 0.63 0.62
E[ht 1|WNC] 0.69 0.69
E[ht 1|WSC] 0.6 0.67
E[ht 1|s = 0] 0.53 0.58
E[ht 1|s = 1] 0.66 0.66
E[ht 1 = 1, ht = 0|T ] 0.01 0.02
Cov(ht 1, s) 0.03 0.02
Auxiliary model (3.23): hit 1 =  0,h +  1,htit +  2,ht2it + uit
 0,h  1.146 0.051
 1,h 0.08 0.023
 2,h  0.0008 0.0004
Table 3.9: Empirical targets and corresponding model moments.
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Non-targetted moments
Moment Data Model
E[wealth|t 2 [20, 30]] 51.19 43.949
E[wealth|t 2 (30, 40]] 130.989 102.34
E[wealth|t 2 (40, 50]] 209.317 214.823
E[wealth|ENC] 139.125 118.858
E[wealth|ESC] 109.666 104.056
E[wealth|MdA] 165.388 150.903
E[wealth|Mnt] 128.192 138.346
E[wealth|NwE] 203.125 166.753
E[wealth|Pcf] 183.162 182.781
E[wealth|StA] 142.203 139.88
E[wealth|WNC] 142.603 111.702
E[wealth|WSC] 100.025 96.389
E[wealth|ht 1 = 0] 33.172 30.817
E[wealth|ht 1 = 1] 219.356 195.733
Table 3.10: Non-targeted model and data moments. This set of moments does
not enter the SMM objective function and can thus be seen as a form of external
validation of the model.
Estimate Std. error
Utility Function
Owner premium size 1 ⇠1 0.012 0.00053
Owner premium size 2 ⇠2 0.052 0.00234
Moving Cost Function
Intercept ↵0 2.77 0.124
Age ↵1 0.017 0.00077
Age2 ↵2 0.001 9.16e 5
Owner ↵3 0.26 0.0116
Household Size ↵4 0.36 0.016
Proportion of high type ⇡⌧ 0.68 0.03
Final Period
Continuation Value !2 5.1 0.22
Table 3.11: Parameter estimates. Standard errors are still work in progress at this
point.
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Figure 3.4: Simulated probability of moving by wealth. The figure shows that as
wealth increases, individuals are both more likely to be owners (color shading), as
well as less likely to move.
164 CHAPTER 3. MIGRATION AND HOMEOWNERSHIP
�������
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
�
�����
����
���
����
����
����
����
����
����
��
��
��������������� ���������������
Figure 3.5: Average probability of moving by income quantiles.
words, moving costs are measured by a0 which solves
v(2, 1, x+ a0)  v˜(2, 1, x) = 0.
The measure is taken at a state x where the individual has zero asset and where
the aggreagate factors P and Y are at the midpoint of their respective grids.
Similarly to Kennan and Walker (2011), the moving costs are large. As they
explain, this is because “[the estimated moving costs] do not refer to the costs of
moves that are actually made, but rather to the costs of hypothetical moves to
arbitrary locations.”
The results are displayed in table 3.12. To calculate moving costs from my
nonlinear model, I use a money metric measure. The moving costs for renters at
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Figure 3.6: Probability of moving by income shock z
age 20 (t = 1) are $159,000 and $575,000 for owners. The estimates in period one
bracket the average cost of $312,000 reported in Kennan and Walker (2011).
There are several reasons for why owners move less than renters. First, they
have higher moving costs as implied by a positive estimate for parameter ↵3. Sec-
ond, owners pay a transaction cost each time they sell the house (proportional cost
 ), which aﬀects the value of migration. Third, owners have to comply with the
Renter Owner
159.486 574.97
Table 3.12: Comparing the moving cost in terms of 1000s of 2012 dollars for owners
and renters at a = 0, z = z1, Q = Q2, P = P2 in the first period of life (age 20).
Kennan and Walker (2011) report an average moving cost of $384,000 for a young
and $312,000 for an average mover.
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Baseline ↵3 = 0   = 0 ↵3 =   = 0
Ownership rate 0.602 0.613 0.626 0.64
%  Migration rate 0 4.202 4.303 10.354
%  Migration | Own 0 30.115 21.47 67.664
Table 3.13: Decomposing owner’s moving costs. Compares baseline statistics to sce-
narios with no additional moving cost for owners (↵3 = 0), no financial transaction
costs from selling the house (  = 0), and neither of the two (↵3 =   = 0).
downpayment constraint if they wish to buy in the new region, which puts restric-
tions on the consumption paths of movers. Finally, ownership is correlated with
larger household size (s = 1), which itself carries a higher moving cost (↵4).
In table 3.13 I decompose the reduced mobility of owners arising from higher util-
ity costs ↵3 and the fixed cost of selling  . Ownership increases as we successively
remove frictions along the first row of the table, as expected. Perhaps more surpris-
ingly, the second row shows that the average migration rate increases by roughly the
same amount if we remove the owner’s moving cost ↵3 or the fixed cost of selling  .
This does not mean that financial frictions are of equal importance for mobility than
non-financial ones. As shown in the final two rows of the table, this result is driven
by a change in composition, i.e. the aggregate migration rate is higher because we
have more owners, who also move more. The final row shows that the increase in
migration resulting from zero non-financial costs is greater than the increase from
no financial transaction costs.
3.6.3 The eﬀects on migration of a regional shock
In this section I illustrate how the model reacts to large economic shocks at the
regional level. The presentation focuses on changes in migratory in and outflows to
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and from a region, when the regional price or income level is reduced unexpectedly
at a certain point in time. The implementation of the shock is symmetric for both
the case of house price and mean income, and I will use the case of the regional
productivity shock to explain the details.
The regional shock consists of reducing the level of the observed mean income
series by 10% in the West North Central division only (West North Central (WNC)
has region index d = 8). The experiment is conducted under the assumption that
agents did not foresee the shock and therefore are surprised in the year 2000 to find
that the mapping form aggregate factors (Q,P ) into (q8, p8) as defined in equation
(3.3) does not apply anymore. In terms of their beliefs about aggregate and regional
prices, they observe ◆2000⇥q8,2000, ◆2000 = 0.9 instead of q8,2000 = a8F2000, as would be
predicted by the model in (3.3).20 The shock is permanent thereafter, i.e. ◆2000+ =
0.9, = 0, 1, . . . .21 Notice that none of the time series properties of the regional
price series other than the level are changed. In particular, the growth rate and
implied variance remain the same. The other regional series (house price in this
instance) is held constant in each experiment, as well as both series in all other
regions. Illustrations of the shocked price and income series are shown in figures 3.7
and 3.8, respectively.
Shock to average labor productivity. Reducing mean labor productivity q in
a given region translates directly into lower disposable income and therefore less
20The surprise assumption is necessary to observe a causal eﬀect of the price change, since
otherwise the response of agents would be partially anticipating the shock. They immeditately
adjust to the new mapping and behave optimally to the new sequence of prices in WNC, i.e.
{pˆ8,t}2012t=2000.
21A separate experiment with a shock that reverts back over 3 years to trend delivered similar
results, just limited to a shorter timeframe.
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utility. The eﬀect of an unexpected reduction in the observed mean income level for
WNC by 10% on migration outflows are shown in figure 3.9. The solid lines trace
out the migration flows in the baseline scenario, while the dashed lines correspond
to the shock scenario. In the right panel, showing renter emigration, we see clearly
that the income reduction leads to a sustained increase in emigrants. The left panel
shows owner outflows, and we also see a slight increase in emigration owners. In
terms of the above discussion about moving costs and preference shocks, both results
come from the fact that smaller payoﬀ shocks are suﬃcient to trigger a move in the
shock scenario than was the case in the baseline.
Looking at the opposite flow of migration, figure 3.10 shows the corresponding
pictures for immigration from the rest of the economy into WNC. Starting with
owners moving to WNC in the left panel, lower mean income makes the region is
less attractive as a destination relative to other regions, thus we see a slight decrease
in arrivals. The eﬀect is much more pronounced for renters in the right hand panel.
It is interesting to note the shape of the solid line tracing out the baseline inflows: As
prices in the rest of the economy start to increase towards the peak in 2008, WNC,
with it’s relatively low level of house prices becomes more attractive to renters. The
increase in renter immigration towards 2005 is large, however, it needs to be looked
at together with the corresponding ouflows at the time. Over the period 1998–2012,
WNC experiences average annual population growth of 1.08% in the baseline model.
Shock to house prices. The pictures in figures 3.11 and 3.12 show the changes
to outflows and inflows as a result of a 30% reduction in the level of house prices in
WNC in the year 2000. Starting with outflows in figure 3.11, the left panel shows
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that fewer owners are leaving the region than before. Owners experience a loss in
net wealth, but this results in only small changes to migration behaviour. From the
perspective of owners, the losses are sunk costs, and to the extent that lower current
wealth makes it harder to aﬀord a downpayment in other regions, the benefits of
moving are reduced. For renters, we also see a clear reduction in ouflows. Given that
rent in the region has fallen to lower levels than before, fewer renters decide to leave.
It is interesting at this point to remember the result in Notowidigdo (2011), where
low skilled individuals are less likely to move away from a depressed region because
they want to take advantage of cheap housing. The same mechanism operates here.
Turning finally to the eﬀects of a reduction in house prices on inflows to WNC,
we see in both panels that lower prices attract slightly more owners, and significantly
more renters, particularly as aggregate prices rise and therefore the cost of living
in other regions increases disproportionately for renters. Both owners and renters
move to the region to enjoy cheaper housing.
3.6.4 The value of Migration
In this section I investigate the value of the migration option. The experiment
assumes that the situation of West North Central changes in the sense that immi-
gration is allowed, but emigrating is prohibited. First we will discuss changes in
migration flows, and the ex-ante welfare eﬀects for residents of WNC under both
scenarios. Finally, we will analyze the experience of individuals who would have
moved in the baseline environment, but are now prevented from doing so.
Migration flows and are displayed in table 3.14. The top panel shows changes
in immigration flows to the region for both scenarios, and the respective percentage
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change. Comparing the first two columns as percentage changes in column three, we
see that inflows into the region fall dramatically in a world where moving away from
WNC is not an option. This shows that agents outside of the region perceive WNC
as a much inferior option to the baseline. In the lower panel of the table I show
baseline emmigration flows for comparison. The bottom row of the table gives an
estimate of average lifetime utility across both regimes, and we see that removing
the option to leave the region carries a very large penalty. Across both regimes,
average expected lifetime utility falls by 5.1%, which implies that individuals would
demand a 4.4% increase in per period consumption in a world without the moving
option before they would be indiﬀerent to the baseline.
Figure 3.13 shows the average levels of utility conditional on age inside of WNC
and in all other regions. We can see in the right panel, that reducing the value
of WNC for potential immigrants aﬀects utility only marginally. This comes from
the fact that movers can easily avoid the region by moving somewhere else. For
individuals inside the region, however, the changes are substantial and they vary
by age. We can see that it is particularly younger individuals who suﬀer from the
removed option to move. This makes intuitive sense, since the forgone expected
gains from moving are larger if we consider a longer time horizon.
To summarize this subsection, restricting the ability to move implies large losses
in welfare. This eﬀect stems from the inability of residents to respond to changes
in their economic environment over time, as well as their inability to accomodate
location preference shocks.
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Baseline No Moving % 
Immigration per period
(percent of local population)
Total 2.72% 1.76%  35.3%
Owners 0.52% 0.37%  28.9%
Renters 2.2% 1.4%  36.4%
Emigration per period
(percent of local population)
Total 1.34% 0  
Owners 0.35% 0  
Renters 0.99% 0  
E[Lifetime U] 1.293 1.227  5.1%
Welfare (c) 4.4%
Table 3.14: Removing the migration option from residents of West North Central.
The top panel shows immigration flows to West North Central as a percentage of
the resident population. The same holds for the second panel shows outflows in
the baseline. The final two rows show the average expected lifetime utility across
scenarios, and the required consumption compensation in order to make agents
indiﬀerent.
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3.7 Abolishing the Mortgage Interest Deduction
In this section I investigate the impact of abolishing the mortgage interest deduction
on migration and ownership rates. In the United States, homeowners are allowed to
deduct the interest paid on the mortgage for their primary residence from taxable
income. This reduces the user cost of owning because it exempts one of the largest
component of an owner’s housing cost – mortgage interest – from taxation. This is
diﬀerent for renters, whose housing expenditures are not tax deductible.22
The mortgage interest deduction has been widely critized on grounds of equity
and distortionary eﬀects in the housing market, see for example Glaeser (2011)
for an overview.23 The common wisdom is that it distorts the housing market by
subsidizing owners, thereby leading to a higher rate of ownership as would arise
without the subsidy. As discussed at length above, owners are less mobile than
renters, so the question investigated in this subsection is whether abolishing the
mortgage interest deduction would increase mobility, and if so, by how much. The
answer to this question provides some guidance on whether housing policy could
serve as an eﬀective means to enhance the eﬃciency of the labor market by fostering
greater mobility, or not.
At this point it is important to emphasize that depending on the elasticity of
housing supply in a given market, we expect to see a general equilibrium eﬀect of
22The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that tax expenditure to finance the mortgage
interest deduction, which is the largest housing policy policy program in the states, was $71.7
billion in 2014 Joint Committee of Taxation (2013).
23It is often held that if there were an oﬀsetting taxation of imputed rent which owner-occupiers
pay to themselves in place, the negative aspects of the subsidy could be greatly reduced. Imple-
menting such taxes is politically diﬃcult in most circumstances, probably highlighted by the small
number of nations which have adopted some form of this tax. For the case of Switzerland, see
Bourassa and Hoesli (2010).
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house prices in response to the policy change. The subsidy implied by the interest
deduction can be viewed much like a characteristic of the house, like for instance
distance to schools, or access to transportation networks. As such, it is capitalized
into house price. Therefore, removing the subsidy would change long-run equilibrium
prices, in the same way as moving a certain property to a location with a diﬀerent set
of available amenities would change its value. In order to partially accomodate this
eﬀect, I will refer to the recent paper by Sommer and Sullivan (2013), in which the
authors compute the stationary general equilibrium in a model with infinitely lived,
heterogeneous agents who are either renters, owner-occupiers or owner-landlords.
They compute equilibrium prices and rents arising from diﬀerent assumption about
the tax system. They find that house prices decrease on the order of 5% when the
mortgage interest deduction is abolished, with rents keeping roughly constant and
the homeownership rate increasing from 65% to 71%.24
The experiment is implemented as follows. The model being in after tax terms,
it does not feature a formal tax system which could be changed in an experiment.
The role of taxes and, in general, the user cost of housing is subsumed in the implicit
mortgage repayment path brought about by the final period restriction on assets,
as explained in section 3.3.4. In reality the interest rate deduction reduces taxable
income, thereby increasing disposable income of owners. Therefore, to simulate
24The mechanism is as follows: removing the subsidy lowers the equilibrium house price, since
this is no longer capitalized into the value of the house; lower house prices makes housing aﬀordable
to more low wealth people who couldn’t buy before, thereby increasing the ownership rate. Their
model does not feature multiple labor or housing markets, and resting on the stationary equilibrium
concept it does not allow for variation in house prices over time as is the case here; nevertheless,
using their result to adjust the level of house prices by 5% in all locations when removing the
mortgage deduction seems like a worthwhile exercise to at least approximate a potential general
equilibrium eﬀect in my model.
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the removal of the deduction, I reduce disposable income of owners by an amount
equivalent to their average implied tax savings. To do this I use data from Poterba
and Sinai (2008), which provides estimates of the average tax savings from the
interest deduction for several income and age brackets. Table 3.15 shows my version
of their table.
age y < 40K y 2 [40K, 75K] y 2 [75K, 125K] y 2 [125K, 250K] y > 250K
< 34 250 720 2220 4400 8650
35-50 260 880 1810 4400 7130
Table 3.15: Average annual tax savings in dollars implied by the mortgage interest
rate deduction for owners at various age and income groups. Data from Poterba
and Sinai (2008) adjusted to 2012 dollars.
To provide some guidance, it is useful to start with a simple calculation to gauge
the likely eﬀect of the policy change on migration rates under the assumption that
the conditional choice probabilities (i.e. whether to move or not) in the model do
not change. This is equivalent to saying that there is a pure composition eﬀect,
but no eﬀect on behaviour. To simplify the example, let’s assume that the baseline
ownership rate is ⇡o = 0.63, and that the annual migration rates for owners and
renters are given by mo = 0.7% and mr = 2% respectively. This would give rise to a
baseline unconditional migration rate of ⇡omo+(1 ⇡o)mr = 1.81%. Assuming that
the conditional choice probabilities which give rise to mo and mr do not change due
to the policy change, and assume, for example, that removing the subsidy increases
the ownership rate by 1% such that ⇡0o = 0.64. In that case we would expect to
see a new migration rate of ⇡0omo + (1  ⇡0o)mr = 1.68%, implying a decrease in the
migration rate of 0.013 percentage points (or a 35% reduction of the rate).
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The choice probabilities do change after the policy is implemented. In fact, it is
easy to show that the only case under which the relative moving probabilities would
remain constant is the one where the relative lifetime utilities in each region would
change by exactly the same amount. This is not very likely to happen. Remember
that the value in any location is determined by the utility derived from owning
(enters utility directly), by the level of house prices, and by the level of consumption.
Given a vector of house prices and incomes in the baseline environment, we can
determine the relative diﬀerences in utilities and the corresponding probabilities of
moving. Removing the mortgage deduction aﬀects the price vector. Furthermore, by
redistributing tax receipts we increase disposable income of a set of the population
that was not able to buy before – not in their current region, and possibly not in
another region. The overall eﬀect on the migration rate will therefore be composed of
a composition eﬀect (shifting individuals from renter to owner status or vice versa),
and an eﬀect that arises from changes in behaviour, influenced by diﬀerent price
levels, diﬀerent price to rent ratios, and redistribution of tax receipts from previous
owners to the entire population.
The results are listed in table 3.16, and the columns under the subheading Re-
move Deduction show the results of the experiment with and without the GE cor-
rection. Both cases redistribute the taxes saved by removing the deduction on a
per capita, per period basis. In other words, for total tax revenue X, and N indi-
viduals observed for T periods, each individual receives X/(TN) additional dollars
per period. This scheme approximates a reduction in income taxes financed by the
removal of the mortgage deduction.
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In the column without the GE correction, we see that ownership decreases by
roughly 0.8%. This is a result of some marginal buyers being unable to satisfy the
downpayment without the deduction. The migration rate increase only marginally
despite this, because the change in composition towards more renters is oﬀset to
some degree by harder access to ownership in all regions without the benefits of the
deduction. This reduces the incentives to move for some households who would have
bought in diﬀerent regions before. In terms of welfare eﬀects, agents are close to
indiﬀerent between this policy and the baseline.25
The final column shows the results with the GE correction, which lowers house
prices by 5% in all regions, while keeping rents at a constant level. Keeping rents
constant is achieved by changing the price to rent ratios d in proportion to the
reduction in prices. We find that ownership increases by about 1.3% as a result of
lower house prices. The reverse mechanism to the previous paragraph is at work,
implying that more people can buy, in this case despite the removal of the subsidy to
owners. The change in composition towards more owners combined with access to
housing in more regions produces a net eﬀect on migration that is slightly positive at
0.115% of the baseline rate. The welfare implications for this experiment are larger
than in the previous case and amount to 2.4% of per period consumption over the
lifecycle.
In concluding this section, it is instructive to note the importance of the general
equilibrium eﬀect in this case. Under the assumption of constant prices, the eﬀect
of removing the deduction is that ownership is reduced and that migration slightly
25As a metric of welfare I compute the implicit consumption tax   which would make agents
indiﬀerent in terms of expected lifetime utility between the baseline and policy regimes, as detailed
in appendix B.1.
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increases. Removing the deduction means fewer low wealth housholds can buy
housing, which reduces welfare, and this oﬀsets any gains made form slightly more
migration. Taking the price change and the implications for the price to rent ratio
into account, however, shows that ownership would increase. This would aﬀect the
migration rate only marginally, but have a significant impact on welfare.
3.8 Conclusion
The main result of this paper is to show that despite average migration rates being
low, the option value associated with the possibility to leave a location in a world
with regional shocks to house prices and labor income is large. Removing the option
to leave a certain region in the model implies an associated reduction in expected
lifetime utility of 5.1%, or 4.4% of per period consumption. To arrive at this result,
I construct a lifecycle model which includes homeownership as a choice variable
next to savings and location choices, which I then fit to SIPP data and use to
make counterfactual experiments. Considering homeownership is motivated by the
fact that well over 60% of the US population are owners, and the observation that
owners exhibit vastly diﬀerent migratory behaviour than renters. The model places
particular emphasis on a close representation of the observed house price and income
series, both of which exhibit strong correlation of regional shocks.
In a policy experiment where I remove the mortgage interest deduction for own-
ers, I find that accounting for a likely general equilibrium eﬀect is crucial for the
resulting eﬀects. Assuming that house prices would not change as a result of remov-
ing the deduction implies that migration rates would increase slightly, mainly due
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to a shift in composition towards more renters. Correcting prices with an external
estimate of the likely GE eﬀect (a 5% reduction as reported in Sommer and Sullivan
(2013)) results in a diﬀerent conclusion: lower prices after the removal of the deduc-
tion allow more people to buy, resulting in an increase of ownership. The net eﬀect
on migration is only marginally positive, however, since part of the shift in composi-
tion towards more owners is oﬀset by changes in migration behaviour brought about
by lower prices in all regions and redistribution of income to the poor. The welfare
implications depend greatly on whether or not prices are adjusted, with average
welfare gains 1% in the former, and of the order of 2.4% of period consumption in
the latter case.
In its current state, the model is silent with regards to location amenities. Dis-
sentangling the eﬀects of price changes on the consumer’s budget constraint from its
eﬀects on local amenities, and therefore utility, is clearly important to understand
migration decisions better. I view the current implementation as a first step in this
direction, and more work is necessary to incorporate amenities.
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Baseline Remove Deduction
w/o GE w GE
Ownership Rate 0.631 0.625 0.639
Migration Rate 0.01282 0.01285 0.01284
%  Ownership 0  0.882% 1.36%
%  Migration 0 0.247% 0.115%
Welfare 0 1% 2.4%
Table 3.16: Abolishing the mortgage interest deduction. Depending on whether or
not a GE correction to house prices is applied (house prices are 5% reduced), the
migration rate increases slightly. Cheaper housing everywhere and higher disposable
income from redistribution enables more previously liquidity constraint households
to buy – in their home region, but crucially also in other regions. This leads to a
very small increase in the migration rate.
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Figure 3.7: Shocking the house price series for West North Central from 2000 on-
wards. The shock multiplies the data series with the factor ◆ = 0.7, i.e reduces the
level by 30%. The dashed line in the right panel is the path of house prices after
the shock.
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Figure 3.8: Shocking the level of average labor productivity in region West North
Central by 10% in 2000.
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Figure 3.9: The eﬀect of a permanent 10% reduction in productivity q in 2000 in
the WNC region only. The experiment holds the regional price series in WNC and
price and incomes in all other regions fixed at their observed values.
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Figure 3.10: Changes in inflow patterns to WNC after the mean productivity level
is permanently reduced by 10% in 2000.
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Figure 3.11: The eﬀect of a 30% decrease of the house price level in 2000 in the
West North Central Division on migratory outflows from the region.
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Figure 3.12: The eﬀect of a 30% decrease of the house price level in 2000 in the
West North Central Division on migratory inflows to the region.
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Figure 3.13: Removing the option to leave WNC. This plot shows average utility
levels conditional on age, for the population residing in WNC, and the population
residing elsewhere.
Appendix A
Appendix to Bankruptcy and Default
State Deficiency Home.Exemption medinc hex.fraction sd.delta.p group
NC No 18500.00 45607.13 0.41 3.18 1
WA No 40000.00 59951.18 0.67 7.38 1
AK No 54000.00 63456.71 0.85 7.70 2
CA No 50000.00 58509.89 0.85 10.26 2
MT No 100000.00 43752.43 2.29 5.70 2
ND No 80000.00 51275.34 1.56 6.25 2
AZ No 150000.00 49907.10 3.01 8.96 3
MN No 200000.00 59445.86 3.36 5.16 3
AL Yes 5000.00 43445.55 0.12 3.06 4
GA Yes 10000.00 49418.75 0.20 3.79 4
IL Yes 7500.00 54433.88 0.14 4.91 4
IN Yes 7500.00 48301.03 0.16 3.62 4
KY Yes 5000.00 42728.06 0.12 3.03 4
MD Yes 0.00 68697.79 0.00 6.56 4
OH Yes 5000.00 49214.44 0.10 3.66 4
TN Yes 5000.00 43074.65 0.12 3.16 4
VA Yes 5000.00 62967.78 0.08 5.37 4
WY Yes 10000.00 53708.11 0.19 6.90 4
AR Yes 17425.00 41227.34 0.42 3.73 5
CO Yes 45000.00 61377.39 0.73 5.58 5
DE Yes 50000.00 56565.67 0.88 5.76 5
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HI Yes 17425.00 64089.82 0.27 10.51 5
LA Yes 25000.00 42654.21 0.59 5.51 5
ME Yes 35000.00 50249.51 0.70 6.27 5
MI Yes 17425.00 51084.04 0.34 5.79 5
MO Yes 15000.00 48774.10 0.31 3.74 5
NE Yes 12500.00 53861.02 0.23 3.29 5
NJ Yes 17425.00 68284.69 0.26 7.62 5
NM Yes 30000.00 45115.96 0.66 5.35 5
OR Yes 25000.00 52448.20 0.48 7.25 5
PA Yes 17425.00 51987.45 0.34 4.24 5
SC Yes 17425.00 44104.29 0.40 3.12 5
SD Yes 30000.00 49528.12 0.61 3.62 5
UT Yes 20000.00 60398.63 0.33 6.44 5
WI Yes 40000.00 53704.30 0.74 4.35 5
WV Yes 25000.00 42656.15 0.59 4.35 5
CT Yes 75000.00 67675.40 1.11 8.04 6
ID Yes 104471.00 50053.53 2.09 5.83 6
MA Yes 100000.00 63015.52 1.59 8.03 6
MS Yes 75000.00 38908.97 1.93 3.24 6
NH Yes 100000.00 68438.14 1.46 8.01 6
NV Yes 550000.00 54782.10 10.04 10.06 6
NY Yes 50000.00 52655.17 0.95 6.79 6
RI Yes 200000.00 55399.59 3.61 8.63 6
VT Yes 75000.00 55026.47 1.36 5.56 6
FL Yes 1 47917.01 7.97 7
IA No 1 52378.80 3.85 7
KS Yes 1 48913.09 3.33 7
OK Yes 1 46108.99 5.60 7
TX Yes 1 48876.19 4.83 7
Table A.1: Grouping of US states by legal environment
concerning bankruptcy and mortgage default. Columns
2 and 3 are taken from Mitman (2011).
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Appendix to Migration and
Homerownership
B.1 Welfare Measure
Denoting the expected lifetime utility from the baseline and policy regimes under
consumption tax   by U and Uˆ( ) respectively, the equalizing consumption tax  ⇤
solves
U   Uˆ( ⇤) = 0
U =
1
TN
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
 t 1u(cit)
Uˆ( ) =
1
TN
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
 t 1u( cit)
where N is the number of simulated individuals and u(c) stands, with some abuse
of notation, for the stream of utility from equation (3.5) as implied by optimal
behaviour. Accordingly, a value  ⇤ > 1 implies that agents would be indiﬀerent
between any proposed policy change if consumption were scaled up in every period,
i.e. they would demand a subsidy. In the opposite case of  ⇤ < 1 they would be
happy to give up a fixed proportion  ⇤of period consumption if they were given the
opportunity to participate in the policy.
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B.2 Initial Conditions and Cohort Setup
The SIPP estimation sample runs from 1998 through 2012. The data moments the
model is supposed to replicate are weighted averages over this period, where the
weights are the SIPP sampling weights. When reconstructing an artificial sample
from the model simulation, care must be taken to replicate the shocks experienced
by each cohort in the data leading up to the point where they are observed.
The data is subset to the ages allowed for in the model, i.e. 20–50. I compute
data moments, for example the average homeownership rate in region d, or the
average total wealth of age group 40–45 in d, as averages over the entire sample
period:
mean_own_datad =
1
15
2012X
t=1998
 
1
Ndt
NdtX
i2d,t
!it1 [hit = 1]
!
mean_wealth_data_40_45d =
1
15
2012X
t=1998
0@ 1
Ndt,j2[40,45]
Ndt,j2[40,45]X
i2d,t,j2[40,45]
!itwijt
1A
where Ndt is the number of people in d at date t, and !it is a person’s crossectional
weight, and i 2 d, t stands for i is in d at date t. Similarly, i 2 d, t, j 2 [40, 45]
stands for i is in d at date t and age j in [40,45].
This means that for the second data moment, for example, 40 year-olds from
1998 contributed as well as 40 year-olds from the 2012 cohort. Needless to say,
those cohorts faced a diﬀerent sequence of house price shocks leading up the point
of observation. For individuals “born” before the first data period, i.e. 1998, I
construct regional house price and regional income series going back until 1968.
Simulating individuals from the 1968 cohort for a full lifetime of J=30 years until
the reach age 50 brings them into the year 1998, where they form the group of 50
year-olds in that particular year. This sort of staggered simulation is carried out
until the final cohort is born in 2012 at age 20. No simulation needs to take place
for any individual alive at years after 2012.
B.3 Estimation of Gmove
In a first step I estimate the marginal distributions of zidt and zikt+1 for all movers.
These are the cross-sectional distributions of residuals uit and uit+1 from the regres-
sion in expression (B.1), which is estimated for all movers. The move takes place in
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period t, such that by assumption, uit is the residual wage in origin location d, and
uit+1 is the residual wage in the new location k.
ln yidt =  0+ 1collegeit+ p(ageit)+ 2numkidsit+ 3sexit+ 4metroit+ d+uit (B.1)
Here p(age) is a third order polynomial in age, metro is an indicator for metropolitan
status and  d is a Division fixed eﬀect. Then I convert the residuals into their
respective rank in the empirical distributions of before and after move residuals.
Denoting the standardized values by (uˆit, uˆit+1), the next step involves fitting the a
normal copula via maximum likelihood to this data. The results are shown in table
B.1, and they indicate a correlation between uˆit and uˆit+1 of 0.59. This estimate
together with the marginal distibutions of uit and uit+1 are used in the structural
model, where I use the current value of z, evaluated in the marginal distribution of
uit for a mover together with the copula estimate Gˆmove to draw the next value of
z0.
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B.4 Map
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Figure B.1: Census Division Map, taken from https://www.census.gov/geo/
maps-data/maps/pdfs/reference/us_regdiv.pdf. The Divisions are from left
to right Pacific, Moutain, West North Central, West South Central, East North
Central, East South Central, New England, Middle Atlantic and South Atlantic.
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⇢ S.E.
Gmove(zt, zt+1) 0.59762 0.01795
Table B.1: Normal Copula estimates for the rank of wage residuals uit and uit+1 for
individuals who move in period t.
Figure B.2: Age profiles as predicted by the empirical implementation of individual
labor income, equation (3.22), for three diﬀerent levels of regional mean productivity
q. Notice that in the model as well as in the data it is never the case that all regions
have the same level of average income.
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East North Central East South Central Middle Atlantic Mountain
qdt pdt qdt pdt qdt pdt qdt pdt
a0d 12.30⇤⇤⇤ 61.10⇤⇤⇤ 3.74⇤⇤⇤ 88.19⇤⇤⇤ 8.42⇤⇤⇤ 34.84⇤⇤ 8.38⇤⇤⇤ 5.89
(0.72) (10.51) (0.60) (7.15) (0.64) (12.00) (0.67) (10.85)
Qt 0.62⇤⇤⇤  0.84 0.70⇤⇤⇤  1.53⇤⇤⇤ 1.00⇤⇤⇤ 2.87⇤⇤⇤ 0.56⇤⇤⇤  1.23⇤
(0.03) (0.49) (0.03) (0.34) (0.03) (0.56) (0.03) (0.51)
Pt 0.01 0.70⇤⇤⇤ 0.01 0.61⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤ 0.75⇤⇤⇤ 0.03⇤⇤⇤ 1.20⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.10)
R2 0.97 0.74 0.98 0.73 0.99 0.92 0.98 0.89
Adj. R2 0.97 0.72 0.98 0.72 0.99 0.91 0.97 0.89
Num. obs. 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05
New England Pacific South Atlantic West N Central West S Central
qdt pdt qdt pdt qdt pdt qdt pdt qdt pdt
a0d 3.77⇤⇤⇤ 114.58⇤⇤⇤ 13.32⇤⇤⇤ 214.09⇤⇤⇤ 6.54⇤⇤⇤ 39.23⇤⇤⇤ 7.75⇤⇤⇤ 62.46⇤⇤⇤ 5.46⇤⇤⇤ 106.64⇤⇤⇤
(0.64) (20.60) (0.56) (17.11) (0.64) (5.32) (0.71) (7.80) (0.93) (12.75)
Qt 1.18⇤⇤⇤ 4.54⇤⇤⇤ 0.55⇤⇤⇤ 3.08⇤⇤⇤ 0.75⇤⇤⇤ 1.47⇤⇤⇤ 0.72⇤⇤⇤ 1.69⇤⇤⇤ 0.63⇤⇤⇤  3.73⇤⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.97) (0.03) (0.81) (0.03) (0.25) (0.03) (0.37) (0.04) (0.60)
Pt  0.01⇤ 1.05⇤⇤⇤ 0.03⇤⇤⇤ 1.91⇤⇤⇤ 0.01 1.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.01 0.78⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤ 0.85⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.20) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.12)
R2 0.99 0.89 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.81 0.96 0.53
Adj. R2 0.99 0.89 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.80 0.96 0.51
Num. obs. 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05
Table B.2: Aggregate to Regional price mappings. This table shows the estimated
coeﬃcients from equation (3.3), which relates the aggregate factors (Qt, Pt) to re-
gional income and house price (qdt, pdt).
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log yit
Intercept  0.684⇤⇤⇤
(0.135)
age 0.211⇤⇤⇤
(0.006)
age2  0.004⇤⇤⇤
(0.000)
age3 0.000⇤⇤⇤
(0.000)
East North Central 0.273⇤⇤⇤
(0.029)
East South Central 0.214⇤⇤⇤
(0.030)
Middle Atlantic 0.273⇤⇤⇤
(0.028)
Mountain 0.276⇤⇤⇤
(0.029)
New England 0.294⇤⇤⇤
(0.027)
Pacific 0.287⇤⇤⇤
(0.028)
South Atlantic 0.265⇤⇤⇤
(0.029)
West North Central 0.280⇤⇤⇤
(0.029)
West South Central 0.248⇤⇤⇤
(0.030)
R2 0.043
Adj. R2 0.043
Num. obs. 288952
RMSE 0.904
⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05
Table B.3: Regional Mean Income to Individual level income mapping. This is
the empirical implementation of equation (3.1), as explained in section 3.5.1. The
estimated equation is log yidt =  0 + ⌘d log ydt +  1ageit +  2age2it +  3age3it + uit and
the coeﬃcients ⌘ are denoted with the Division names.
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